JOHN MACQUARRIE'S THEOLOGY OF REVELATION:
AN EXISTENTIAL-ONTOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

A dissertation by
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presented to
The Faculty of the
Graduate Theological Union
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements of the degree of
Doctor of Theology

Berkeley, California
June, 1971

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CHAPTER I

THE WORLD THAT WE KNOW

> If philosophy declines to observe and interpret the new and characteristic scene, it may achieve scholarships; it may erect a well equipped gymnasium wherein to engage in dialectical exercises; it may clothe itself in fine literary art. But it will not afford illumination or direction to our confused civilization. These can proceed only from the spirit that is interested in realities and that faces them frankly and sympathetically. John Dewey.

Heeding Dewey's advice, we will proceed to characterize the world that we know. It must be admitted from the very start that our characterization of the contemporary milieu or modernity is a biased one, i.e., one seen from a particular perspective that takes seriously into account notions like temporality, relativity, and process. Furthermore, this perspective is theological in outlook; its ultimate aim is the utilization of this perspective in the doing of theology.

We have to admit that our goal is a limited one. We only intend to characterize modernity, spot-lighting the major emphases without wishing to go further than that. It is not our intention to claim exhaustive knowledge of or competence in fully spelling out all the interesting and complex implications of our contemporary Weltanschauung. But we do intend to point out how the doing of theology is affected by the perspective that takes into account notions like movement, fluidity, and change.

To the experts, the following pages will suggest a lack of expertise. We do not deny this charge. We can only say that it needs

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more than a couple of pages to spell out modernity exhaustively and it is not the intention nor is it within the scope of this dissertation to deal with modernity per se. Thus our intention is to point out the major emphases of the picture and leave it to the experts to explicate the whole picture more fully.

We begin by examining the role of natural theology before and after the nineteenth century. We will then briefly mention two major factors which contribute to the change of atmosphere, viz., the contemporary view on history and nature. Then we will consider how the word "God" functions in our current milieu. A passing remark will be made concerning how the modern Weltanschauung has affected Heidegger and the contribution he had made to it. A more exhaustive treatment of Heidegger's contribution will be made in the next chapter.

Since the advent of the Darwinian theory of evolution, science has played a crucial role in any theological enterprise. Any theologian worthy of his salt has to reckon with science if his scholarship wished to be seriously considered by others. The range of this maxim is wide; it covers the whole spectrum of the theological field, i.e., from Biblical to historical and philosophical theology.

Temporality, relativity, and process spell the death of the traditional emphasis on transcendence, transcendence understood in the traditional metaphysical sense as standing above and beyond the world.[1]

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[1] John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, ed. John T. McNeill, trans. F. L. Battles (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960), pp. 68-69.

The focus now is this-worldly, a this-worldly emphasis that seriously considers the role played by temporality, relativity, and process.[2] To light up this point, we will consider what has been known as natural theology, and how natural theology functions today.

Natural theology, as the name suggests, is simply a consideration of theological topics based on data and methods available to anyone, at least to those in the Western world. As executed by scholars prior to the modern era the data, methods, and conclusions were independent in kind. Natural theology was almost a "discipline" by itself, without any explicit dependence on historical revelation with respect to either data or conclusion. It was also a strictly Western affair, i.e., no thought was given to perspectives other than the one available in the Western world. Its approach was empirical or rationalistic; its sources came from the natural world of time, space, substance, cause, etc.; from the world of nature, e.g., natural evil, growth, decay, etc.; and from the world of man standing apart from his relation to Jesus, e.g., mind, goodness, evil, disease, etc.[3]

When it came to the doctrine of God, natural theology started with an observation concerning a phenomenon observable in this world, and through analogy concluded with an inference that was considered

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[2] C. Hartshorne, The Logic of Perfection, (Illinois: Open Court Publishing Company, 1962), pp. 64, 69, 142, 293-295.

[3] E. Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption, trans. O. Wyon, (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1952), pp. 80, 81, 142-144.

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applicable to the transcendent world. Thus natural theology was an interpretation of God, man, and the world based on human knowledge unassisted by revelation. The reliability of the human knowledge of God and the transcendent world was contingent on the accuracy of man's knowledge of this world and the applicability of his analogies. The church did not consider this saving knowledge which comes through special revelation.[4]

Special revelation (revelatio especialis) was understood as God's self-disclosure made known through the supernatural revelation in the person of Jesus Christ. Furthermore, this self-disclosure of God was said to be self-authenticating. Man, by himself, did not discover this; he can only appropriate it (to know the benefits of Christ's work) via faith.[5] Special revelation was a supernatural event, only to be understood and appropriated through faith. It was God's self-disclosure in the person of Jesus Christ, a phenomenon incapable of being comprehended by ordinary means. In a word, it is supernatural. Thus there are natural and supernatural phenomena.

It is against this background that contemporary theology operates. To begin with, there is a strong objection to the dichotomy between the natural and the supernatural. Any attempt to bifurcate

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[4] E. Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of God, trans. O. Wyon (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1950), pp. 132-134, 301.

[5] Ibid., p. 89.

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nature is regarded as an irresponsible act.[6] If we cease to bifurcate nature, then the belief in the supernatural and the natural world as explained above collapses. Once belief in a supernatural world ceases to be believed in, then all theology must be regarded as "natural "theology," where "natural" is meant to embrace the world of nature and the world of history. In their own ways, process thinkers, linguistic analysts, and a few existentialists who are involved in the doing of theology regard revelation as a "natural" happening.[7]

To these people, revelation can never be regarded as God's self-authenticating self-disclosure. In fact, it is extremely difficult to define the meaning of "self-authenticating." After all a revelatory encounter or confrontation could be an illusion, i.e., revelation could turn out to be a bitter experience for some people.[8] All that can be done is to describe the experience of revelation and to show how that experience is part of the constitution of human existence. We can go

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[6] "The theory of 'prehensions' embodies a protest against the 'bifurcation' of nature. It embodies even more than that; its protest is against the bifurcation of actualities." A.N. Whitehead, *Process and Reality*. (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1960), p. 443.

[7] E.g., (a) Nels F. S. Ferre, "God Without Theism," *Theology Today*, Vol. xxii, no. 3, Oct., 1965, pp. 372-379.
(b) Paul Van Buren, *The Secular Meaning of the Gospel*, (New York: Macmillan, 1963), *et passim*.
(c) John Macquarrie, *Principles of Christian Theology*, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1966), *et passim*.

[8] For an account of a non-religious experience of revelation, see J. P. Sartre, *The Philosophy of Existentialism*, ed. W. Baskin (New York: Philosophical Library, 1965), pp. 111-146.

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further by comparing it with other related types of experience.

Therefore revelation is a this-worldly phenomenon, subject to observation and correction like any other phenomenon, and it is not different from other phenomena substantively or ontologically. We can only say that its revelatory power differs *in degree* from that of other phenomena. Like other phenomena it operates within the natural-historical context and is not exempt from the scrutiny of the laws of nature. This does not minimize the importance and place of revelation. In fact, it spotlights the significance of revelation by placing it in the right context, i.e., it illustrates revelation as a designation of faith in a particular person or event which serves as a key to the understanding of reality. Historical relativity plays an important role in the appropriation of this self-disclosure in faith and the revelatory event itself. Therefore the biblical materials that record the revelatory event and the appropriation of the same are not exempt from historical relativity though some scholars, e.g., Joseph J. Smith, claim that the biblical materials are in some sense exempt from historical relativity.[9] We do not agree.

We prefer to subject the biblical materials to historical relativity, and as such recourse to scripture to buttress the "special" authority of scripture is precluded simply because of the recognition of its relative character. This point is seen in the historical-critical investigation of scripture that is carried out exhaustively in terms of the natural, i.e., one studies scripture to understand a nation's experience of the heights and depths of actuality without resorting to any supernatural claims. Once the supernatural character of scripture is denied, there is no basis for any claim to scriptural authority unless it is founded on an inclusive understanding of the world. Thus scriptural authority resides in the preservation of a nation's experience of the sublimity of reality, a preservation and an experience delimited by the temporal-spatio dimension of that era, and as such subject to historical relativity.[10]

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[9] Joseph J. Smith, "Primal Revelation and the Natural Knowledge of God: Brunner and Catholic Theology," *Theological Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 3, Sept., 1966, pp. 339-357.

So far we have used revelation and its ancillary implications like scripture and natural theology to demonstrate how an understanding of anything is bound to its natural-historical dimension. We now spell out the meaning of nature and history, and in the light of this say what we mean by God's activity in our natural-historical world. Let us begin with history.

History and the natural sciences are two dominant notions in our world. Just as we accept the authority of science in the comprehension and utilization of natural phenomena, so we also interpret social and cultural phenomena in the light of their past development. To relate intelligibly to modern man, the Christian faith must take into account the current scientific cosmology and the problems raised by

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[10] John Macquarrie, "Christianity and Other Faiths," Union Seminary Quarterly Review, Vol. XX, no. 1, Nov., 1964, p. 42.

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historical thinking. It is with the latter task that we wish to ponder.

Two major motifs immediately spring to mind when we consider history, viz., *individuality* and *development*. Before elaborating the notions of individuality and development, we define history to mean the whole life experience of humanity. Thus history has to do with those processes of development that are particularly human.[11]

By individuality we do not mean a single individual, but we do mean units of various kinds caught up in the historical process, units that are unique, individual, unrepeatable, and *yet ongoing*.[12] In

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[11] Cf. "In its widest possible extension the title of this book--Adventure [sic] of Ideas--might be taken as a synonym for The History of The Human Race, in respect to its wide variety of mental experiences. In this sense of the title, the Human Race must experience its own history. It cannot be written in its total variety.

Throughout this book I propose to consider critically the *sort* of history which ideas can have in the life of humanity, and to illustrate my thesis by an appeal to some well-known examples . . . Also for our purpose in the book the notion of History includes the present and the future together with the past, affording a mutual elucidation and wrapped in common interest." Alfred N. Whitehead, *Adventures of Ideas* (New York: The New American Library, 1964), p. 11.

[12] Temporal actualities or actual occasions embody Whitehead's view of what is "concrete." There is a plurality of concrete, finite things. They are not substances, but functional activities. Every actuality is "something" by reason of its activity; yet its activity involves a structure making it a real individual. The final facts "are drops of experience, complex and interdependent." Primarily, a concrete actuality is process as, "an act of experience arising out of data." Both real individuality and connectedness are implicated since as a concrescing act of experience it is a novel unification of other things as they relate to the internal experience of *this* thing. From the other side, when this act becomes a complex, completely definite being ("satisfaction") it potentially acquires another character of action, that of acting as an element in later concrescent experiences. Hence temporal actualities can also be viewed from their function in

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considering individuality, we have to deal with the various factors that have shaped and influenced it.[13] Thus its meaning and value are relative to the overall backdrop, to the factors that have influenced it, and to the experiences that constitute it.[14] This means deviating from the Aristotelian metaphysics which conceives an individual as complete in itself, having no essential relations to anything else.[15]

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the self-creation of another actuality ("objectification"); but, "subjective experiencing is the primary metaphysical situation," since it is the basis for actual occasions' "being" as a potential for later "becomings." Thus there is real, novel individuality as well as the internal connectedness of one thing somehow being in another, making possible efficient causation and direct perception. This is the actual occasion in its internal constitution as concrescent activity. Process and Reality, pp. 28, 65, 243. Cf. Adventures of Ideas, p. 179 where Whitehead beautifully and succinctly summarizes his idea of individuality.

Thus our idea of individuality stresses two major emphases, viz., (a) the uniqueness of an entity and (b) how an entity has been influenced by the past and how it can influence the future. So when we say that entity A is unique, we mean that entity A is entity A and not something else. In the same breath, we wish to affirm that entity A is entity A precisely because of the influence of the past and the potential contribution entity A can make to the future.

[13] John H. Randall, Jr., Nature and Historical Experience (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), pp. 94-95.

[14] Ibid., pp. 114-116.

[15] "For according to this [Aristotelian] doctrine no individual primary substance can enter into the complex of objects observed in any occasion of experience. According to the metaphysical system that I suggest to you, this Aristotelian doctrine is a complete mistake. The individual, real facts of the past lie at the base of our immediate experience in the present. They are the reality from which the occasion springs, the reality from which it derives its source of emotion, from which it directs its passion." Adventures of Ideas, p. 279.

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The notion of development complements the notion of individuality by affirming that the individual totalities or wholes are in the process of becoming. They show themselves in process, fluidity, change, and movement. This is such a conditio sine qua non that without it we do not have historical understanding. To understand history is to comprehend the character of this process of development which is understood as the unveiling of the possibilities inherent in a given historical totality or whole. It shows certain ideas which possess important potentiality for future use and which do affect the formations of meaning and value. This gives a dynamic character to history and regards history as possibility instead of as a static fact. The developmental character of history does not ignore the importance of cultural or biological factors or even accidental factors, e.g., race, environment, physique, and intelligence of a man. Admittedly these factors do affect the process of becoming, at times most crucially, but they only indicate a similarity between historical development and the growth of an organism.[16]

Basic to the idea of historical development is the notion of continuous connection or extensive continuum.[17] History is a becoming of continuity with each novelty arising out of the possibilities given

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[16] W. M. Dixon, The Human Situation (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., n.d.), pp. 340-343.

[17] Process and Reality, p. 53. Here again we see the interrelatedness of the past to the present and the present to the future.

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to it by the past. Continuity concerns what is potential.[18] Potentiality is basically future-oriented, but the past does provide conditions for new developments. In fact, the present is inevitably and intrinsically related to and affected by the past. Thus an understanding of the past helps us to comprehend the developments of the present individual. Nonetheless this fact does not preclude the introduction of novel elements into the historical process of becoming, elements not totally predictable from the vantage point of the past out of which they emerge. While a historical development is shaped and affected by the past, it is not totally determined by it.[19]

History includes novelty, emergent evolution, or new being, to change the figure of speech. These notions of novelty, freedom, and emergent evolution are related to the fact that the past provides us with not one but several possibilities for future development. The question as to which of these viable possibilities shall dominate in the ongoing process of history is in a crucial manner determined by the decisions and actions of the present.[20] A "history" of the present is problematic because its decisions and actions have not yet been decided; they are in the process of becoming decided. In this sense we cannot yet estimate the full significance of the present for historical development. At the same time, the emerging creations and formations in the historical process of becoming are crucially related to the past out of which they have come. They are emerging individualities made possible by the past, continuous with it, and contingent upon it for their form and content.

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[18] _Ibid._, pp. 95-97.

[19] _Process and Reality_, p. 72.

[20] _Ibid._, p. 68.

The notion of the becoming of continuity in history is not confined to a given historical totality. It also refers to the nexus of totalities, i.e., it also refers to connections and interactions between the various historical totalities. This means we have to cease to think in terms of isolated historical developments. There is always an important reaction between the various social and cultural formations in history. Indeed, it is the interaction of the various social and cultural formations that leads to a richer understanding of history. The introduction of Oriental culture, history, religions, etc., gives the Western world a stimulus to the development and growth of Western civilization and vice versa.[21]

This view of history seriously considers the continuous movement, fluidity, and interconnection of history; it includes decay and development. History then cannot be stopped and made into an absolute. It is always in the process of developing, unfolding, and moving. It is always caught up in the making of new formations and in the adapting to changing circumstances. This means that any value we find in history is and has to be relative, as opposed to dogmatic finality. By relativity we mean the transition from actuality to actuality is not a one-track process because an actuality, upon obtaining satisfaction, shall be a datum for subsequent actualities. Thus any value we find in history is caught up in an intricate maze of relationships, in which it, directly or indirectly, inherits from all its antecedents and makes its contribution to all its successors.[22] Thus history is subject to probabilities and uncertainties. Orthodoxy finds this hard to swallow. We have used revelation as an example of how Orthodoxy views history. We continue.

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[21] Thomas W. Ogletree, Christian Faith and History (New York: Abingdon Press, 1965), p. 25.

According to Orthodoxy, on the one hand, there is Heilsgeschichte (salvation-history), an history of supernatural events (the revelation of God in Jesus Christ being the principal one) whose truth and power are guaranteed by God. On the other hand, there is the secular history showing the human sphere of sin, confusion, and error. Salvation-history is "historical" in the sense that it occurs in human history, but in no sense can it be viewed as deriving from the secular history.[23] Thus historians are not competent to deal with salvation-history because the events in Heilsgeschichte (revelation being the chief one) can only be comprehended as acts of God and can only be known through faith.[24] We cannot subscribe to this.

For reasons indicated above, we have to treat history as relative. Nothing in history should be regarded as absolute and final, not when we subscribe to a history that is always caught up in the process of becoming.

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[22] Alfred N. Whitehead, Religion in the Making (Cleveland: The World Publishing Company, 1960), p. 109, says: "the whole world conspires to produce a new creation."

[23] Ogletree, pp. 32-33.

[24] E.g. Emil Brunner, Revelation and Reason, trans. O. Wyon (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1956), p. 168.

We now turn to the contemporary concept of nature. Mention has been made concerning the objection to the bifurcation of nature. How did this arise? To begin with, we have to see how nature is now popularly regarded. "Nature" is understood as a process and attention is given to its form rather than to its substance, i.e., instead of regarding nature in terms of the stuff of which it is made, the contemporary view of nature emphasizes the "happenings in nature, the way it acts, and the relations which stand between constituent parts or events."[25] In a very real sense, to characterize the current view of nature amounts to an expectation of the falling of the sky because there is no one single view of nature. The most we can do is to spotlight a current view that is compatible with our view of nature. To accomplish this, we will try to characterize the contemporary view of nature as it develops from the Greek and Reformation ideas of nature.

The Greeks viewed nature as an intelligent organism and based their view on the analogy between the world of nature and man, who began

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[25] Donald J. Butler, Four Philosophies: And Their Practice in Education and Religion, (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1957), pp. 84-85. Here again the emphasis is on becomingness, relativity, interrelatedness, temporality, etc. Any emphasis on or attempt to speak in terms of absolute finality is regarded as an unwarranted aberration precisely because the contemporary world has ceased to speak in such categories.

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by discovering certain traits in himself as a person, and proceeded to regard nature as possessing similar or analogous characteristics. By examining himself he came to view his body as a whole with the various parts in constant rhythmic motion, working smoothly as to propagate the ongoing development of the whole. He also found himself to be a mind directing the activities of the body to fulfill his desires. Nature is like man on a gigantic scale.[26]

The Reformation view of nature ("Reformation" is used to signify the era of Copernicus, Tolesio, etc., and has nothing to do with the Reformation associated with Luther, Calvin, etc.) as a machine is also analogical in its origin. Much emphasis was put on the Christian idea of God as the creative and omnipotent God-Creator and on human experience in creating and manipulating machines. It was the era of the Industrial Revolution which imparted, for the first time, a knowledge of making and manipulating the wheelbarrow, pulley, pump, etc. Thus people understood the nature and function of machines and had the experience of creating and utilizing them. It was then easy and natural for people to make an analogy between a watch-maker and a watch with God and nature.[27]

The modern view of nature, too, is based on an analogy, the analogy between the processes of the natural world known to science and the human problems known by history. To describe the modern view of

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[26] R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of Nature (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1945), pp. 3-4.

[27] John H. Randall, Jr., The Making of the Modern Mind (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1926), pp. 253-279.

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nature in a couple of pages is an impossible task; we can only delineate its major emphases. The modern view was made possible by historical studies that emphasize change, development, and process.[28] The advent of the Darwinian theory of evolution can be considered as a starting point.

Evolution is a natural process in which man and all other organisms are involved in its uninterrupted continuity or in the process of the becoming of continuity. Natural selection bodies forth in novelty, adaptive improvement, and makes possible general organization, i.e., emergence results in the formation of dominant groups. As groups make progress, they increase their mental capacity. The acme of this mental progress is man.[29] Evolution is a natural process of irreversible change resulting in novelty, variety, and a more developed organization, organization understood as a structural and functional pattern in which differentiated parts are integrated into some unitary system of operation. All reality can be viewed in one aspect as evolution. Biological evolution is one phase of this total process; there are also the inorganic and human phases. These phases succeed each other in time, the later being based on and emerging from the earlier. For convenience, we can label the inorganic as prebiological and the human as post-biological. Each phase has its own modus operandi, proceeds according to its own speed, possesses its own possibilities and limitations.[30] We will not involve ourselves with Darwin's thesis, but we do desire to see the implications or consequences of the modern Weltanschauung that is based on the process of becoming.

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[28] *Supra*, pp. 10-12.

[29] Charles R. Darwin, *The Origin of Species*, (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1897), I, 100-102.

The notion of relation immediately crops up. Evolution involves frequent interadjustment of organisms with their surroundings which affects our view concerning our relations with the universe and its resources. We now have a new sense of universal interrelatedness. We see how a simple action can lead to great or disastrous results, e.g., deforestation executed without planning can lead to disastrous erosion and consequent loss of fertile land, while carefully planted weeds can save a plot of land for future use. The balance in nature must be kept in equilibrium:

> A universal patterned assemblage of different vegetational, animal and microbial types, inter-adjusted to give optimum utilisation of the resources of a particular habitat. If the dynamic pattern of relations is interfered with, the entire habitat and the ecological community living in and on it may be damaged.[31]

Our notion of time has been affected too. Nowadays no one in his right mind would ever dream of agreeing with Archbishop Ussher's teaching that the universe was created in the year 4004 before Christ.[32]

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[30] Origin, II, 280-282.

[31] Julian Huxley, Essays of a Humanist (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), p. 128.

[32] C. R. Elrington (ed.), The Whole Works of James Ussher (Dublin: Hodges, Smith, & Co., 1864), I, 267.

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We now think of the universe as having existed for billions of light years, thus giving us a new perspective of time. This new perspective of time enjoins us to consider seriously the heritage from the past and beckons us to the results that will ensue from our present actions.[33]

Thus the notions of relation and time are intrinsically involved in evolution. We are reminded that everything on earth is caught up in the total universal process of becoming. Everything in the world of nature is always in a state of continuous change.[34]

This change is progressive, not cyclical. We understand "progressive" in terms of leading to something new with no moral evaluation of betterment. The idea of change as cyclical is out of date because it does not stand up to facts. By cyclical change we mean a change of state A to state B, completing its full revolution by returning to state A. This does not stand up to facts because, for example, the change from childhood to adolescence and to old age admits of no such return. Therefore we are forced to admit that history never repeats itself, i.e., A emerging into B is characterized by a constant emergence of novelty and, in that sense, A is unrepeatable.

The theory of evolution suggests that we no longer regard nature as a mechanical entity. A machine has nothing in common with process; something in process of becoming may build itself machines, but it itself is not a machine. Nature, caught up in the process of

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[33] Infra, pp. 34-37.

[34] R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of Nature (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1945), p. 13.

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becoming, may have machines but is itself not a machine. A machine is a finished product; if it is not completed, it is not a machine. For example, a watch in the making is not a watch because it cannot tell time. It can only tell time when it is completely finished. Nature does not operate in that manner, e.g., a puppy develops into a dog, but while it is developing it is already functioning. We cannot expect that of a watch. Therefore nature should not be regarded as a machine.

The idea of development suggests teleology. This follows from the rejection of regarding nature as a machine because if nature is a machine then everything functions like a cog in a watch. It functions but it does not develop. It does not consider the role played by nature in realizing something not yet existing. Teleology does consider the *nisus*, the constant procreative role of nature. Therefore the *esse* (to be or being) of anything in nature is its *fieri* (to become or becomingness), i.e., nature tries to sustain itself in its own becoming. It continues the process of becoming in which it is already involved.[35]

Finally our idea of substance has to be changed. If we believe that nature is process, then it is dynamic and cannot be static. Words descriptive of substance have to be replaced by words descriptive of function.[36] A mechanistic view of nature already presupposes a vocabulary of functional terms, but the terms are always accompanied by another vocabulary of substantial terms. In a machine, substance is one thing, function quite another. In fact, in a machine function presupposes substance. For example, to have a working compass, we must have a piece of steel with certain hardness. The shape, weight, and size of the steel are determined by the function we want the steel to play. Thus to have a functioning machine we must choose substances of right properties to serve their respective functions. Therefore function presupposes substance. Substance and function are thus distinct in a machine or in nature that is mechanistically conceived.

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[35] Collingwood, p. 15.

[36] *Ibid*., p. 16.

In human affairs there is no such distinction. The substance is resolvable into function, e.g., the "substance" of feudalism is such that it functions as a means in keeping various classes together. So its substance is really a complicated maze of function, kinds of ways in which people of various classes comport themselves.[37]

Carrying this principle over to our view on nature, we regard the substance of nature as serving a function. It is working, dynamic, and it consists of processes. Nature is organism and is also process.[38]

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[37] Ibid., p. 17.

[38] "The process is itself the actuality. It took a long while . . . for philosophers to get beyond the idea of static matter . . . . Certain substances, like water or fire, could be seen to be changing rapidly; others, like rock, looked immutable. We know now that a piece of granite is a raging mass of activity, that it is changing at a terrific rate . . . . The element of time affects it too. Our human bodies change from day to day; certain external appearances of them are the same, but change is constant and sometimes visible. . . change is constant, whether we measure it by minutes or millennia; we ourselves are a part of it . . . ." Dialogues of A. N. Whitehead, as recorded by Lucien Price (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1954), pp. 213-214.

The modern view of history and nature can be summarized in these words:

> For history it meant that the present condition of the human race is simply and strictly the result of a causal series (or set of causal series)--a continuous succession of changes, where each state arises causally out of the preceding; and that the business of historians is to trace this genetic process, to explain each change, and ultimately to grasp the complete development of the life of humanity.[39]

The success of the evolutionary theory has affected our idea of history and nature; it also has helped to discredit the supposition or at least the invocation of transcendent causes. Thus there is a reluctance to invoke the rather naive conception of a God in history to account for the historical movements. The present emphasis is this-worldly. Naturally our idea of God is affected, and in the following pages we will try to see how the word "God" can be meaningful in the light of the contemporary view on nature and history.

The issue involved in our idea of God is that of deciding whether or not God is "functional" in the ongoing processes which in their totality make up the being of the universe. By "functional" we mean something that works, something that makes a difference to our living, something that has an effect, something that deals with causal efficacy. We will not deal with the various emphases on causality. Rather, we will point out that a phenomenon will not be what it is without having been shaped by the past and without contributing something to the future. Thus the process from A to B and from B to C means, among other things, that the becoming of B has been influenced by A and its present decision does affect the emergence of C. Two things emerge from this type of thinking. (i) Everything in the universe is actively being caught up in the process of becoming and (ii) everything is moving to its teleological end. God is included in this process of becoming.[40]

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[39] Haeckel, Thomson, Weismann, and Others, Evolution in Modern Thought, (New York: Boni and Liveright, Inc., n.d.), p. 248.

For the concept of God to be meaningful, God must be functional in a causally efficacious way in the events of the universe and he must somehow provide the teleological consummation. Else he would be irrelevant to the universe and to us. If an entity does not function in relation to the universe in a causally efficacious way, then it is irrelevant to us who are caught up in a network of natural and historical relationships. God is not exempt from this principle.[41]

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[40] "Rather, all actuality must be included in His [God's] actuality, and all possibility in His potential actuality." C. Hartshorne, The Logic of Perfection, p. 41.

[41] God's aim at formal intensity orders the eternal objects as relevant lures of concrescence "severally appropriate for all realizable basic conditions." Consequently, by definition God is the ground of "order" in the world; because, "'order' in the actual world is differentiated from mere 'givenness' by introduction of adaptation for the attainment of an end." Apparently, God's primordial ordering of possibility - apart from which it is in "mere isolation indistinguishable from nonentity" - cannot be fixed and static. If it were, the principle of creativity (of which God is primordial exemplification) would be internally violated; also, as merely conceptual realization it requires the actual world to which it must be adapted as relevant. While forms are generally 'ordered' primordially to aim at intensity in formed immediacy, God must wait upon the world in its givenness and self-emphasis. Although, then, forms are realized "primordially" it seems necessary to stress the unity of God from which primordial and consequent natures are abstractions. Process and Reality, pp. 134, 127, 373-374.

Previously, the above statement would have raised questions. Theologians would have postulated a realm of being and meaning that goes beyond the realm of worldly occurrences. Faith to them would call for a supernatural God whose activities go beyond the natural. However such postulations are "unscientific" to a this-worldly approach and we need not bother with them. We are solely interested in the natural, where "natural" includes the world of history and the world of nature in the sub-human sense. We have characterized history as individuality and development, nature as process, relation, change, and function.[42] In the light of this view, we have to say that reality is a unified whole, extremely complex, mystery-laden, ever-expanding, never described with final precision, but finally an organic whole with all its parts integrally related to each other. Its unity is found in this state of being interrelated. God, if he is meaningful at all, must be involved in and related to this state of interrelatedness. There is not other alternative. This means a clear-cut rejection of the traditional concept of the human sphere as the natural and the trans-human sphere as the supernatural. To us everything is "natural."

We thus deny the irruptions from the "outside" in the everyday processes which constitute the being of our universe. Nothing is "foreign" to the ongoing processes; it is already there as an ingredient. Of course new things do emerge, but the emergence of novelty is achieved in the becoming of continuity, i.e., the causal interrelatedness remains unbroken. Novelty does appear in the ongoing processes, novelty that we might not have been able to anticipate. But once novelty had emerged we can, in retrospect, see how it fits in the processes that lead up to it.[43]

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[42] A. N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, (New York: The New American Library, 1925), pp. 42, 100.

We also need to say that the natural not only affects other things, but is itself also affected by them. There is a mutual dependence. In the process of learning, what we have learnt is going to affect what we are able to learn and what we learn is going to affect what we have learnt. In this network of relationships, nothing gets exempted from being reconstituted in a new set of relationships. In any relationship there is mutuality and interdependence, and God is not exempt from this mutual dependence. Thus God does not dwell in the supernatural realm, an immutable Being, unaffected by process, change, and development.[44]

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[43] Process and Reality, pp. 354-356.

[44] God is entailed in his general function as a ground of order for the acts of experience; this also applies to the derivative order of the extended world. In criticizing Hume's unempirical aspects, Whitehead also asserted the irrationality of his doctrines. For if impressions of sensations arise from an unknown cause "rational" cosmology is stymied; such a "cosmology requires that metaphysics shall provide a doctrine of relevance between a form and any occasion in which it participates . . . ." Whitehead intended to do this in "the doctrine of God embodying a basic completeness of appetition and the doctrine of each occasion effecting a concrescence of the universe, including God." Process and Reality, p. 481.

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Being involved in the ongoing process, it is God's continuous function to lead the process in a definite direction. Being involved in the process instead of outside of it, God faces limitations. His activity is limited by the responses of men. Thus he provides possibility.

Into this world, Heidegger was born and did his work. The following pages will show how Heidegger contributed to our growing knowledge of the world and of man. A more exhaustive treatment of Heidegger's work is found in the next chapter.

When Heidegger reflected on his experience of the world, he became aware of the mystery of Being. There are entities. Being "is."[45] It is a sine qua non over which man has no control. Therefore philosophy must deal with the fundamental question of the meaning of Being. The question is: how?

Heidegger contended in his Being and Time that only man or Dasein (literally translated, it means being-there) can know Being because Dasein is the presence of Being in concrete life and situations. Man is the only being who has an understanding of Being, i.e., man is the locus of the presence of Being.[46]

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[45] In his own way, Whitehead agreed with Heidegger when he said: "Actual entities' - also termed 'actual occasions' - are the final real things of which the world is made up. There is no going behind actual entities to find anything more real." Process and Reality, pp. 27-28.

[46] M. Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 27.

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Only man can question the "to be" in everything that is. Heidegger's main concern was to analyze Being itself ontologically, but since only Dasein can understand Being one must examine Dasein, i.e., after an explicit understanding of Dasein is arrived at, Being itself can be expressed. One must know about Being in order to ask about Being; a question inevitably presupposes some knowledge of that which is being questioned. Thus to know Being, one must know Dasein.

Heidegger's preoccupation with Being indicates that there is no entity which may be viewed in such fashion that its basis in Being is not made perfectly transparent. No entity just "is" per se. It "is" precisely because of its fundamental relation to Being. If this relation is not made clear, then we do not fully understand the entity. In short, Being is the prior condition of anything that may be. To treat an entity apart from the power that enables it to be (no emphasis on its supernatural origin), is to miss the woods for the trees. That there are beings is not the mystery. The mystery is why there is Being.[47]

The "how" of Being is to be found in man himself, in Dasein understood in its unity with other Daseins in the world and in Dasein understood as temporality. Man himself is the answer to his questions, but he has been in such manner that this is no longer apparent; discovering ἀλήθεια is a matter of becoming what we in fact are if we

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[47] Cf. L. Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. C. K. Ogden (London: Kegan Paul, 1922), p. 187, where he said: "Not how the world is, is the mystical, but that it is."

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only realize it. To locate the truth in man is to deny that one seeks truth in a transcendent being such as God. It is to affirm that truth is immanent though it is not something substantive, absolute, or unchanging. Truth can only be fully known by Dasein in its dealing with the world, with others, and with itself. It is the concrete truth of Dasein living with other Daseins in the world, and as such truth is fundamentally that which we already are. However, we must also add that truth can only be fully realized when it is unmasked, i.e., since it has been covered up by falling, we have to overcome fallenness in order to get at the truth. Finally "to be" is already to know the truth. Truth is not unknowable; man has the ability to know truth or to be the truth.

Heidegger went on to lay bare the structures of human existence, e.g., understanding, conscience, death, etc., with the hope of getting at the pristine meaning of Being. As such, this part of his work as exemplified in his Being and Time can be considered to be existential, but then in his later works Heidegger conceived of Being as the empowering power that lets-be, the prior condition of anything that may be. Is there a logical hiatus in the two Heideggers? This perplexing question has plagued students interested in Heidegger. At this juncture, we will only say that a careful study of the earlier and later Heidegger shows a bridge linking the two Heideggers together.[48]

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[48] Infra., pp. 109-111.

At this point, we will not go into a study of Heidegger's concept of Being. We just wish to spotlight two crucial points, viz., (i) there *are* entities, Being "is," (ii) man has the capacity to know this truth. On the first point, we freely and willingly acknowledge there is a world; we do not have to prove the existence of the world. The second point repudiates any belief in a supernatural being imparting divine truths to men. To locate truth in man is to assert his capacity and ability to know truth.

In our characterization of history and nature, the word "relation" cropped up many times. In his own inimitable way, Heidegger made his contribution to the ever growing emphasis on relation. To Heidegger, relation is Being-in-the-world. He considered man on a different level from that of objects which he called entities "present-at-hand" [*Vorhandenheiten*]. They are static. However the essence of man is dynamic. Heidegger called this essence "existence" and restricted "existence" to human existence.[49] Man is dynamic in the sense he "makes" himself. His selfhood is not a given, but is something to be won or lost. So his being is an unsolved problem; existence is the perennial attempt to solve this problem. "Dasein is an entity for which, in its Being, that Being is an issue."[50]

Basically Dasein is related to its own existence, but because

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[49] Heidegger, *loc*. *cit*., p. 67.

[50] *Ibid*., p. 236.

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of its social nature, it is also related to the world. Dasein as Being-in-the-world is not an entity like an orange in a box. The preposition "in" means more than a spatial relationship. Being-in-the-world is a way "to be" of a being that differentiates itself from those entities simply present-at-hand. Dasein does not regard the world as an object but *is* worldly. It *belongs* to the worldliness of the world, and the world belongs to Dasein. Without man, there is no world and vice versa. No one can adequately understand man apart from the world, and the world lacks meaning without man. This relation between man and the world is so fundamental that to deny it is nonsensical.

The "in" of Being-in signifies "dwelling," "residing," or "inhabiting." Being-in is to be accustomed to our environment. Being-in expresses our intimate involvement with the environment. We see, handle, care for entities. Man's worldliness is an a priori because, without it, we cannot encounter things. Dasein discovers the world before discovering things.

Heidegger characterized the Being-in of Dasein as "having to do with something, producing something, attending to something and looking after it, making use of something, giving something up and letting go, undertaking, accomplishing. . . ."[51] In a word: concern [*Besorgnis*]. Being-in is to be concerned which is an essential feature of Dasein as Being-in-the-world. Concern is the basis of man's relation to the world.

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[51] *Ibid*., p. 83.

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This relationship cannot be understood in terms of man as subject, the world as object. It is this false dualism that explains why truth has been regarded as an agreement between subject and object. Heidegger contended that truth is the disclosure of reality and cited the early Greek philosophers for confirmation. This truth is not a proposition or a sentence, but reality itself in which we are really concerned with the things themselves outside of us.[52]

Traditional philosophy had been dealing with entities present-at-hand in the world instead of dealing with the world itself. In reality, the world precedes these entities present-at-hand. Things are always within the world without which they cannot be encountered. How do we encounter the world? Through equipment.

In the environment, Dasein encounters not static objects but things of the environment (which is the inauthentic world yet nevertheless is a mode of the world) which are known as equipment. Equipment is determined by our usage of the entities and thus is different from entities as present-at-hand, which are passive or unused.

Equipment *per se* is meaningless, but gets its meaning by being related to a totality. This reminds us of our affirmation that reality is a whole with its various parts integrally related.[53] Equipment's prominent characteristic is its "in order to," and it is this "in order to" that refers to the totality. For example, a spade is meaningless in itself, but it becomes meaningful with regard to farming, which is meaningful with respect to the living environment which is the totality within which the spade gains meaning.

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[52] *Ibid*., p. 256.

[53] *Supra*., pp. 16-18.

Our understanding of equipment presupposes knowledge of the equipment-totality.[54] Our circumspection never begins with a detail (like the spade), but approaches the detail from the totality (environment). This suggests that the world is not a thing nor the sum of things, but rather the totality that the equipment by its structure is pointing to. Because Dasein is Being-in-the-world, it has knowledge of this reference-totality which enables Dasein to discover and use equipment in its concernful dealings. Dasein is an understanding of being because Dasein knows the world and all the equipmental relations to it. "To Dasein's Being, an understanding of Being belongs."[55] Dasein is open to Being. In Dasein's openness to Being, word and language are founded.[56] A talking being _is_ a worldly being, i.e., the world opens itself only with man, the only being who can know Being.

To know Being is to be with the world. Only through its dealings with the equipment of the environment does Dasein know itself as a meaningful and concernful being and as Being-in-the-world. Thus Dasein knows itself in togetherness with others. Dasein is always concerned with equipment and thus meets other Daseins. "The World of Dasein is a with-world [*Mitwelt*]. Being-in is Being-with-Others. Their Being-in-themselves within-the-world is Dasein-with [*Mitdasein*]."[57] To be Dasein is to be *Dasein-with*. Being-with-Others is thus an *existentiale*.[58] Our very existence has a Being-with structure.

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[54] _Ibid_., p. 98.

[55] _Ibid_., p. 118.

[56] _Ibid_., p. 121.

Being-in shows our concern for things in the environment. It also shows a caring [*Fursorge*] for others, and in *Fursorge* we show our Being-with-others. We know people not by statements made but by our very way of existing.

Existence is unity in the making; Dasein exists as its own possibilities which have to do with things in the world, caring for other Daseins, and the capability of Dasein to be for its own sake. These possibilities are existential, not logical or categorical. Dasein as existential possibility is the primary foundation of any kind of possibility. As existential possibilities, they can be ignored, rejected, or used by Dasein. Dasein does not create these possibilities because Dasein itself is a "thrown" possibility. "Dasein is the possibility of Being-free *for* its ownmost potentiality-for-Being.[59]

However one needs to say that Dasein does not subordinate itself to its thrownness; rather it *projects* its own thrownness. "As thrown,

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[57] *Ibid*., p. 155.

[58] A category is the *a priori* character of things. An existentiale is the *a priori* character of the being of man. *Infra*., p. 40.

[59] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 183.

Dasein is thrown into the kind of Being which we call 'projecting'."[60]

Thus Dasein is thrown into a world in which it may reject or accept possibilities, be indifferent to or responsible for them. Its projecting is always related to its own thrown possibilities. Man cannot choose his own Da, but is simply thrown into it. Yet this Da is its very own, and by accepting this Da man determines his way of being. This accounts for the unity in the making. Unity is never a ready-made *a priori*; it is always in the making. Hence the affinity between Heidegger and Whitehead in the sense that process plays a crucial role in their philosophy. Germane to process is the idea of temporality which is another significant contribution of Heidegger.

Temporality is an important idea to Heidegger and it is temporality that relates existentialism *a la* Heidegger to process philosophy. We have said that Dasein is being in relation with the world. Dasein is also being in process or becomingness. Individuality is a becoming emergent from the possibilities that are given to it in its being-in-the-world. An individual starts out by conforming to the past he has inherited. Thus anticipatory evolution is the decision of Dasein to become itself by making a decision to be itself in the midst of the possibilities given to it by its being-in-the-world. There is no individuality without resolution. The true self can appear and disappear, i.e., the possibility of ceasing to be is indigenous to Dasein. Its identity can get weak or even dissolved in the they-self, a word coined by Heidegger to signify the faceless collective mass in which one loses his identity because one fails to exercise his individuality.

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[60] *Ibid.*, p. 185.

How you become determines what you become. This is the how of Dasein's decisions. Becomingness is implied and contained in Being.[61] Thus becomingness and whatness are closely related in Heidegger's philosophy. The second notion implies the first; it does not flow organically from the first, but the vice versa is true.

The call of conscience is the summons to be an emergent authentic self. Thus individuality emerges out of the threat of non-being whose ultimate is death.[62] In this way the ultimacy of relation (Being-in, Being-with, Being-in-the-world), and the ultimacy of emergence (temporality), are asserted by Heidegger, not forgetting the foundational notion of Being.

Temporality is, for Heidegger, the foundation of man. When Dasein is ontologically shown in its facticity, in its relation to the world, temporality is revealed as that which makes Dasein's existence possible.[63] Temporality is thus a key word.

Temporality is "the unity of a future which makes present in the process of having been,"[64] the unity which is the meaning of care.

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[61] Infra., pp. 119-120.

[62] Heidegger, pp. 476-478.

[63] Ibid., pp. 456, 486.

[64] Ibid., pp. 374-375.

This unity is an ecstatical unity, i.e., Dasein has the ability of stepping outside of itself in order to be itself.[65] Dasein exists in terms of other Daseins and other entities. This is where Dasein gets its possibilities; Dasein does not get swallowed up in its possibilities; it is in relation to other Daseins and things that Dasein itself is. Thus when in the ecstasy of temporality Dasein stands "outside" of itself, it nevertheless remains itself. In temporality Dasein is always in a world, is always there [Da], and is there in such wise that it stretches itself along in the ecstasies of past, present, and future. Dasein moves towards its future by making itself a present in the world because it has already been doing this in the world.

Heidegger wanted to say that the primordial situation of authentic Dasein is one in which man is very close to the environment and to other Daseins. There is an inter-reaction between man and man, and man and things which truly makes up the spatio-temporal world. In its primordial temporality as stretched far and oft in its world, Dasein knows the truth of its Being.

In temporality the future is all important. Though one's possibilities are determined by the past and though one's Being in the world now is what is an issue of Dasein, yet "the primary phenomenon of primordial and authentic temporality is the future."[66] Because of the priority of the futural mode of temporality, temporality is

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[65] Heidegger, loc. cit.,

[66] Ibid., p. 378.

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finite. The authentic future is Being-towards-one's self which is Being towards one's death.[67] Thus death has more than just a coincidental role in Heidegger's philosophy.

Non-being has its place in the Being of Dasein's temporality. Temporality is the unity of care, the essential characteristic of Dasein as it expresses itself in solicitude in the world. Non-being is primordially founded in the structure of care... So is death:

> Death, as the end of Dasein, is Dasein's ownmost possibility--non-relational, certain and as such indefinite, not to be outstripped. Death is as Dasein's end, in the Being of this entity towards its end.[68]

Dasein always "is" towards its death, but it may be so authentically or inauthentically. Death is Dasein's ownmost, non-relational possibility. By anticipating death as a constant threat to its existence, Dasein attains the wholeness of selfhood.[69] Thus there is a call for resoluteness. Resoluteness is the primordial truth of existence as one's ownmost potentiality-for-Being.[70] This suggests that Dasein seeks itself as coming towards itself. It does this by receiving itself from the future out of its past in terms of the present. Thus the ecstatical unity of temporality serves as the unity of anticipatory resoluteness.

We can now wrap up our discussion on temporality by going back to our discussion on the question of the priority of the futural mode of temporality and the question of the importance of the finitude of temporality. To be authentic is resolutely to anticipate death. It is only when Dasein considers non-Being as part and parcel of its Being that it can be the truth of its own Being. Death belongs fundamentally to the futural mode of temporality. All possibilities must be regarded futurally. If Dasein is to be authentic, then it must be so in the priority of the futural mode.[71]

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[67] *Ibid*., pp. 378-380.

[68] *Ibid*., p. 302.

[69] *Ibid*., pp. 306-310.

[70] *Ibid*., pp. 354-355.

The temporality of Dasein is finite because it is coming toward itself in the light of its own non-Being. This enables Dasein to be authentic, i.e., it is enabled to regard its thrown possibilities as its own rather than those of the they-self. It discovers that its past is its own and it makes its possibilities present in such fashion that is authentic and whole. In the ecstatical unity of finite temporality, Dasein is at all times the wholeness of its past, present, and future.

The preceding pages have tried to characterize modernity as we know it. The emphasis is on development, fluidity, change, process, relation, relativity, and temporality. Such notions fight shy of the absolute, static substance, and unchangingness. To make our point, we purposely contrasted how natural theology and supernatural or revealed theology used to operate. We then examined two crucial topics, viz., history and nature and then proceeded to show how the current view on history and nature has caused us to separate ourselves from and to deny the validity of thinking in two realms, the natural and the supernatural. It is our contention that everything is natural, though the power to evoke reverential feelings or to actualize any potentiality or to bring to fruition any incipient goodness varies in degree from person to person or from thing to thing. We also showed how God is affected by such a world-view. Finally we briefly mentioned Heidegger's philosophy in this contemporary milieu and his unique contribution. We now proceed to examine more exhaustively Heidegger's inimitable contribution.

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[71] This aspect of Heidegger's philosophy reminds us of process philosophy's emphasis on the momentary character of becoming and emergent evolution. The emphasis is the becoming rather than on the become, i.e., there is more reality on the becoming than on the become.

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CHAPTER II

HEIDEGGER'S CONTRIBUTION TO CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY

In the previous chapter we surveyed the contemporary milieu, and at the end of the chapter we dealt briefly with the situation Heidegger found himself in and the contribution he made to it. We continue. The genius of a great man lies in his ability to learn from and contribute to the society that he finds himself in. Heidegger did just that. Measured by any criterion, Heidegger must be considered an intellectual giant and maker of thought in the twentieth century. Theologians, psychotherapists, philosophers, and others have utilized Heidegger's philosophy in their own fields, indicating the extent of Heidegger's influence.

Three elephantine notions stand out most vividly when one studies Heidegger, in particular his Being and Time. They are Being, relation, and temporality. These elephantine notions are so basic that they cannot be further reduced but are axiomatic in Heidegger's philosophy. This is what we understand by elephantine notions. As far as we know, any contemporary man must come to terms with Being, relation, and temporality if he desires to understand modernity.

It is our intention to study the three elephantine notions as exhaustively as scholarship and talent will permit, dealing first with the prevalent ideas traditionally associated with the elephantine notions and examining the shift in emphasis and meaning made by

Heidegger. We will begin with Being and the first thing we see is the way Heidegger related Being to existence and vice versa.

I. Being and Existence.

Heidegger's philosophy has to do with the question of the meaning of Being.[1] The question of the meaning of Being is not a new or novel project. Western philosophy has been wrestling with it for ages, but in modern thought Being has been relegated to the background of philosophy. That is why Heidegger felt it was necessary to re-examine the question of the meaning of Being, and to get at the pristine meaning of Being.

To Heidegger, Being can never be considered as an entity, a thing, or something that is. Therefore, Heidegger never asked the question: "What is Being?" because such a question assumes Being is an entity, a thing. Traditionally Western philosophy has operated under the category of thinghood or substantiality, and Heidegger wanted to move away from substantiality.[2]

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[1] The word "Being is used to translate das Sein and being (not capitalized) is used to translate das Seiende, "that which is."

[2] Thus instead of philosophizing in terms of categories, Heidegger operated in terms of existentialia. Categories are used to describe the properties of natural phenomena, but they are inadequate when it comes to human existence. To describe the possible ways of existing of man, Heidegger used existentialia. Thus a category is a basic concept used to describe what we understand concerning the properties of phenomena; an existentiale is used to describe the possible ways of human existence.

Heidegger realized that the prevailing philosophical situation is not sympathetic to his approach. To accomplish his goal, Heidegger had to overcome three prejudices that obstruct any inquiry into the meaning of Being.

The first prejudice has to do with the universality of "Being." Thinking about something presupposes we think of it as something that is. "An understanding of Being is already included in conceiving anything which one apprehends as an entity."[3] However, the "universality" of "Being" is not that of a class or genus, i.e., "Being" is not a property or class-concept like roundness, hardness, etc. If it were so, it would be the emptiest of all concepts and a waste of time, effort, and energy to inquire into it. The "universality" of Being transcends all distinctions of classes. Aristotle understood this and medieval ontology spoke of Being as a transcendens because it lies beyond the customary categories of thought.

The second prejudice affirms that "Being" is indefinable. This would be true if Being were understood as the most universal class-concept, but we have asserted that Being cannot be comprehended under the traditional class-concept. Being is not another entity that can be classified or categorized, but this does not mean we do not have a problem. It just means that we have to look for another way of discussing the meaning of Being.

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[3] Being and Time, p. 22.

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The third prejudice says that "Being is the most self-evident concept. Whenever one makes an assertion, whenever one considers some entities, some use is made of "Being." Thus whenever we say, "The sky is blue," or "I am happy," we have a good idea of the meaning of "Being" because of the use of the infinitive "to be." However if we were to pursue the issue, we would find that it is more complex than we thought. The average kind of intelligibility is surely not as transparently clear as one hopes. Therefore philosophy has to investigate some of these dimly understood ideas we have of "Being" instead of assuming that it is so axiomatic that it becomes self-evident.

By considering these prejudices, we note that the question of Being lacks an answer, and the question itself is obscure. Therefore, we need to re-formulate the question of Being, and do it in such a way that it becomes transparently clear.

"Every inquiry is a seeking [Suchen]."[4] To ask a question implies that we already know something of what we are asking about, and yet at the same time we acknowledge we do not know the full answer. Each question already has a direction, and we could hardly ask a question unless we had some notion of what we were asking about; yet we would not raise a question if we did not already know something about it. The principle holds true when it comes to the question of Being:

> Inquiry, as a kind of seeking, must be guided beforehand by what is sought. So the meaning of Being must already be available to us in some way. As we have intimated, we always conduct our activities in an understanding of Being.[5]

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[4] *Ibid.*, p. 24.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 25.

We often use the infinitive "to be" and this implies we already know something of what it means to be, and yet this understanding is vague. To answer the question of Being intelligently, we need to clarify that vague indefinite understanding that we already possess.[6]

When we ask about anything whatsoever, we select and analyze the data in such a way as to produce an understanding of what we are asking about. If we ask about Being, then the data are things that are, the beings that exemplify Being. Anything that is, is a being. But there are various kinds of beings--hills, stars, atoms, etc. Which one best serves as a spring-board in our attempt to understand Being? The questioner himself. A star is, a mountain is, and a man is. However, man differs from stars, mountains, etc., because he not only is, but he knows what it means to be. In a real way, he is responsible for what he is. "Dasein (man) is an entity for which, in its Being, that Being is an issue."[7] Man can exercise responsibility, freedom, and choice and the question of who he is becomes inescapable.[8] This question inevitably leads to Being because man is an ontological entity, that is, from the very way man is constituted he cannot avoid the Being that is already an issue for him in the very way he _is_.

When Heidegger spoke of man, he used Dasein to signify man's

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[6] _Ibid_., p. 25.

[7] _Ibid_., p. 236.

[8] _Ibid_., p. 33.

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ontological constitution. "This entity which each of us is himself and which includes inquiring as one of the possibilities of its Being, we shall denote by the term 'Dasein'."[9] Dasein is best left untranslated because there is no exact English equivalent for it. Literally, it means Being-there. In traditional German philosophy it used to signify "existence." Man is Dasein (Being-there) in the sense he finds himself in a particular situation; at the same time he is "there" in the sense that his Da is disclosed to him and forms his centre of reference. In Heidegger's usage, Dasein is restricted to human existence and "existence" is also restrictively used for the kind of Being that belongs to Dasein. Mountains, stars, tigers, etc., are, but man alone is said to exist because he alone has to decide about Being. His Being is an issue for him. In confining "existence" to Dasein, Heidegger was not, for a moment, denying the reality of mountains, stars, tigers, etc.; they are real enough, but they lack the kind of Being that lets them "exist" in the peculiar sense of human existence.

Heidegger has been called an "ontologist," "existentialist," and "phenomenologist," and in a sense each label does bespeak what Heidegger has done. The search for Being begins from the Being of the inquirer himself, the human Dasein, and then proceeds to study the structure of his existence. However, this was not the primary or sole concern of Heidegger; it was never his intention to make man's subjectivity the measure of all things. His main concern was to get at the pristine meaning of Being [*Sein*], and to accomplish this he had to study man [*Dasein*] because Dasein is the exemplary being that "reflects" Being most lucidly. Thus the exploration of man's Being is the fundamental ontology, but it is never a self-contained study of man.[10] One studies Dasein with the hope of getting at the primordial meaning of Being. Thus the study of Dasein and *Sein* is *related*, and if we overlook this relation, then Heidegger's earlier work becomes radically different from his later work.

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[9] *Ibid*., p. 27.

At the end of this chapter, it behooves us to deal with the relation of Heidegger's earlier work to his later work.[11] At this juncture, it suffices to characterize his earlier work as "existential," i.e., it is dominated by a study of human existence which will yield clues to a better comprehension of Being. The later work is "ontological," i.e., one is more preoccupied with the idea of Being, and human existence is now understood in the light of Being. If one were careless, one would think the earlier and later Heideggers were two different philosophers. This comes about when the relation of Dasein to *Sein* is overlooked.

We do not deny that the earlier Heidegger was concerned with existence and that the later Heidegger was preoccupied with Being. But the two concerns are related because from first to last,

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[10] *Ibid*., pp. 33-34.

[11] *Infra*, pp. 106-111.

Heidegger's interest was with Being. His earlier work utilizes Dasein to explicate Being and his later work uses Being to light up, reinforce, and make adequate our understanding of Dasein. Therefore, Heidegger was conscious of the crucial link between his earlier and later work, and it was far from his intention to compartmentalize his system. This crucial link is the massive _dialectic_ that relates his earlier work to his later work. The sole concern of Heidegger, from first to last, was Being. But there is no straightforward approach to the study of Being; one gets at the meaning of Being via human existence's understanding of being in the world. This sets the context for the study of Being, but the context must be evaluated from the wider backdrop of Being. The massive dialectic holds together the human context and the backdrop of Being.

Hints of this dialectic were already given in his _Being and Time_,[12] where he spoke of the "hermeneutical circle." This is not a circular reasoning that begs the question. The hermeneutical circle offers us the tool to relate the premises of an inquiry to the conclusions of the same. An interpretation presupposes some vague knowledge of what is inquired into, and an interpretation would be meaningless if the initially vague knowledge were not complemented, corrected, and altered in the course of an investigation. Thus the initially vague understanding should be related to the conclusions.

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[12] _Ibid_., pp. 27-28.

This principle holds true in our search for the meaning of Being. Some opaque understanding of Being is already given in human existence, which as a kind of Being forms the initial understanding of Being. In the end, human existence can only be fully understood and appreciated in the light of Being. Thus the related wholeness of the earlier and later Heidegger must never be overlooked. The dialectic between existence and Being, the existential and the ontological, the earlier and later Heidegger, is introduced in Being and Time as follows:

> In the question of the meaning of Being there is no 'circular reasoning' but rather a remarkable 'relatedness backward or forward' which what we are asking about (Being) bears to the inquiry itself as a mode of Being of an entity. Here what is asked about has an essential pertinence to the inquiry itself, and this belongs to the ownmost meaning (eigensten Sinn) of the question of Being. This only means, however, that there is a way--perhaps even a very special one--in which entities with the character of Dasein are related to the question of Being.[13]

If students characterize the earlier and later Heidegger as two different philosophers, it means they have overlooked this crucial link, or massive dialectic, or hermeneutical circle, that exists in Heidegger's work.

So far we have tried to set the stage for our inquiry into the meaning of Being. We have said that human existence forms the spring-board to a clearer understanding of Being. Before diving from the spring-board into Being, let us suspend our action, and

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[13] Ibid., p. 28.

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have a clearer look at the spring-board. This means leaving the question of Being temporarily so that we might have occasion to study the constitution of Dasein more in detail before spelling out what we mean by Being. This proposal is faithful to Heidegger's procedure, where Being-in-the-world (relation) and temporality are first considered before more is said of Being. This means dealing with relation and temporality before we can wrap up our treatment of Being.

The question of Being is approached from the question of existence, the kind of Being that belongs to Dasein. Every Dasein has to choose its way of existing, to know itself in one way or another, and thus every Dasein is already involved in the question of existence in a concrete manner:

> Dasein always understands itself in terms of its existence--in terms of a possibility of itself; to be itself or not itself. Dasein has either chosen these possibilities itself, or got itself into them, or grown up in them already. Only the particular Dasein decides its existence, whether it does so by taking hold or by neglecting. The question of existence never gets straightened out except through existing itself. The understanding of oneself which leads along this way we call "existentiell." The question of existence is one of Dasein's ontical 'affairs.' This does not require that the ontological structure of existence should be theoretically transparent. The question about that structure aims at the analysis [Auseinanderlegung] of what constitutes existence. The context [Zusammenhang] of such structures we call "existentiality." Its analytic has the character of an understanding which is not existentiell, but rather existential.[14]

The existentiell question is different from the existential question. Everyone is concerned with the concrete existentiell question of deciding about his existence, but not everybody deals with the existential question which has to do with an explicit theoretical inquiry into the ways of existence generally. This is a mistake. One appreciates the concrete existentiell question in the light of the abstract theoretical existential question. One can wisely choose the viable alternatives in the light of the background which gives rise to the alternatives. We are not affirming Heidegger's fondness for abstract rationalism. On the contrary, it was Heidegger's contention that Being can be understood on the basis of our participation in existence. Participation in existence means knowing the concrete practical possibilities (the existentiell possibilities) of the individual Dasein. These concrete practical possibilities arise from the general possibilities (the existential possibilities) of Dasein, the general possibilities that all Daseins share. Therefore, we need to know the existential possibilities to appreciate the existentiell possibilities.

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[14] Ibid., p. 33.

Thus Heidegger tried to delineate the fundamental structures of human existence as they are known to us in our own existing. The task of delineating the basic constitution of Dasein is known as the "existential analytic." It endeavors to articulate the existentiality of existence, i.e., to spell out the distinctive features of the existent that makes it different from other kinds of beings.

The phenomenological method is employed in the attempt to differentiate human existents from other existents. One achieves this

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by carefully describing the process of analyzing the existent. The word "phenomenology" comes from φαινόμενον (neuter, present, participle of φαίνεσθαι --to appear, passive of φάινειν --to show) and λόγος (word, speech, etc.). The phenomenon is that which shows itself, or allows itself to be seen for what it is. The logos is the speech, word, or a "showing." Phenomenology is primarily a showing of that which discloses itself, a stripping away of all the concealments and distortions, so that it will be seen for what it actually is. Thus the phenomenological method is one of description and not one of proof.[15]

Heidegger's existential analytic does not prove human existence, but it does carefully and detailedly describe some fundamental features of human existence. This may sound easy but it is really anything but easy. Existence is not a datum that we can objectively and dispassionately study. We ourselves are the existents under study, and it is difficult to know oneself. We tend to cover up what we do not wish to see, to conceal the bare truth from ourselves.[16] Therefore, the phenomena have to be dislodged from the tendencies that conceal them.

To understand the existential analytic better, one has to know what Heidegger meant by existence. Earlier we stated that Heidegger restricted the word "existence" to the kind of Being that belongs to

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[15] Ibid., pp. 50-58.

[16] Ibid., pp. 58-59.

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Dasein, the human existent. Dasein exists (_ex_ out and _sistere_ to cause to stand, from _stare_, to stand, so that to exist is to stand out) in the sense that he is not just another entity in the world but also a being open to himself, having a limited ability to choose and decide his ways of being. There are three primary features of Dasein that differentiate it from other existents.

(a) The Being of Dasein is always in the making, in the process of becoming. Dasein is never complete in its Being; he is _possibility_, always more than he has actualized. Therefore, he does not have an essence as entities have. He is constituted by possibility rather than by essence or property. Entities or other beings have essences or properties that are fixed. To all intents and purposes, all cricket-balls have a similar size and weight, redness, rotundity, etc. These essences or properties are fixed, but man is not constituted that way. He does not have a fixed essence or property. He is possibility and his only "essence" is the one he makes as he goes along, realizing his possibilities or allowing them to slip away. This is the meaning of "the essence of Dasein lies in its existence."[17] The existential analytic does not purport to describe the universal properties of Dasein, but it seeks to describe the possible ways of existing, known to Heidegger as _existentialia_.[18]

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[17] _Ibid_., p. 67.

[18] _Supra_, p. 40.

(b) Man is individual. Existence is always mine--Jemeinigkeit. To all intents and purposes, all cricket-balls are identical and can be thus classified, but man defies such classification. Cricket-balls can be substituted, but not Daseins. The Dasein is not an entity, class or genus, but it is individually unique or *sui generis*. This follows from the fact that every Dasein is possibility and thus has no fixed essence. Its existence *precedes* its essence.[19] If Dasein is so individually unique, then how can the existential analytic function? We have asserted that the existential analytic does not intend to describe universal properties; it describes the general horizons of possibility (existential possibilities) from which the concrete (existentiell) possibilities of Daseins would arise.

(c) Man has a relation to himself in a way that is *sui generis* to him as existing. Man can choose to be or not to be; he can stand out as the distinctive being which he is, or he can slip into the group (the they-self) and lose his identity. He can be at-one with himself or he can war against himself. He can exercise his freedom to choose or he can just go along with the crowd, yielding to public opinion or social pressures.[20] Thus there are two types of existence--authentic or inauthentic. This is not a moral judgment. Authentic existence is one in which man exercises his freedom or takes over the possession of its own possibilities of Being. In the inauthentic existence, the possibilities of Being have been relinquished.[21] It is

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[19] *Ibid.*, pp. 67-68. [20] *Ibid.*, p. 68. [21] Heidegger, *loc. cit.*

Heidegger's contention that each Dasein exists inauthentically most of the time, and authenticity is not something gained once and for all, but must be achieved in new situations as they come along.[22]

The preceding pages indicate the way Heidegger's existential analytic portrays the concept of existence. Heidegger began with the "everyday" existence, the type of existence that lies nearest to hand, the kind of existence that follows the daily routine and is inauthentic.[23] Then he proceeded to describe the authentic existence that has broken loose from the inauthentic existence, and is existing resolutely. We will follow his procedure.

II. Relation or Being-in-the-world.

Having half-dealt with Being (the other half will follow the treatment of relation and temporality as explained on pages 33-34), we will now deal with relation, the second elephantine notion in Heidegger's philosophy.

Being-in-the-world is a basic constitutive state of Dasein.[24] Dasein is always in the world and is inconceivable without a world. Man's worldliness is an *a priori* because, without it, we cannot encounter things. Thus there is no need to prove the reality of the world. Man not only is in the world; he is also related to it.

"The compound expression 'Being-in-the-world' indicates in the very way we have coined it, that it stands for a unitary phenomenon."[25] However, three constitutive items are discernible in this unitary phenomenon. (a) The notion of Being-in raises the question of the kind of relation. (b) The notion of the world poses the problem of the kind of environment or context within which existence is set. (c) The notion of the self questions the kind of existence constituted by Being-in-the-world.

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[22] *Ibid*., pp. 167-169.

[23] *Ibid*., pp. 69-70.

[24] *Ibid*., p. 78.

(a) Being-in has a relation that means more than the mere spatial one of being located in the world. Dasein as Being-in-the-world is not like an orange in a box. Being-in has a richer meaning like "he is in love," where the proposition "in" means more than a spatial relation. Being-in-the-world is a way "to be" of a being that differentiates itself from those entities simply present-at-hand. Dasein does not regard the world as an object, but is worldly. It belongs to the worldliness of the world, and the world belongs to Dasein. Without man, there is no world, and vice versa. No one can adequately understand man apart from the world, and the world lacks meaning without man. This relation between man and the world is so fundamental that to deny it is unthinkable.

The "in" of Being-in signifies "dwelling," "residing," or "inhabiting." Being-in is to be accustomed to our environment. Being-in expresses our intimate involvement with the environment, made possible by our nearness to Being. We see, handle, and care for entities only because we stand in the world which we evaluate in the light of

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[25] Heidegger, loc. cit.

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the understanding received from our nearness to Being. We are not simply located in the world, but are bound to it by ties of interest, love, affection, work, etc.

Heidegger characterized the Being-in of Dasein as:

> Having to do with something, producing something, attending to something and looking after it, making use of something, giving something up and letting it go, undertaking, accomplishing, evincing, interrogating, considering, discussing, determining. . . .[26]

In a word: concern [Besorgnis]. Concern covers the way we relate ourselves to our environment--utilizing, constructing, producing, caring, etc. Being-in thus has a practical concern.

(b) What is the world that Dasein finds itself in? The answer lies in how we regard any particular entity within the world, e.g., we come across a lake. We can regard it as a hole in the ground filled with water and nothing else. Then it becomes something that is one of those things in the world; it is merely "present-at-hand." We are minimally related to it. But we can also think of the lake in relation to our practical concerns. Then it becomes a source of life, i.e., it provides water for drinking and fish for eating, it becomes a recreation area for swimming, boating, etc. Now the lake becomes "ready-to hand" and becomes an item within the arena of practical concern.

In the environment, Dasein encounters not static objects but things of the environment which are known as equipment. Equipment is determined by our usage of the entities and thus is different from entities as present-at-hand, which are passive or unused, so to speak.

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[26] Ibid., p. 83.

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Equipment per se is meaningless, but gets its meaning by being related to a totality. Its prominent feature is its "in order to," or its "for" and it is this "in order to" or "for" that refers to the totality. For example, a spade is meaningless in itself, but it becomes meaningful with regard to farming, which is meaningful with respect to the living environment which is the totality within which the spade gains meaning.

Our understanding of equipment presupposes knowledge of the equipment-totality.[27] Our circumspection never begins with a detail (like the spade), but approaches the detail from the totality. (environment). This suggests that the world is not a thing nor the sum of things, but rather the totality that the equipment by its structure is pointing to. Because Dasein is Being-in-the-world, it has knowledge of this reference-totality which enables Dasein to discover and use equipment in its concernful dealings. Dasein is an understanding being because Dasein knows the world and all equipmental relations to it. "To Dasein's Being, an understanding of Being belongs."[28] Dasein is open to Being. In Dasein's openness to Being, word and language are founded.[29] A talking being is a worldly being, i.e., the world opens itself only with man, the only being who can know Being.

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[27] Ibid., p. 98.

[28] Ibid., p. 118.

[29] Ibid., p. 121.

To know Being is to be with the world. Only through its dealings with the equipment of the environment does Dasein know itself as a meaningful and concernful being and as Being-in-the-world. Thus Dasein knows itself in conjunction with others. Dasein is always concerned with equipment and thus meets other Daseins. "The world of Dasein is a with-world [Mitwelt]. Being-in is Being-with-Others. Their Being-in-themselves within-the-world is Dasein-with [Mitdasein]."[30] To be Dasein is to be Dasein-with. Being-with-others is thus an existentiale. Our very existence has a Being-with structure.

Thus the world is understood by Heidegger as a huge instrumental system held together by Dasein's concern. It is from this concern that things become meaning-filled as they get incorporated into the world of man. It is from this concern that things in the world and other Daseins get more humanized.

(c) We now have to consider the "who" of Dasein. What kind of self is constituted in this Being-in-the-world? In a way, our consideration of existence as that unique being that is mine, the "I," is an answer to the question of the "who" of Dasein. But we also mentioned that the "I" can be authentic or inauthentic. Do we find genuine selfhood in the everyday existence, or is this most of the time an inauthentic existence? "It could be that the 'who' of everyday Dasein just is not the 'I myself'."[31]

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[30] Ibid., p. 155.

[31] Ibid., p. 150.

Heidegger showed considerable insight when he asserted that most of the time authentic existence is suppressed in the everyday Being-in-the-world. It is true that Dasein's concern for the world gives meaning to it, yet paradoxically Dasein gets absorbed in the world. It tends to become part of the system, to be caught up in the assembly line, to become automated.

This tragedy occurs not only in our relation to the things of the world, but also in our dealings with other Daseins. We are supposed to have a personal concern (solicitude) for other Daseins, and we are further supposed to achieve authentic existence through a genuine solicitude for other Daseins. Unfortunately this does not usually happen. For the most part, our relation to others is one of indifference or domination, seeking to squash out their possibilities for authentic existence. Then there is also the tendency to get swallowed up in the collective mass, the they-self; in this they-self, one ceases to exercise his freedom because his decisions are made for him by the group, public opinion, or social pressures. With the current mass-media and mass-product we have a collective drab uniformity and conformism. So the elusive, almost indefinable they-self dominates. What then can we say concerning the "who" of Dasein that we are trying to pin down?

To answer that question, we have to go further than just asserting the reality of the world and of man. We have to see how Dasein is distinctively different from other entities, i.e., we have to scrutinize the kind of openness of the Being-in-the-world that distinguishes Dasein from other entities.

Heidegger spoke of Dasein as the clearing [*Lichtung*] of Being:

> To say that it is 'illuminated' ["*erleuchtet*"] means that *as* Being-in-the-world it is cleared [*gelichtet*] in itself, not through any other entity, but in such a way that it *is* itself the clearing.[32]

Thus Dasein is a clearing up of Being; just like an open space in the woods allows the light to shine through, Dasein is the means through which Being shines through, lights up, and discloses itself. Thus Dasein can become transparent, and it is in this transparency that we come to know the "who" of Dasein. The transparency of Dasein is made known through the *affects* and through *understanding*.[33]

Heidegger made a thorough investigation of the affective states. They determine all our experiences because every aspect of our experience comes under the affective states. Heidegger considered the affective states an *existentiale*; they show us the way we find ourselves. Customarily, the affective states are regarded as moods, of no significance because they come and go. However, Heidegger emphasized the significance of these moods because they have a direct bearing on our Being-in-the-world. Each mood shows up our relation to the environment. It is more than a mere emotion because it lights up the way we attune ourselves to the environment. Affective states like

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[32] *Ibid*., p. 171.

[33] *Ibid*., pp. 171-172.

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fear, boredom, anxiety, etc., were dealt with by Heidegger, but we choose to postpone discussing them here. More will be said on the affective states, anxiety in particular, when we tackle Heidegger's concept of authentic existence.

Heidegger used "facticity" to characterize the disclosure that comes in moods. "What we indicate *ontologically* by the term "state-of-mind" is *ontically* the most familiar and everyday sort of thing; our mood, our Being-attuned."[34] Facticity does not mean that Dasein is just another fact in life. When Heidegger asserted that Dasein's mode of Being is existence, he had already affirmed that Dasein is not another object in the world, not just another fact that we come across. Facticity means that Dasein always finds itself in a situation where "to be" is a *conditio sine qua non*. Facticity indicates a person's thrownness in the world; it shows the way of being in which a person exists as a fact. Dasein does not exist in a vacuum, i.e., he lives in a situation that is full of "givens." Some of the "givens" arose from his past actions and were chosen by him; others are beyond his control, e.g., his race, heredity, physique, etc. Previously, we have characterized existence in terms of possibility. Now we add a qualification. We have to say that the possibilities of existence are always conditioned by the "givens," i.e., existence is not a pure possibility, but is a factical possibility. This was implied in the assertion that existence is characterized as mine and no one else's.

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[34] *Ibid.*, p. 172.

I am myself and no one else, and I am found in a particular situation. This means I have to take over and accept the "givens" in my situation. Therefore I have to accept this twin-situation--I am myself and I am in a world. My race, heredity, physique, etc., are the raw materials out of which I form myself, for better or for worse.[35]

A person finds himself "thrown" into a situation. Affective states show up the "there" of Dasein, the concrete situation within which he finds himself. However, his "whence" and "whither" remain hidden, and the stubborn fact of his existence glares at us from this hidden background. As Heidegger put it:

> This characteristic of Dasein's Being--this 'that it is'--is veiled in its 'whence' and 'whither,' yet disclosed in itself all the more unveiledly; we call it the 'thrownness' of this entity into its 'there;' indeed, it is thrown in such a way that, as Being-in-the-world, it is the 'there.'[36]

The preceding remarks show the significance of the affective states in Heidegger's philosophy. One cannot produce affective states at will, but one tends to flee from them and the kind of disclosure which they produce. "The way in which the mood discloses is not one in which we look at thrownness, but one in which we turn towards or turn away [An- und Abkehr]."[37] We are always in some mood or other; moods keep coming at us. "A mood assails us. It comes neither from 'outside' nor from 'inside,' but arises out of Being-in-the world, as a way of such Being."[38] Thus the inevitability of moods. We will say more concerning moods, but right now we have to pay attention to understanding.

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[35] Ibid., p. 175.

[36] Ibid., p. 174.

[37] Heidegger, loc. cit.

[38] Ibid., p. 176.

Heidegger asserted that Being-in-the-world is disclosed to itself via two fundamental and equiprimordial ways, viz., through _affective states_ and through _understanding_.[39] Therefore, understanding, like the affective states, is an _existentiale_.

Moods are associated with the disclosure of the _facticity_ of Dasein; understanding deals with the disclosure of Dasein's _possibilities_. A possibility is not just something that might happen, but a way of Being that is open to Dasein in any situation, and into which it can advance into novelty. This presupposes some knowledge of the equipmental relation of Dasein to the world. Understanding is founded upon practical concern:

> Dasein is in every case what it can be, and in the way in which it is its possibility. The Being-possible which is essential for Dasein, pertains to the ways of its solicitude for others and of its concern with the 'world,' as we have characterized them; and in all these, and always, it pertains to Dasein's potentiality-for-Being towards itself, for the sake of itself.[40]

Understanding has to do with the knowledge of _what_ it is capable of, i.e., what its potentiality-for-Being is capable of.[41]

Projection characterizes understanding. Dasein is always projecting:

> The character of understanding as projection is constitutive for Being-in-the-world with regard to the disclosedness

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[39] _Supra_, p. 59.

[40] Heidegger, p. 183.

[41] _Ibid_., p. 184.

> of its existentially constitutive state-of-Being by which the factical potentiality-for-Being gets its leeway [Spielraum]. And as thrown, Dasein is thrown into the kind of Being which we call 'projecting.' Projecting has nothing to do with comporting oneself towards a plan that has been thought out, and in accordance with which Dasein arranges its Being. On the contrary, any Dasein has, as Dasein, already projected itself; and as long as it is, it is projecting. As long as it is, Dasein has understood itself and always will understand itself in terms of possibilities.[42]

Heidegger understood "projecting" in at least two senses. (i) Dasein projects itself into its possibilities, but (ii) it also projects its possibilities upon the things it comes across.[43] The second form of "projecting" shows how the world of things gets incorporated into the human world through their service*ability*, us*ability*, and detriment*ality*, as the case may be, i.e., as Dasein projects its possibilities upon the things it comes across in the world, it "discovers" them in their serviceability, usability, and detrimentality. This is how things come to have meaning for Dasein.

The idea of projection reinforces the assertion that Dasein is never complete in its Being, but is always in the process of becoming. In a sense, Dasein is futural; it is always ahead of itself because it has already projected itself into some possibilities of its Being. As such, Dasein is always more than it actually appears to be on inspection:

> Because of the kind of Being which is constituted by the *existentiale* of projection, Dasein is constantly 'more' than it *factually* is, supposing that one might want to make an inventory of it as something-at-hand and list the contents of its Being, and supposing that one were able to do so. But

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[42] *Ibid*., p. 185.

[43] Heidegger, *loc*. *cit*.

> Dasein is never more than it _factically_ is, for to its facticity its potentiality-for-Being belongs essentially. Yet as Being-possible, moreover, Dasein is never anything less; that is to say, it _is_ existentially that which, in its potentiality-for-Being, it is _not yet_.[44]

Understanding implies interpretation. "The projecting of the understanding has its own possibility--that of developing itself [_sich auszubilden_]. This development of the understanding we call 'interpretation'."[45] Things get incorporated into the world of Dasein via Dasein's understanding of their serviceability, usability, and detrimentality. Whatever Dasein comes across gets related to Dasein's understanding. This act of relating implies interpretation. Dasein assigns places for the entities it encounters, and in assigning it imparts meaning to them, e.g., a spade _per se_ is quite useless, but Dasein gives it meaning by utilizing it as an instrumental implement. This illustration indicates that the assigning of meaning is not arbitrary; it is related to the understanding that one already possesses. Ordinarily one would not use a spade to fell a tree if an axe is available.

Heidegger spoke of the _fore-structure_ of understanding and the _as-structure_ of interpretation.[46] The fore-structure is the prior understanding that we already have before we attempt to interpret anything. Thus the fore-structure is the frame of reference, the way we see and understand things that exist prior to the effort of interpreting anything. "In every case interpretation is grounded in something we see in advance--in a fore-sight."[47] In a very succinct manner, Heidegger said that "an interpretation is never a presuppositionless apprehending of something presented to us."[48] Therefore interpretation is carried out on the basis of some prior understanding.

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[44] _Ibid_., pp. 185-186.

[45] _Ibid_., p. 188.

[46] _Ibid_., pp. 191-193.

"Anything interpreted, as something interpreted, has the 'as'-structure as its own... . ."[49] We interpret something as something, and only on that basis can we say to have understood it. For instance, we interpret a two-wheel vehicle as a bicycle, and on this basis can we say to have understood it.

There are two levels of interpretation--the informal and the formal. The former goes on all the time, e.g., any noise heard has already been interpreted, so that a noise is interpreted as the barking of a dog, or the mewing of a cat, and not just as a noise. This informal kind of interpretation occurs frequently, and is carried over in our everyday perception of the world, e.g., a movement in the bushes indicates some form of danger though it may only be caused by a squirrel.

The formal kind of interpretation is more sophisticated. It occurs in our attempt to understand a poem, a lyric, an historical event, or even man himself. To interpret more pointedly, hermeneutical principles are formulated.

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[47] *Ibid.*, p. 191.

[48] Heidegger, *loc. cit.*

[49] *Ibid.*, p. 192.

Heidegger's primary concern was with the prior understanding that we bring to interpretation.[50] Therefore, we must learn to clarify our presuppositions so as to yield a more adequate interpretation:

> To be sure, we genuinely take hold of this possibility only when, in our interpretation, we have understood that our first, last, and constant task is never to allow our fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception to be presented to us by fancies and popular conceptions, but rather to make the scientific theme secure by working out these fore-structures in terms of the things themselves.[51]

It is only natural that interpretation inevitably leads to language, the tool used in interpreting:

> The fact that language _now_ becomes our theme for the first time will indicate that this phenomenon has its roots in the existential-ontological foundation of language is discourse or talk.[52]

Discourse is communication among entities, which gets expressed in language, i.e., in words and sentences. There is a distinction between discourse and language, and as the above quotation indicates, Heidegger wished to assert the priority of discourse. "The existential-ontological _foundation_ of language is discourse or talk." Discourse is expressed through language, and discourse, in turn, "is constitutive for Dasein's existence."[53] Discourse is said to be existentially equiprimordial with moods and understanding as a disclosive _existentiale_ of the Dasein. "Discoursing or talking is the way in which we articulate 'significantly' the intelligibility of Being-in-the-world."[54] Discourse thus expresses Being-in-the-world.

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[50] _Ibid_., p. 195.

[51] _Ibid_.

[52] _Ibid_., p. 203.

[53] _Ibid_., p. 204.

Heidegger thought that the logic of discourse implies an ontology. The Greeks defined the *raison d' être* of man as ζφ̃ον λόγον ἔχον. Man is a talking being, and as such he is able to discover the world and Dasein itself.[55] It is the function of language to light up or uncover what is talked about, and in this way it gets formulated and communicated. The thing talked about gets illuminated in discourse. To Heidegger, truth is never a sentence or a proposition, but it is the unveiling of that which is talked about. Therefore, ἄληθεια is "unhiddenness."

However, Heidegger found that the possibilities for genuine discourse and unhiddenness or unconcealedness get diverted in everyday existence.[56] Discourse degenerates into idle talk [*Gerede*], where truth does not unveil itself to us. Instead, the "they" has already given us the interpretation:

> We do not so much understand the entities which are talked about. We already are listening only to what is said-in-the-talk as such. What is said-in-the-talk gets understood; but what the talk is about is understood only approximately and superficially. We have *the same thing* in view, because it is in the *same* averageness that we have a common understanding of what is said.[57]

Therefore there is no genuine communication. Instead of lighting up the topic under discussion, idle talk only closes it off. There is no "revelation," only concealment.

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[54] Heidegger, *loc*. *cit*.

[55] *Ibid*., p. 208.

[56] *Ibid*., p. 210.

[57] *Ibid*., p. 212.

Heidegger used the word "falling" to describe the various ways in which the possibilities of Dasein can be perverted. "Falling" means "deterioration" though it does not have any spiritual connotations like the "Fall" in Christian theology:

> This term [falling] does not express any negative evaluation, but is used to signify that Dasein is proximally and for the most part *alongside* the world of its concern. This 'absorption in . . . .' [*Aufgehen bei* . . .] has mostly the character of Being-lost in the publicness of the "they." Dasein has, in the first instance, fallen away [*abgefallen*] from itself as an authentic potentiality for Being its Self, and has fallen into the 'world.' 'Fallenness' into the 'world means an absorption in Being-with-one-another, in so far as the latter is guided by idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity.[58]

Thus Heidegger wanted to say two related things. He wanted to indicate the ontological possibilities of Dasein, and yet at the same time he wished to say that for the most part, in his everyday existence, the Dasein is indeed fallen or deteriorated:

> In falling, Dasein *itself* as factical Being-in-the-world, is something *from* which it has already fallen away. And it has not fallen into some entity which it comes upon for the first time in the course of its Being, or even one which it has not even come upon at all; it has fallen into the *world*, which itself belongs to its Being.[59]

This does not mean that Dasein has ceased to exist but it does mean a falling away from what is most distinctive in his existence. Dasein gets absorbed in the world of things and Dasein gets dominated by the "they" which deprives Dasein of its freedom.

Heidegger described the fallenness of Dasein in terms of *tranquilling*, *alienation*, and *scattering*.[60] It is a kind of

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[58] *Ibid*., p. 220. [59] Heidegger, *loc*. *cit*.

[60] *Ibid*., pp. 222-224.

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tranquilling because it falsely rests on the so-called security of the "they-self," taking away responsibility and anxiety (not the guilt-ridden neuroses that we traditionally associate with "anxiety") that go with an authentic existence.

This tranquillity in inauthentic Being gets aggravated. It has diverted the Dasein from authentic existence and from the authentic community. In a word, it is alienation:

> This alienation _closes off_ from Dasein its authenticity and possibility, even if only the possibility of genuinely foundering. It does not, however, surrender Dasein to an entity which Dasein itself is not, but forces it into its inauthenticity--into a possible kind of Being _of itself_. The alienation of falling--at once tempting and tranquilling--leads by its own movement, to Dasein's getting entangled [_verfangt_] in itself.[61]

Dasein's getting entangled in itself is a scattering because Dasein's possibilities are determined by factors outside of himself, i.e., under the domination of the they-self. Thus Dasein loses its cohesion and unity that are characteristic features of authentic existence.

Before we go on to an examination of authentic existence, we pause to recapitulate. We have said that (i) Dasein is always ahead of itself--here we dealt with _possibility_, projecting, understanding; (ii) Dasein is already-in-the-world--here we dealt with _facticity_, thrownness, affective states; and (iii) Dasein is close-to-the-world, so much that it gets absorbed in it--here we dealt with "falling," the they-self, tranquilling, alienation and scattering. The threefold structure of possibility, facticity, and falling constitutes the Being of the everyday Dasein or Dasein's "average everydayness."[62] Care is the backbone of this threefold structure. Religious people, poets, and prophets have, in one way or another, asserted that care shows up what is most essentially and distinctively human in life. Loss of care leads to oppression, but a care-filled life is one of love, concern, and freedom.

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[61] _Ibid_., pp. 222-223.

This means we have to go further than Dasein's average everydayness. Hitherto, we have followed Heidegger's analysis of Dasein in terms of everyday routine existing, but Heidegger went on to show how the daily routine is broken up, yielding a deeper and more primordial understanding of existence. This is where Heidegger dealt with the authentic existence.[63]

We have seen how Heidegger went about examining the existential analytic, emphasizing the need to see Dasein as a whole rather than in his fragmented aspects. We now observe how Heidegger went beyond his treatment of Dasein in his everyday existence to get at the authentic existence. Heidegger's approach is seen in the following questions:

> Can we succeed in grasping this structural whole of Dasein's everydayness in its totality? Can Dasein's Being be brought out in such a unitary manner that in terms of it the essential

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[62] Ibid., p. 225.

[63] Ibid., pp. 225-227.

> equiprimordiality of the structures we have pointed out, as well as their existential possibilities of modification, will become intelligible? Does our present approach _via_ the existential analytic provide us an avenue for arriving at this Being phenomenally?[64]

The answer to the following questions is an unequivocal "yes," and Heidegger accomplished the task he set himself by introducing two further phenomena: _death_ and _conscience_. Death enables us to grasp Dasein in its totality, and conscience discloses to Dasein its authentic possibility. These two phenomena are closely related, but before we consider them we have to back-track for a while and consider affective states.

In Heidegger's philosophy, the affective states play a crucial role, for they indicate how Dasein becomes disclosed to itself. We have seen how moods light up the situations within which we find ourselves. We are always in a factical situation, and as such, our possibilities are always limited and not pure ones.[65] To Heidegger, the most crucial affective state is anxiety.

Anxiety is the basic state-of-mind or way in which Dasein is disclosed. Actually true anxiety is rarely experienced for one major reason. The falling of Dasein or his tendency to get absorbed into the they-self is a flight from himself:

> Dasein's absorption in the "they" and its absorption in the 'world' of its concern, make manifest something like a _fleeing_ of Dasein in the face of itself--of itself as an authentic potentiality-for-Being-its-Self . . . But to bring itself face to face with itself, is precisely what Dasein does _not_ do when it thus flees.

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[64] _Ibid_., p. 226.

[65] _Supra_, p. 60.

> It turns *away from* itself in accordance with its own-most inertia [*Zug*] of falling.[66]

Thus Dasein flees from anxiety because this is the very mood that discloses himself in the most fundamental way. Heidegger distinguished anxiety from other affective states by stating that anxiety seems to have no special object as fear (an affective state) has:

> Our Interpretation of fear as a state-of-mind has shown that in each case that in the face of which we fear is *a detrimental entity within-the-world which comes from some definite region* but is close by and is bringing itself close, and yet might stay away.[67] (Italics mine)

In anxiety it is not some definite region that gets disclosed, but Dasein's total situation as the existent thrown into a world where he *is* and has to be:

> Anxiety does not 'see' any definite 'here' or 'yonder' from which it comes. That in the face of which one has anxiety is characterized by the fact that what threatens is *nowhere* . . . . 'Nowhere,' however, does not signify nothing: this is where any region lies, and there too lies any disclosedness of the world for essentially spatial Being-in.[68]

That which threatens is not "this" or "that," but the possibility of the ready-to-hand in general, i.e., it is the world itself. When anxiety has disappeared, we ask, "What was it that threatened us?" and the answer is "nothing." But this "nothing" says more than we are aware of:

> The 'nothing' of readiness-to-hand is grounded in the most primordial 'something'--in the *world*. Ontologically, however,

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[66] Heidegger, p. 229.

[67] *Ibid.*, p. 230.

[68] *Ibid.*, p. 231.

> the world belongs essentially to Dasein's Being as Being-in-the-world. So if the 'nothing'--that is, the world as such--exhibits itself as that in the face of which one has anxiety, this means that _Being-in-the-world itself is that in the face of which anxiety is anxious._[69]

This "nothing" is already an acknowledgement of the finitude and nullity of existence, and anxiety lights up this fact. It seems as if Dasein, in its very Being, is aware of a standing threat to this Being.

In this day and age, anxiety is not a respectable word. It connotes weakness and mental sickness. Not so in Heidegger's philosophy. To face anxiety requires fortitude, and it is because of this that most people try to avoid or tranquillize it when it strikes them. In anxiety one feels uncanny (_unheimlich_, literally means _unhomely_). One feels he is not-being-at-home. The familiar at-homeness is shattered by anxiety, and Dasein realizes he is not-at-home in this world. The usually taken-for-granted pattern of everyday living is shown to be "foreign," a not-at-home mode of existence. The Being-in-the-world flees from the uncanny not-at-homeness that lies at the ground of a thrown Being-in-the-world. It flees to the false security of the they-self, the faceless collective mass. This flight is not merely accidental and occasional. It is a recurring event. "This uncanniness pursues Dasein constantly, and is a threat to its everyday lostness in the 'they,' though not explicitly."[70] Ontologically:

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[69] _Ibid._, p. 232.

[70] _Ibid._, p. 234.

> That kind of Being-in-the-world which is tranquillized and familiar is a mode of Dasein's uncanniness, not the reverse. From an existential-ontological point of view, the 'not-at-home' must be conceived as the more primordial phenomenon.[71]

Heidegger's analysis of anxiety is forceful and penetrating and the conclusion he arrived at serves as a catalyst in our attempt to understand Being. In his own words:

> Anxiousness as a state-of-mind is a way of Being-in-the-world; that in the face of which we have anxiety is thrown Being-in-the world; that which we have anxiety about is one potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world. The fundamental ontological characteristics of this entity are existentiality, facticity, and Being-fallen. These existential characteristics are not pieces belonging to something composite . . . but there is woven together in them a primordial context which makes up that totality of the structural whole . . . . In the unity of those characteristics of Dasein's being . . . this Being becomes something which is possible for us to grasp as such ontologically.[72]

How is it possible for Dasein to understand Being? What does Being mean? The above discussion indicates the crucial role played by the "not." The "not" is the clue to understand Dasein and Being. The "not" indicates Dasein's finitude, i.e., man exists finitely because anxiety discloses to him a not in his uncanny not-at-homeness. Finitude does not mean the inability to last forever. In this sense a rock or a stone is finite. By finitude, Heidegger meant the fundamental and *sui generis* character of man's being which is not-at-home. The not-ness that determines man's existence can be better explained by linking it to death and conscience.

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[71] Heidegger, *loc. cit.*

[72] *Ibid.*, pp. 235-236.

As related to death, the not-ness summons us to accept the transient character of our existence, which is thoroughly finite and which faces the possibility of slipping into non-being. As related to conscience, the not-ness summons us to accept responsibility for our existence.

We have said that finitude characterizes man's existence, and we have also affirmed that anxiety discloses finitude. The most obvious feature of human finitude is death. Heidegger claimed that death enables us to grasp Dasein as a whole.[73]

At first sight, this claim seems unintelligible if not paradoxical. Death is usually viewed as a negative phenomenon. It is the termination and destruction of Dasein as Being-in-the-world. In this sense it is very different from the other existentialia (like understanding, moods, discourse, etc.) that have been employed to explain the structure of existence. To complicate the issue, we have seen that Dasein is always incomplete, in the process of becoming, and is constantly projecting itself into its possibilities. As long as Dasein is existing, it cannot be comprehended in its totality. Death, by terminating all future possibilities for becoming, makes it one hundred percent certain that we cannot grasp Dasein at all. Then how on earth is it possible for us to understand death as the phenomenon that allows Dasein to be grasped as a whole? Is this nothing more than just loose talk? Not so, claimed Heidegger.

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[73] Ibid., pp. 279-311.

Heidegger acknowledged that death is not the "culmination" of existence; death frequently occurs at a time when man's ability has not fully matured, and with the help of modern medicine death occurs after a man's ability has declined in his old age:

> So little is it the case that Dasein comes to its ripeness only with death, that Dasein may well have passed its ripeness before the end. For the most part, Dasein ends in unfulfillment, or else by having disintegrated and been used up.[74]

Thus death does not consummate existence in the sense of bringing to maturity its potentialities. "Ending does not necessarily mean fulfilling oneself. It thus becomes more urgent to ask in what sense, if any, death must be conceived as the ending of Dasein."[75]

"'Ending' signifies 'stopping',"[76] i.e., death serves as a boundary-line between being and non-being. Death distinguishes Dasein as Being-in-the-world from the nothing into which he slips when he ceases to be in the world. To be distinguished from the nothing in this manner is precisely to stand out [ex-sist] from it, and that is the right meaning of existence because one is aware of the boundary of existence and accepts that as one's own existence:

> Just as Dasein is already its 'not-yet,' and it is its 'not-yet' constantly as long as it is, it is already its end too. The

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[74] Ibid., p. 288.

[75] Ibid., p. 289.

[76] Heidegger, loc. cit.

> 'ending' which we have in view when we speak of death, does not signify Dasein's Being-at-an-end [*Zu-Ende-sein*], but a Being-towards-the-end [*Sein zum Ende*] of this entity. Death is a way to be, which Dasein takes over as soon as it is.[77]

Therefore death is one's *ownmost* possibility. An existence that is authentic is one that has been made one's very own:

> Death is a possibility-of-Being which Dasein itself has to take over in every case. With death, Dasein stands before itself in its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. This is a possibility in which the issue is nothing less than Dasein's-Being-in-the-world. Its death is the possibility of no-longer-being-able-to-be-there. If Dasein stands before itself as this possibility, it has been *fully* assigned to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. When it stands before itself in this way, all its relations to any other Dasein have been undone. This ownmost non-relational possibility is at the same time the uttermost one.[78]

A life that ignores death and considers the future as a series of unending tomorrows is not likely to have a great sense of urgency and responsibility. This is seen in the fact that we usually camouflage death by either saying "One of these days one will die too, in the end; but right now it has nothing to do with us,"[79] or by using euphemisms like "he passed away." So death is considered impersonally. We recognize that everyone has to die, but our death is always in the indefinite future. This concept of death occurs in the inauthentic existence, but Heidegger wanted to break loose from this and to regard death authentically.

This does not mean that Heidegger advocated an unhealthy preoccupation with death. However, he did strongly assign to death a crucial role. Because death is one's ownmost possibility, i.e., death inalienably belongs to everyone, Heidegger thought that anticipation of death should play an important role in authentic existence. All existence is a Being-toward-death, but to accept this fact instead of fleeing away from it is already to embrace authentic existence:

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[77] *Ibid*., p. 289.

[78] *Ibid*., p. 294.

[79] *Ibid*., p. 297.

> The ownmost, non-relational possibility is not to be outstripped. Being towards this possibility enables Dasein to understand that giving itself up impends for it as the uttermost possibility of its existence. Anticipation, however, unlike inauthentic Being-towards-death, does not evade the fact that death is not to be outstripped, instead, anticipation frees itself for accepting this. When, by anticipation, one becomes free for one's own death, one is liberated from one's lostness in those possibilities which may accidentally thrust themselves upon one; and one is liberated in such a way that for the first time one can authentically understand and choose among the factical possibilities lying ahead of that possibility which is not to be outstripped.[80]

Thus Heidegger advocated an existence that is aware of the urgency and responsibility of living in the face of the imminent end which shapes and governs all our actions. A fallen existence does not have a master possibility to give a sense of cohesion to our life; it is scattered and incoherent.[81] On the other hand, to anticipate death and to accept the boundary of one's existence is to obtain a master possibility which gives cohesion to all the possibilities of existence. In short, death is the master possibility, the ultimate

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[80] Ibid., p. 308.

[81] Supra, pp. 68-70.

"given" in whose light all the other "givens" of existence (like intelligence, physique, race, etc.) are evaluated. In contemporary language, we say that death gives a perspective in life from which the possibilities of life are organized. By anticipating death as a constant threat of its existence, Dasein attains the wholeness of selfhood, selfhood understood as the culmination of existence, i.e., existence fulfills itself in selfhood.

Is the assertion that death is the master possibility an assertion of nihilism or pessimism? Far from it. It is an assertion that the unity of the various concerns of an existent is achieved by the master possibility, the perspective that holds together and gives meaning to the various concerns an existent has. Death summons us to accept the situation into which we have been thrown and from which alone our possibilities are found. Thus there is an unequivocal acceptance of what is factically given in the situation, taking into account what has been given and being open to novelty. Thus death is far from being a negative phenomenon. It is an integrative rather than a destructive phenomenon.[82] It calls for an acceptance of human finitude, and it asks us to realize that all living is also a dying (Being-towards-death), and in this way it enables us to transcend the triviality of life. This is authentic existence because it permits us to see how we dissipate our energy on the useless and base things which consume our energy and effort, and it also indicates a life that has seriousness, resolution, and power:

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[82] Cf. Richard Kroner, a former colleague of Heidegger, had these words to say: "What was most fascinating and startling to me was not so much his [Heidegger's] metaphysical conception of Being, but rather his thoughts about death and mortality. These thoughts seemed to be in the very centre of his discussion . . . Heidegger, however, had transformed this philosophy of life (Lebensphilosophie popularized by Nietzsche and others) into a philosophy of death and had furnished it with the solid defence of a critical method, thus giving it academic respectability. In this new attire, the formerly rejected philosophy of life demanded the greatest attention and the most careful study. Was

> Holding death for true (death is just one's own) shows another kind of certainty, and is more primordial than any certainty which relates to entities encountered within-the-world, or to formal objects: for it is certain of Being-in-the-world. As such, holding death for true does not demand just one definite kind of behaviour in Dasein, but demands Dasein itself in the full authenticity of its existence. In anticipation Dasein can first make certain of its ownmost Being in its totality--a totality which is to be outstripped.[83] (Italics mine)

Heidegger then went on to show how anxiety in the face of death calls man from the forgetfulness of Being and awakens him to wonder of Being. Experiencing nullity brings awareness of Being, i.e., experiencing the shock of non-being serves as a prelude

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this philosophy that dared to make death the dominant problem of a new ontology still philosophy in the traditional sense, or was it merely the manifestation of a revolutionary feeling, aimed at arousing people?" "Heidegger's Private Religion," Union Seminary Quarterly Review, XI/4, p. 24. Quoted by Macquarrie in Studies, pp. 47-48.

[83] Heidegger, pp. 309-310.

to Being:

> Anticipation reveals itself to Dasein its lostness in the they-self, and brings it face to face with the possibility of being itself, primarily unsupported by concernful solicitude, but of being itself, rather, in an impassioned freedom towards death--a freedom which has been released from the Illusions of the "they," and which is factical, certain of itself, and anxious.[84]

We must now move on to the phenomenon of conscience. If death permitted us to see Dasein in its wholeness, conscience will permit us to see Dasein in its authenticity. Heidegger's treatment of conscience is really an eye-opener to anyone who desires to study Dasein.

Conscience provides us with something to understand, i.e., it discloses. Thus like affective states and understanding, conscience is a mode in which the Dasein is disclosed to itself. Conscience can be likened to a call [Ruf] and "the call of conscience has the character of an appeal to Dasein by calling it to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being-its-Self . . . ."[85] So conscience is the disclosure to us of what we ought to be, i.e., our authentic self. Among other things, an existent has a relation to himself. He can either be at-one with himself, or he can war against himself.[86]

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[84] *Ibid*., p. 311.

[85] *Ibid*., p. 314.

[86] *Supra*, p. 51.

We bring to mind the fact that in the everyday existence, "for the most part I myself am not the 'who' of Dasein; the they-self is its 'who'."[87] Conscience reminds us of this fact. Therefore it calls us from our absorption in the they-self to the authentic self:

> But because Dasein is lost in the 'they,' it must first find itself. In order to find itself at all, it must be 'shown' to itself in its possible authenticity. In terms of its possibility, Dasein is already a potentiality-for-Being-its-Self, but it needs to have this potentiality attested.
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> In the following Interpretation we shall claim that this potentiality is attested by that which, in Dasein's everyday interpretation of itself, is familiar to us as the 'voice' of conscience [Stimme des Gewissens].[88]

In conscience we see how the passage from inauthentic existence is effected. Heidegger explained it thus. Conscience is a Ruf. Who is it that is called? Who calls? It is quite apparent that the call is addressed to Dasein who is lost and absorbed in the they-self. Dasein is summoned to forsake the false security found in the faceless collective mass, to forsake his irresponsibility, and to embrace his original possibilities that he has lost.[89] Heidegger put it this way:

> One must keep in mind that when we designate the conscience as a 'call,' this call is an appeal to the they-self in its Self; as such an appeal, it summons the Self to its potentiality-for-Being-its-Self, and thus calls Dasein forth to its possibilities.[90]

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[87] Heidegger, p. 312.

[88] Ibid., p. 313.

[89] Ibid., pp. 317-319.

[90] Ibid., p. 319.

Heidegger then considered the question of who is it that calls in conscience. His answer is:

> In conscience Dasein calls itself--indeed that call is precisely something which _we_ _ourselves_ have neither planned nor prepared for nor voluntarily performed, nor have we ever done so. 'It' calls, against our expectations and even against our will. On the other hand, the call undoubtedly does not come from someone else who is with me in the world. The call comes _from_ me and yet _from_ beyond me.[91]

Man is the caller as well as the called, i.e., it is the authentic self calling or summoning the inauthentic self to forsake the false security found in the "they," and to be authentic. But if Dasein is lost or absorbed in the they-self, how can there be an authentic self to summon him? This question is misleading because it understands the self as an object or entity, but we have already stated and shown how the self is possibility.[92] As possibility, the authentic self is still there as possibility even though man has gotten lost in the they-self. As long as man exists and is possibility he has the possibilities of being himself (his true authentic self), or losing himself (his inauthentic self):

> The proposition that Dasein is at the same time the caller and the one to whom the appeal is made, has now lost its empty formal character and its obviousness. Conscience manifests itself as the call of care: the caller is Dasein, which, in its thrownness (in its Being-already-in), is anxious about its potentiality-for-Being. The one to whom the appeal is made is this very same Dasein, summoned to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being (ahead of itself . . .). Dasein is falling into the "they"

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[91] _Ibid_., p. 320.

[92] _Supra_., p. 51.

> (in Being-already-alongside the world of its concern), and it is summoned out of this falling by the appeal. *The call of conscience--that is, conscience itself--has its ontological possibility in the fact that Dasein, in the very basis of its Being, is care*.[93] (Italics mine)

Thus the ability for the authentic self to summon the inauthentic self is still an *ontological* possibility even though the *ontical* possibility of being his true self has been lost. Therefore, Dasein has the ontological possibility of being called to authenticity, though ontically the possibility might have been sealed off by the preoccupation with the they-self. For example, all men have the ontological capacity to love, but some men might find it ontically impossible to love because of their previous embittering experiences. Similarly Dasein has the ontological power to heed to the voice of conscience, though ontically its preoccupation with the they-self might make it deaf to the call of conscience.

If the *Ruf* of conscience seems strange to Dasein, that is because Dasein has fallen so much into the they-self that it forgets

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[93] Heidegger, pp. 322-323.

[94] There is a distinction between being as such [*Sein*] and being in the sense of that which is [*Seinendes*]. Thus there are two ways of stating anything. A statement may be ontological [*ontologisch*], i.e., it may inform us about the being of something and its range of possibilities. Or a statement may be ontical [*ontisch*], i.e., it will inform us about some entity in its actual relations with other entities.

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what it means to be Dasein. He ceases to recognize his authentic self, but when in the mood of anxiety he gets dislodged from the they-self, i.e., when he is confronted with his true self, when his false security in the "they" is shattered, then the call of conscience is heeded, and the summons to his original possibilities begins to take effect.

Here we see the relation between death and conscience. It will be recalled that death, as the ownmost non-relational[95] possibility, isolates Dasein from the they-world, and allows him to be confronted with the fact of his own individual existence.[96] Conscience calls him to accept the being that is delivered over to death, and to project himself resolutely upon it. But how does Dasein achieve this? By heeding the call of conscience of course. But how? This leads to the consideration of hearing, i.e., an understanding of the summons.

Dasein can "hear" the call of conscience in two ways, viz., via the they-self where distortion sets in, or through an authentic hearing. This authentic hearing understands the Ruf of conscience as a summons to guiltiness. "The call of conscience has the character of an appeal to Dasein by calling it to its ownmost potentiality-

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[95] In death Dasein is severed from relations with others and non-relational means being devoid of relationships.

[96] Supra, pp. 78-80.

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for-Being-its-Self; and this is done by way of summoning it to its ownmost Being-guilty."[97] The concept of guilt in Heidegger's philosophy wants to say two things. (i) Guilt is the lack of something that can and ought to be, and this occurs in the realm of worldly concern. (ii) To hear the call of conscience one must dislodge guilt from the sphere of worldly concerns, and understand it in relation to the individual's own being. What then is lacking? What is lacking seems to be the power needed to execute the responsibility demanded by conscience. To accept responsibility is to be guilty, i.e., when I accept responsibility I am guilty in the sense that I realize I lack the power to discharge my responsibility. Therefore I fight shy of responsibility.[98]

If the call of conscience is a summons to guiltiness, and if accepting responsibility is guilt, then what is the use of conscience? Before we answer that question, we will recapitulate three facts. (a) We have said that conscience is related to the whole structure of man's being. As existing, man is possibility. Therefore he experiences the tension of either gaining himself or losing himself. (b) Conscience is a mode of disclosure. It is related to anxiety; and conscience discloses the possibility of authentic existence. Dasein is summoned from fallenness to his original possibilities.

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[97] Heidegger, p. 314.

[98] *Ibid.*, pp. 330-331.

(c) Yet at the same time man experiences his impotence. To be responsible is to be guilty, i.e., man is free yet he is not the master of his freedom; before committing guilt he is already guilty because he has accepted a responsibility which he cannot carry out.[99]

According to Heidegger, fallen man has the possibility of hearing the call of conscience authentically. That possibility occurs when man gets isolated from the domination of the they-self, but then is that an ontical possibility? The answer is "no." As fallen man can still hear the call of the authentic self, because as long as he is man, authenticity and inauthenticity are ways of being open to him. Unfortunately authenticity is only an ontological possibility, but not an ontical possibility; ontologically man is so constituted that authenticity is a possibility for him, but it is not an ontical possibility because fallen man is deprived of the power to choose his original possibilities.[100] So is the call of conscience a futile one? No. Heidegger utilized the concept of "resoluteness" to explain how the passage from inauthentic to authentic existence is effected.[101]

Conscience plays a crucial role in the transition from inauthentic to authentic existence. Conscience makes one dissatisfied with a fallen existence. It creates uneasiness or uncanniness, it dispels the contentment found in the preoccupation with the they-self, it awakens man to responsibility, and thus challenges Dasein to be resolute. It thus initiates the quest for authenticity:

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[99] This is where Heidegger came very close to religion, a factor not too seriously considered in Being and Time, but one which finds more sympathy in Heidegger's later writings.

[100] Heidegger, pp. 333-334.

[101] *Ibid.*, pp. 343-348.

> Resoluteness, as _authentic Being-one's-Self_, does not detach Dasein from its world, nor does it isolate it so that it becomes a free-floating 'I' . . . Resoluteness brings the Self right into its current concernful Being-alongside what is ready-to-hand, and pushes it into solicitous Being with others . . . Dasein's resoluteness towards itself is what first makes it possible to let the others who are with it 'be' in their ownmost potentiality-for-Being, and to co-disclose this potentiality in the solicitude which leaps forth and liberates. When Dasein is resolute, it can become the 'conscience' of others. Only by authentically Being-their-selves in resoluteness can people authentically be with one another--not by ambiguous and jealous stipulations and talkative fraternizing in the 'they' and in what 'they' want to undertake.[102]

This is to rest a lot of weight on conscience, but Heidegger himself believed his analysis of conscience could carry the load.[103] He went on to consider how temporality further supports his analysis.

III. _Temporality_.

So far we have examined Heidegger's analysis of the existential analytic, spotlighting his emphasis on relation (Being-in-the-world, Being-with-others), death and conscience. We now reach a point where we can go beyond articulating Dasein in its wholeness and authenticity.

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[102] _Ibid_., pp. 344-345.

[103] _Ibid_., p. 348.

Postulating Dasein as possibility, Heidegger had rejected the idea that the existent can be conceived as a substance. Therefore, instead of philosophizing in terms of categories, one philosophizes in terms of existentialia.[104] When one regards the self as a substantial entity, one thinks of the self in terms of an enduring thinghood, and thinghood is an inappropriate as well as inadequate model for spelling out existence. We have seen how selfhood is something to be won; it is not given-made in human existence, i.e., the self is not a "given," but rather it is a possibility to be realized or lost. Therefore, the concept of selfhood or existence is a dynamic one, and thinghood is too static for such a dynamic concept. To do justice to such a dynamic concept, we have to find a more adequate model, and Heidegger believed that he had found it--*temporality*.[105]

Temporality with its three dimensions of the present, past, and future reminds us of the threefold structure of care, as possibility (the projecting of what is to come), facticity (accepting what has been), and falling (preoccupation with the present.) To conceive of the self as temporality further distinguishes Dasein from entities or even animals. Substance (entity) endures through time. Of course it is involved in and changes with time, but its relation to time is an external one, i.e., it hops from one "now" to another, and as far as we know its past and future are of no intrinsic significance to it.[106] However, the past and future of an existent are of great importance. As projecting, he already has a foot in the future, while as thrown, he is always one who has already been.

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[104] *Supra*, p. 40.

[105] Heidegger, pp. 370-372.

In the inauthentic existence, Dasein hops from one concern to another, but in authentic existence the ecstases of temporality (past, present, and future) are fully unified. By anticipating Being-toward-death, Dasein has already projected himself to what is to come; by answering to the call of conscience, Dasein takes over in responsibility his factical guiltiness, i.e., Dasein appropriates what has been. Through the appropriation of both the "ahead" and the "already," Dasein is liberated for authentic resoluteness in the present situation:

> Coming back to itself futurally, resoluteness brings itself into the situation by making present. The character of 'having been' arises from the future, and in such a way that the future which 'has been' (or better, which 'is in the process of having been')releases from itself the Present. This phenomenon has the unity of a future which makes present in the process of having been; we designate it as 'temporality.' Only in so far as Dasein has the definite character of temporality, is the authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-whole of anticipatory resoluteness, as we have described it, made possible for Dasein itself. Temporality reveals itself as the meaning of authentic care.[107]

Individuality is a becoming emergent from the possibilities that are given to it in its Being-in-the-world. An individual starts out by conforming to the past he has inherited. Thus anticipatory evolution is the decision of Dasein to become itself by making a decision to be itself in the midst of the possibilities given to it by its Being-in-the-world. There is no individuality without resolution. The true self can appear and disappear, i.e., the possibility of ceasing to be is indigenous to Dasein. Its identity can get weak, or even dissolved in the they-self.

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[106] Ibid., p. 377.

[107] Ibid., p. 374.

How you become determines what you become. This is the how of Dasein's decision. Becomingness is implied, contained in Being.[108] Thus becomingness and whatness are closely related in Heidegger's philosophy. The second notion implies the first; it does not flow organically from the first, but the vice versa is true.

The call of conscience is the summons to be an emergent; it is the lure, appeal, or impulse to be an emergent authentic self. Thus individuality emerges out of the threat of non-being whose ultimate is death.

Temporality is, for Heidegger, the foundation of man.[109] "Our provisional aim is the Interpretation of time as the possible horizon for any understanding whatsoever of Being."[110] When Dasein

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[108] Infra, pp. 119-120.

[109] Heidegger, p. 375.

[110] Ibid., p. 1.

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is ontologically shown in its facticity, in its relation to the world, temporality is revealed as that which makes Dasein's existence possible.[111] Temporality is thus a key notion.

Temporality is "the unity of a future which makes present in the process of having been," the unity which is the meaning of care. This unity is an ecstatical unity, i.e., Dasein has the ability to step outside of itself in order to be itself.[112] Dasein exists in terms of other Daseins and other entities. This is where Dasein gets its possibilities; Dasein does not get swallowed up in its possibilities. It is in relation to other Daseins and things that Dasein itself is. Thus when in the ecstasy of temporality Dasein stands "outside" of itself, it nevertheless remains itself:

> The phenomena of the "towards . . .," the "to . . .," and the "alongside . . .," make temporality manifest as the εκστατικόν pure and simple. Temporality is the primordial 'out-of-itself' in and for itself. We therefore call the phenomena of the future, the character of having been, and the Present, the "ecstases" of temporality.[113]

In temporality Dasein is always in a world, is always *there* [Da], and is there in such a manner that it stretches itself along in the ecstases of past, present, and future. It "is" at all times the wholeness of its past, present, and future.

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[111] *Ibid*., pp. 456, 486.

[112] *Ibid*., pp. 374-377.

[113] *Ibid*., p. 377.

Dasein moves towards its future by making itself a present in the world because it has already been doing this in the world.[114]

Heidegger wanted to say that the primordial situation of authentic existence is one in which man is very close to the environment and to other Daseins. There is an inter-reaction between man and man, and man and things which truly constitutes the spatio-temporal world. In its primordial temporality as stretched for and aft in its world, Dasein knows the truth of its Being.

In temporality the future is all-important. "The primary meaning of existentiality is the future."[115] Though one's possibilities are determined by the past, and though one's Being in the world now is what is an issue for Dasein, yet "the primary phenomenon of primordial and authentic temporality is the future."[116] It is with the future that the notion of emergence is associated. Heidegger himself had said:

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[114] In process philosophy, one would say that prehension involves three elements. There is: (a) the "subject" receiving; (b) the "datum;" (c) the "subjective form," which is how that subject prehends the datum. Categorically speaking, the present occasion's prehension of the past actual entity is the activity which effects the objectification of the past actuality. The antecedent past is "active" only as an objectively immortal, stubborn fact. Activity really refers to the immediate subject's absorption of the object. As a datum, the past occasion's function is not immediate, but is "itself" a settled fact. As satisfaction, it is now divisible and susceptible to abstraction from its own formal constitution. A.N. Whitehead, Process and Reality, (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1960), pp. 337, 363-364.

[115] Heidegger, p. 376.

[116] Ibid., p. 378.

> And *only because* factical Dasein *is* thus *awaiting* its potentiality-for-Being, and *is awaiting* this potentiality in terms of that with which it concerns itself, can it *expect* anything and wait for it [*erwarten und warten auf*]. . . . In each case some sort of awaiting must have disclosed the horizon and the range from which something can be expected. *Expecting is founded upon awaiting, and is a mode of that future which temporalizes itself authentically as anticipation*. Hence there lies in anticipation a more primordial Being-towards-death than in the concernful expecting of it.[117]

Because of the priority of the futural mode of temporality, temporality is finite, i.e., the authentic future is Being-towards-one's-Self which is Being-towards-one's-death.[118] Once again we see that death has more than just a coincidental role in Heidegger's philosophy.

Non-being has its place in the Being of Dasein as temporality. Temporality is the unity of care, the essential characteristic of Dasein as it expresses itself in solicitude in the world. Non-being is primordially founded in the structure of care. So is death:

> Death, as the end of Dasein, is Dasein's ownmost possibility . . . non-relational, certain and as such indefinite, not to be outstripped. Death is as Dasein's end, in the Being of this entity towards its end.[119]

Dasein always "is" towards its death, but it may be so authentically

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[117] *Ibid*., p. 387.

[118] *Ibid*., pp. 378-380.

[119] *Ibid*., p. 303.

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or inauthentically. Death is Dasein's ownmost, non-relational possibility. By anticipating death as a constant threat of its existence, Dasein attains the wholeness of selfhood.[120] Thus there is a call for resoluteness. Resoluteness is the primordial truth of existence as one's ownmost potentiality-for-Being.[121] This suggests that Dasein seeks itself as coming towards itself. It does this by receiving itself from the future out of its past in terms of the present. Thus the ecstatical unity of temporality serves as the unity of anticipatory resoluteness.[122]

A few more words on the question of the priority of the futural modes of temporality and the question of the importance of the finitude of temporality before we move on to temporality and historicality:

To be authentic is to anticipate death resolutely. It is only when Dasein considers non-Being as part and parcel of its Being that it can be the truth of its own Being. Death belongs fundamentally to the futural mode of temporality. All possibilities must be regarded futurally. If Dasein is to be authentic, then it must be so in the priority of the futural mode.

The temporality of Dasein is finite because it is coming toward itself in the light of its own non-Being. This enables Dasein to be authentic; it is enabled to regard its thrown possibilities as its own rather than those of the they-self. It discovers that its past is its own, and it makes its possibilities present in such fashion that is authentic and whole. In the ecstatical unity of finite temporality, Dasein is at all times the wholeness of its past, present, and future.

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[120] Supra, pp. 75-77.

[121] Heidegger, pp. 306-310.

[122] Ibid., p. 388.

We now move on to temporality and historicality. By now it is obvious that to appreciate the temporal character of existence is also to recognize it as historical. We have stressed the relation of Dasein to itself, to other Daseins, and to the world.[123] Temporality and historicality involve relations. Therefore the temporality of Dasein is caught up in a nexus, i.e., a wider movement of history, and every Dasein shares the common problems of its group, age, and generation. Each Dasein not only has to consider its past, present, and future, but also the past, present, and future of its society. It does not take too much effort to see the importance of history when one considers man.

Much confusion surrounds the term "history," and it does not help one wee bit to see history used to signify (i) historical actuality, or the stream of history and (ii) a study of history. Heidegger circumvented this problem by using Geschichte for the stream of history, and Historie for the study of history:

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[123] Supra, pp. 53-55.

> Heidegger makes much of the distinction between '*Historie*' and '*Geschichte*' and the corresponding adjectives '*historisch*' and '*geschichtlich*.' '*Historie*' stands for what Heidegger calls a 'science of history.' (see H. 375, 378). '*Geschichte*' usually stands for the kind of 'history' that actually *happens*. We shall as a rule translate these respectively as 'historiology' and 'history,' following similar conventions in handling the two adjectives.[124]

However one needs to say that the two are related. Only because man is thoroughly historical can he study history, i.e., man can study history precisely because he, as an historical existent, has intimate knowledge of historical reality. As a deliberating, future-making, and limit-setting creature, man not only sees history being made, but he also makes history. Thus the study of history and the historical reality are related.[125]

Heidegger then went on to say two more things on history. (i) It is a mistake to regard history as having only to do with the past.[126] Dasein is always historical and is always future-oriented. By studying history, one studies man and learns about the possibilities of his existence. Knowledge of the possibilities of his existence should enlarge the understanding about the situation a man finds himself in. Therefore, knowledge of the past can be brought to bear on the contemporary situation. A study of history does not stop at memorizing past facts; it should utilize the knowledge of past facts to help solve the contemporary problems.[127]

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[124] Heidegger, p. 30, footnote

[125] *Ibid*., p. 433.

[126] *Ibid*., pp. 430-431.

[127] *Ibid*., p. 432.

(ii) If history is not confined to the past but has to do with the present and future as well, then it must be studied existentially:

> Dasein factically has its 'history,' and it can have something of the sort because the Being of this entity is constituted by historicality. We must now justify this thesis, with the aim of expounding the ontological problem of history as an existential one.[128]

Historical events occur only because they are related to man, e.g., an earthquake has significance only because human lives are involved. As far as we know, a thousand earthquakes per se are insignificant if they do not affect man directly or indirectly. Thus phenomena like earthquakes, and the documents, monuments, etc., that record them are secondary. What is primary is man himself, and man has to be understood existentially. Techniques employed to study phenomena are inapplicable in one study of man because human existence is possibility and not a static fact.

Extending this argument, one can say that the stuff of history is possibility rather than mere fact. This does not put history on the same level as legends or mythology because history deals with factical possibilities, not imaginary possibilities. Admittedly, historians are not interested in all the factical possibilities of mankind, but only in those possibilities that open up new vistas of the Dasein, those that explore the authentic possibilities of existence.[129]

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[128] Ibid., p. 434.

[129] Ibid., pp. 435-436.

Thus history is studied because we want to "fetch again" or "bring back" or "repeat" those authentic possibilities of existence that were available in the past, and that will be of great importance to us today, e.g., a study of the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. ought to show where and how the authentic possibilities were wasted, and how they could and should be corrected today. So history shows the authentic "repeatable" possibilities of Dasein, though "repeatable" is a poor translation of wiederholbar. Wiederholen means "to fetch again," "to repeat," or "do over again," but Heidegger wanted to depart from these meanings. To him wiederholen is not a mechanical repetition or an endeavor to reconstitute the past; rather it means to go back to the past and retrieve former possibilities which are explicitly handed down:

> The resoluteness which comes back to itself and hands itself down, then becomes the repetition of a possibility of existence that has come down to us. Repeating is handing down explicitly--that is to say, going back into the possibilities of the Dasein that has-been-there.[130] (We may add: with the idea of retrieving the authentic past possibilities.)

So "retrievable" seems a better translation for Wiederholbar. History is studied with the idea of going into the past in such manner that one fetches back or retrieves the possibilities which it contains and makes-present these authentic possibilities now:

> Only by historicality which is factical and authentic can the history of what has-been-there, as a resolute fate, be disclosed

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[130] Ibid., p. 437.

> in such manner that in repetition the 'force' of the possible gets struck home into one's factical existence--in other words, that it comes toward that existence in its futural character.[131]

It is in this sense that we get a real "happening," to use a current slang. It is in this sense that we see the wholeness of actual Dasein, with its potentialities of authentic and inauthentic existence, from its ground, i.e., from temporality. The purpose of examining the existential analytic is the elaboration of the problem of Being as such. If the wholeness of Dasein is found to be grounded in temporality, then temporality, as the ecstatic "outside-of-itself," is the most likely candidate to account for the ecstatic "projection" of Being as such. The last paragraph of *Being and Time* very strongly states that time lights up the horizon of Being:

> The existential-ontological constitution of Dasein's totality is grounded in temporality. *Hence the ecstatical projection of Being must be made possible by some primordial way in which ecstatical temporality temporalizes*.[132] (Italics mine.)

This brings us back to Being which we left dangling in the air at the beginning of this chapter.[133] We have dealt with existence; we now give the other half. It was claimed that Heidegger's trend of thought fell into two parts. The first part was mainly concerned with an examination of human existence, with the hope that the examination will yield a better comprehension of Being. The second part was directly concerned with Being, and Dasein is now understood in the light of Being. A _prima facie_ scrutiny might conclude that the two parts are contradictory, but we have asserted that the _massive dialectic_ that links the two parts serves as an antidote to any trace of contradiction. The one concern of Heidegger was to know more of Being, but since there is no straightforward method one can use to study Being, one has to study Being _via_ Dasein. If Dasein were to be more adequately understood, it has to be understood in the light of Being. We now try to see how that works.

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[131] *Ibid*., p. 447.

[132] *Ibid*., p. 488.

[133] *Supra*, pp. 46-48.

Heidegger's inaugural lecture at Freiburg dealt with the thorny question: _Was ist Metaphysik?_[134] He began his lecture by mentioning the various disciplines studied in a university. They have one thing in common, viz, they claim to deal with what is, with the beings, with the things that are.[135] Man, himself a being, throws himself into the world of beings in order to understand what and how things really are. "This distinct world-relationship to what-is in itself is sustained and guided by a freely chosen attitude on the part of our human existence."[136] Modern science claims to be submissive before what-is, so that this may reveal itself. It is objective and factual. It studies what-is, and nothing else.

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[134] _Was ist Metaphysik?_ An English translation of the lecture and postscript is found in _Existence and Being_, ed. W. Brock (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1949), pp. 355-392.

[135] _Metaphysik_, p. 356.

[136] _Ibid._, p. 357.

It is this "nothing else" that Heidegger paid attention to. Science is not directly interested in this nothing else, though to emphasize its objectivity, it often claims to be dealing with what-is and nothing else. This nothing else is the metaphysical question for Heidegger. Questions inevitably pop out when such a claim is made. Was Heidegger kidding his audience? How could he say such a thing? Let us see how he did it.

Heidegger claimed that the idea of "nothing" is not derived from negation. Rather the reverse is true. "The question as to the what and wherefore of Nothing turns the thing questioned into its opposite. The question deprives itself of its own object."[137] In encountering the "nothing" that Dasein has in its very being, one obtains the idea of negation. To shed light on this complex notion, we bring to mind the role played by anxiety. We have seen how anxiety reveals to us the character of Dasein as delivered over to death.[138] It is the encounter with the nothingness that quintessentially belongs to a Being-towards-death that was claimed by Heidegger as the primary meaning of nothingness. To light up nothingness Heidegger developed his idea of anxiety.[139]

Anxiety not only discloses the finitude of human existence, but it also shows how the totality of beings sinks into nothing:

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[137] _Ibid_., p. 360.

[138] _Supra_, pp. 71-73.

[139] _Metaphysik_, pp. 365-367.

> All things and we with them, sink into a sort of indifference. But not in the sense that everything simply disappears; rather, in the very act of drawing away from us everything turns towards us. This withdrawal of what-is-in-totality, which then crowds round us in dread, this is what oppresses us. There is nothing to hold on to. The only thing that remains and overwhelms us whilst what-is slips away, is this "nothing."[140]

Thus nothing becomes the foil for Being, i.e., against the background of nothing can anything stand out as something that is. Against the foil of nothing, we notice with wonder that there is something. Being surrounds us all the time, but most of the time it is unnoticed. What we notice are particular beings, the entities and persons that are, but when these sink to nothing we are struck by the being in virtue of which they are. We are awed by the condition that there may be anything whatsoever, i.e., we are open to the wonder of Being. "The essence of Nothing as original nihilation lies in this: that it alone brings Dasein face to face with what-is as such."[141]

Naturally objections abound when one comes across such an exposition of nothingness. Heidegger dealt with three major objections in the postscript.

(i) The first objection insists that Heidegger presented us with an unmitigated nihilism, that he over-emphasized nothing and seemed to advocate an attitude of indifference as to whether one lives or dies. Heidegger objected to this interpretation. Science investigates what-is but Being can never be regarded as a what-is, an entity; therefore science never deals with Being. From the point of view that is solely interested in what-is and nothing else, Being belongs to the nothing else:

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[140] Ibid., p. 366.

[141] Ibid., p. 369.

> It would be premature to stop thinking at this point and adopt the facile explanation that Nothing is merely the nugatory, equating it with the non-existent [_das_ _Wesenlose_]. Instead of giving way to such precipitate and empty ingenuity and abandoning Nothing in all its mysterious multiplicity of meanings, we should rather equip ourselves and make ready for one thing only: to experience in Nothing the vastness of that which gives every being the warrant to be. That is Being itself. Without Being, whose unfathomable and unmanifest essence is vouchsafed us by Nothing in essential dread, (anxiety) everything that "is" would remain Beinglessness [_Sein-losigkeit_]. But this too, in its turn, is not nugatory Nothing, assuming that it is of the truth of Being that Being may be without what-is, but never what is without Being.[142]

(ii). The second objection claims that too much emphasis is laid on anxiety, leading to morbidity and its appeal is made to the neurotic but not the healthy-minded. Again Heidegger objected to this interpretation.[143] We have already answered to this objection when we asserted that it takes a brave and mature person to face anxiety.[144] Heidegger then developed the notion that anxiety makes it possible for Dasein to be aware of Being:

> Readiness for dread (anxiety) is to say "Yes!" to the inwardness of things, to fulfill the highest demand which alone touches man to the quick. Man alone of all beings, when addressed by the voice of Being, experiences the marvel of marvels: that what-is is. The clear courage for essential dread (anxiety) guarantees

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[142] _Ibid_., pp. 384-385.

[143] _Ibid_., pp. 385-387.

[144] _Supra_, pp. 71-73.

> that most mysterious of all possibilities: the experience of Being . . . . Awe clears and unfolds that region of human being within which man endures, as at home, in the enduring.[145]

(iii). The third objection states that logic has been forsaken, and in its place has been substituted a philosophy of feeling. In a way, this objection is true, i.e., Heidegger did not use the logic of scientific inquiry, but how on earth can the logic of scientific inquiry be employed to study man, who is not a thing but possibility? Heidegger's ontological inquiry has its own logic, and Heidegger did present a description of the type of thinking that is peculiar to an ontological investigation.[146]

Heidegger called this thinking "primordial" or "essential" thinking,[147] and contrasted it with calculative thinking which operates in the scientific inquiry. Calculative thinking is aimed at mastering and utilizing the phenomena under examination. "Primordial" or "essential" thinking is meditative, and Being has the initiative in primordial thinking. We await the address of Being, and here Heidegger seemed to be a mystic. We seem to encounter a different Heidegger here, the so-called "later" Heidegger, and it behooves us

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[145] Metaphysik, p. 386.

[146] Ibid., pp. 387-392. It is now acknowledged that there are many language-games instead of the sole scientific inquiry (sense-verification). Cf. L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, (New York: Macmillan, 1953), 222e.

[147] Metaphysik, p. 389.

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to see how this later Heidegger is linked to the earlier Heidegger.

It is quite obvious to anyone who has some knowledge of Heidegger's works that there is a considerable difference between the earlier and the later Heidegger. In these few concluding pages we propose to acknowledge the differences in emphasis, and at the same time attempt to see how the earlier and later Heideggers are and should be linked together. Consequently, we will sift out a few areas which light up the emphases of the two Heideggers.

(a). We have briefly touched on one such area, viz., the different levels of thinking, and we now try to elaborate on it. We have said that calculative thinking characterizes scientific inquiry; it is the type of thinking aimed at mastering things. It is the type of thinking associated with practical concerns, e.g. one studies the pressure belts to predict the weather conditions with the purpose of readying oneself for storms, tornadoes, etc. This is the type of thinking one comes across in Heidegger's understanding of the existential analytic in Being and Time.[148] In Heidegger's later works, the emphasis is on "primordial" or "essential" thinking, the type of thinking that is passive and meditative. It is not done by us, but it is the "occurrence of Being" in us, i.e., it is a kind of "revelation," a lighting up of an idea occasioned by

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[148] Infra, pp. 109-111.

Being.[149]

Is this a radical shift? We do not think so. Already in Being and Time, Heidegger had claimed that history is as scientific as science.[150] A historian thinks "repetitively," i.e., he "enters into" the thought of the historical event, document, or monument that records the historical event, and "thinks with" the author or recorder of the historical event. We can consider repetitive thinking as a bridge linking calculative and primordial thinking. In his An Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger claimed that the most effective way to understand a text, poetry, history, etc., is to hear what they have to say instead of imposing our presuppositions upon them,[151] i.e., exegesis instead of eisegesis. From this repetitive thinking, one automatically crosses over to primordial thinking where one awaits the address of Being.

(b). ἀλήθεια in Being and Time is interpreted not in terms of agreement with facts, or a proposition, or a sentence, but as "unhiddenness." Dasein can be the truth by stripping away the concealments that becloud "the core of the matter," so to speak.

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[149] M. Heidegger, Existence and Being, ed. W. Brock (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1949), p. 387.

[150] Being and Time, pp. 429-431.

[151] M. Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. R. Manheim (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), p. 146.

ἀλήθεια seems to get a different meaning in The Essence of Truth where Heidegger spoke of truth as "letting-be":

> If we translate ἀλήθεια by "unconcealment" or "revealment" instead of truth, the translation is not only more "literal" but it also requires us to revise our ordinary idea of truth in the sense of propositional correctitude and trace it back to that still uncomprehended quality: the revealedness [Entborgenheit]. and revelation [Entbergung] of what-is. Participation in the revealed nature of what-is does not stop there; it develops into a retirement before it is so that what-is may reveal itself as *what* and *how* it is, and the approximation which represents it in the statement may take it for a criterion. In this manner "letting-be" exposes itself [setzt sich aus] to what-is-as-such and brings all behaviour into the open [versetzt ins Offene]. "Letting-be," i.e., freedom, is in its own self "ex-posing" [aus-setzend] and "ex-sistent" [ek-sistent].[152]

Comparing Being and Time and Being and Existence we see that the former claims that Dasein is the locus of truth, the latter, truth belongs to Being. Has a logical hiatus taken place? Not really. Already in Being and Time Heidegger had asserted that Dasein is the clearing [Lichtung] in Being, the place where Being becomes transparent to itself.[153] Man is the only being who has an understanding of Being; man is the *locus* of the presence of Being.[154] From here it is only natural that we move from the notion that man is the locus of truth to the notion that truth belongs to Being.

(c). We now come to existence and Being. We have seen how the earlier Heidegger was preoccupied with existence, but his later

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[152] *Existence and Being*, pp. 333-334.

[153] *Being and Time*, p. 171. [154] *Ibid.*, pp. 78-80.

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writings zero in on Being.[155] By "existence," Heidegger meant human existence and his Being and Time very brilliantly portrays his understanding of existence. The later Heidegger concentrated on Being where Being is said to be the transcendans pure and simple.[156] Again Heidegger could talk of Being as the "wholly other" to all entities; Being is the incomparable and transcendent, lying beyond all categories of thought and cannot be subsumed under any of them.[157] Are the two Heideggers saying different things? No! A closer scrutiny will reveal the interrelatedness of the earlier and later Heidegger.

From first to last, Heidegger's sole concern was with Being. His Being and Time was designed to study Being and was not primarily a treatise about man. Man or Dasein was used to light up the question of Being.[158] Heidegger's analysis of the existential analytic never became an end in itself, and man was never the measure of all things, i.e., Heidegger fought shy of being called a philosophical anthropologist. Instead he insisted that "the analytic of Dasein remains wholly oriented towards the guiding task of working out the question of Being."[159] Man *per se* was never discussed by Heidegger, i.e., Heidegger was only interested in man in his ontological dimension. Heidegger himself affirmed his interest in fundamental ontology, but not anthropology.[160] He was interested in the being of the being for whom the meaning of Being has become an issue.

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[155] Supra, p. 100.

[156] M. Heidegger, The Question of Being, trans. William Kluback and J.T. Wilde (New York: Twayne, 1958), pp. 56-57.

[157] Being and Existence, pp. 389-392.

[158] Supra, p. 44.

There is a circularity in Heidegger's writings and he himself pointed out this fact.[161] To know Being we study Dasein because Dasein is the only being who has any knowledge of Being. To confirm the result of our inquiry we use Being to test the accuracy of our inquiry. This is very much akin to any scientific inquiry and interpretation. Interpretation would not take place if we knew nothing of what was to be interpreted; interpretation would be unnecessary if there was not something hidden from us that has to be brought out into the open. Therefore, there is a relatedness backward and forward. This applies to the study of existence and Being. Being is the sole concern of Heidegger, but existence is employed to light up Being and Being is used to correct and confirm the tool (Dasein) used to light up Being.

The above interpretation is confirmed by scholars who have done intensive work on Heidegger.[162] Heidegger himself, in the preface to Father W. J. Richardson's Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought, said:

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[159] *Being and Time*, p. 38.

[160] *Ibid.*, pp. 71-77.

[161] *Ibid.*, pp. 27-28, 193-195.

> The distinction you [Father Richardson] make between Heidegger I and II is justified only on the condition that this is kept constantly in mind; only by way of what Heidegger I has thought does one gain access to what is to-be-thought- by Heidegger II. But the thought of Heidegger I becomes possible only if it is contained in Heidegger II.[163]
>
> ....

At the beginning of the chapter we asserted that Heidegger must be considered a twentieth century intellectual giant. We now try to justify such a claim. One criterion for assessing the importance of a thinker is the relevance of the problems originally envisaged by him, the intensity and consistency with which he deals with them, and the clarity of his exposition. The corollary of this criterion is, under the influence of the thinker, his students or readers are driven to view the world with a perspective that gives meanings to factors previously ignored or unthought of. Judged by this criterion, Heidegger must be considered a maker of thought, so to speak. We select a few areas where his influence has been widely acknowledged.

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[162] Cf. Being and Existence, pp. 134-136.
Laszlo Verseny, Heidegger, Being, and Truth, (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1965), pp. 3-5.
J.S. Kockelmans, Martin Heidegger: A First Introduction to His Philosophy, (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1965), pp. 141-143.

[163] William J. Richardson, Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought, (Martinus Nijhoff: The Hague, 1963), p. xxii.

(i) We begin with the doctrine of man. For centuries, man has been understood in terms of substance, and the doctrine of a substantial self has understood man as a kind of dual being. Descartes gave the classic formulation of the substantial self when he described man as *res extensa* and *res cogitans*, body and mind respectively. The *res extensa* is the material substance that occupies space; the *res cogitans* is the immaterial substance whose function is to think. *Res* (Latin for thing, object, matter, etc.) was used to describe body and mind, and consequently the explanatory model for the self is "thinghood,"[164] Heidegger did not like this model, and therefore he wished to escalate the war against the traditional formulation of the self as a material entity. His contribution here is his consideration for *temporality*, a fact that was either forgotten or overlooked by some philosophers.

Man is understood in terms of possibility instead of substance. As possibility, he can either be or cease to be; he can be at-one with

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[164] Cf. John Macmurray argued that when the self is understood as substance, then the self is explained on the analogy of a material entity. This is inadequate because the self cannot be explicated in terms of thinghood; the self is more dynamic and complex than a thing. "For constructive philosophy the task was to determine a logical schema of organic unity through which all experience might be coherently thought: or--to express it otherwise--to reject the Cartesian view that the Self is a substance and substitute for it the doctrine that the Self is an organism." *The Self as Agent*, (London: Faber & Faber, 1957), p. 81.

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himself, or he can war against himself.[165] Man has to attain to himself, i.e., his selfhood is not given ready-made, but is something to be won. In current terminology, we say that the self is not a "given," but is a possibility to be realized or lost. Therefore the self is active and dynamic, not a static substance. The self is a becoming emergent from the possibilities that are given to it in its being-in-the-world; the self starts out by conforming to the inherited past. Thus anticipatory evolution is the decision of the self to become itself by making a decision to be itself in the midst of the possibilities given to it by its being-in-the-world. The true self can appear and disappear, i.e., the possibility of ceasing to be is germane to the self. So conceived man is possibility, not a static substance.[166]

(ii) As students of theology, we are inevitably interested in language. Heidegger can be a very illuminating teacher here. In

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[165] *Supra*, pp. 51-53.

[166] Cf. A.N. Whitehead rejected the category of substance interpreted as simple endurance. Notions of an eleatic materialism with its emphasis on changelessness and simple location come under fire. One just does not buy such simple, undifferentiated endurance. Rather one buys the dynamic momentary character of becoming. Consequently *Process and Reality* shows the philosophical shift from a static substance to an ever-emerging occasion, from the microscopic to the macroscopic. Becoming suggests temporality which plays an important role in the ongoing process of becoming. *Process and Reality*, (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1960), pp. 118, 121, 155.

Being and Time, Heidegger regarded language as a human phenomenon. Man expresses himself in language; language is a medium of communication. Expressing and communicating are distinctly human characteristics, and can only be fully appreciated when we take into account the living context within which they take place. Thus Heidegger was right in correlating language analysis with existential analysis.[167] Language gets used in different contexts by people of varying intelligence and culture. To get at the meaning of a sentence one must know how the words were used, e.g., near the region of Lake Toba in Indonesia, there was a severe earthquake. The residents, lacking a scientific understanding of the principles of seismism, interpreted the earthquake as two rival gods trying to get at each other. So the clause "The gods were fighting" per se might be meaningless if the statement is taken as an objective empirical statement, but it makes sense when it is interpreted as an expression of the residents' self-understanding. So forms of discourse like mythology, symbolism, analogy, parable, etc., are legitimate ways of expressing and communicating in the universe of discourse, and are not to be "outlawed" because they fail to meet the requirements of the principle of verification as put out by the logical positivists.[168]

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[167] Being and Time, pp. 202-204. Cf. L. Wittgenstein's emphasis on setting language in its living context instead of seeing whether it meets the standards of the sense-verification principle. Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953), p. 19e.

In his later writings, Heidegger shifted gear. Instead of claiming that man expresses himself in language, we see that language itself speaks, or that language is the voice of Being. Language is the "house of Being." Instead of saying, "man speaks," Heidegger, in his *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, maintained that "language speaks." Man does not use language, but language uses man.[169] If so, to interpret means listening to the address or voice of Being rather than endeavouring an existential translation of what is said. This reminds us of the exhortation of preachers when they read the Scriptures: "*Hear* the Word of God." In this sense Heidegger's shift of emphasis still possesses value for anyone who wishes to make use of Heidegger

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[168] In the days of logical positivism, theology was "outlawed" because it failed to operate within the limits of sense-verification and tautology. Nowadays we are reminded that the question of meaning is prior to the question of truth, i.e., before one can discuss the truth or falsity of a statement, we need to know what it means. Linguistic analysis sees how unsatisfactory it is to maintain that some utterances are more meaningful propositions. Linguistic analysis sees that a method based on *a priori* propositions can only be ruled out *a priori*; therefore, it is unwise to state in advance what kinds of statements are to be regarded as meaningful. Linguistic analysis takes as its task the investigation of the various kinds of language, to see which and what meaning can be assigned to it. *Philosophical Investigations*, pp. 149e, 151e, 218e.

[169] M. Heidegger, *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, (Tubingen: Pfullingen, Neske, 1959), pp. 90, 193, 196.

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in his theological enterprise.[170]

Before leaving language, we do well to dwell on thinking for a while. We have mentioned calculative, repetitive, and primordial thinking. In his later writings, (particularly in his Memorial Address), Heidegger contrasted calculative with primordial thinking.[171] Calculative thinking is aimed at mastery over and utilization of the phenomena under examination. Primordial thinking is meditative, and is aimed at listening to the address of Being. Heidegger has been accused of depreciating science because of his emphasis on primordial thinking, and his love for the Black Forest is cited as an example of his withdrawal from the rough-and-tumble of the twentieth century living. Perhaps, but Heidegger's insistence on primordial thinking can be interpreted as an antidote to the dehumanization of mankind created by calculative thinking whose acme is technology. As such Heidegger could be claimed to have played a prophetic role.

(iii) Heidegger's teaching on Being has been utilized in theological enterprise which fastens on the more positive aspects of

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[170] Heidegger, in correlating language analysis with existential analysis, offered a hermeneutical tool to Bultmann's demythologizing programme. Heidegger, in his emphasis on hearing the address of Being, reminds one of Karl Barth's teaching on the Word of God. It is well known that Heinrich Ott's theology serves as a bridge in linking Bultmann and Barth. Cf. Denken und Sein, (Zollikon: Evangelischer Verlag, 1959).

[171] M. Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking, trans. J. M. Anderson and E. H. Freund, (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), pp. 47-57.

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Heidegger's teaching. Heidegger regarded Being as the *transcendens* pure and simple, yet related to the beings who reflect Being. Immediately one thinks of God who is creator but yet related to the creation. It is now more fashionable to speak of God as being intrinsically related to creation than to assent that God as the creator has nothing to do with creation in the sense that he is not affected by what is going on. An emerging God makes more sense than a God who is eternally perfect and complete.[172] Though it is true that Heidegger had characterized Being as the *transcendens* pure and simple, yet he also spoke of the limitation of Being.[173] This brings us face to face with two problems, viz., how to demonstrate the dynamic character of Being and how to justify identifying God with Being.

It is a well-known fact that Heidegger tried to postulate a dynamic view of Being by utilizing the idea of φύσις. He contended that the early Greek philosophers equated Being with *physis*:

> In the age of the earliest and crucial unfolding of Western philosophy among the Greeks, who first raised the authentic

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[172] It is well known that Charles Hartshorne opted for an emerging God. How can absolute power be of any use to an absolutely (completely impassive) God? To what end is the power to be directed if God, as inclusive of all being (eternally perfect and complete) is not surpassable in some of his aspects? How can we speak of God as love if we deny divine passivity? Is not love exalted as much through its passive as active side? To give negative answers to these questions is to deny "all-pervasive, infinitely fundamental aspects of life-change, variety, complexity, receptivity, sympathy, suffering, anticipation--as relevant to the idea of God." *Man's Vision of God*, (Chicago: Clark and Company, 1941), pp. 105-106, 125.

[173] Heidegger, *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, pp. 95-206.

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> question of the essent as such in its entirety, the essent was called physis.[174]

φύσις has more than one meaning. The first set of meanings highlight the idea of generating, producing, giving birth to or to be born. Heidegger contended that the Latin translation, natura, took over this meaning because natura means "birth." According to Heidegger, this was a mistake that has been perpetuated for several centuries:

> What happened in this translation from the Greek into the Latin is not accidental and harmless; it marks the first stage in the process by which we cut ourselves off and alienated ourselves from the original essence of Greek philosophy.[175]

Heidegger then made a case for equating φύσις with the idea of:

> Self-blossoming emergence (e.g., the blossoming of a rose), opening up, unfolding, that which manifests itself in such unfolding and preserves and endures in it; in short, the realm of things that emerge and linger on.[176]

This is the second set of the meaning of φύσις which has the idea of germinating, springing or growing up.

Two things need emphasis. (i) Being is not and can never be equated with substance because φύσις "is being itself, by virtue of which essents become and remain observable."[177] φύσις is the δύνᾱμις that emerges and endures. (ii) "This power of emerging and enduring includes 'becoming' as well as 'being' in the restricted sense of inert duration."[178] φύσις can be considered to be the process of a-rising, of springing forth from the hidden.

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[174] Ibid., p. 13.

[175] Ibid.

[176] Ibid., p. 14.

[177] Ibid.

Being is not substance. Substance is static and has to do with thinghood. Being "lets-be" and is the energy of existing. Being lets beings and Daseins be, makes them be, and is the prior condition of anything that may be.

Heidegger then contrasted Being to becoming. This contrast has been noted by the early Greek philosophers. The contrast between Being and becoming is less pronounced than the contrast between Being and nothing. Becoming can be said to lie somewhere between Being and nothing. The become must already be, but to become implies, among other things, that it is not yet what it is supposed to be. Plato put it this way: "If there be anything so constituted, as at the same time to be and not to be, must it not lie somewhere between pure being and pure nothing?"[179]

Becoming is related to the become yet distinct from it; stretching the language, we can "equate" the become with Being. Thus we have Being, becoming, and nothing. Being cannot be identified with a static, undifferentiated, changeless ultimate because pure being, simple and indeterminate, is simply nothing:

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[178] Ibid.

[179] Plato, Republic, 477. Quoted by John Macquarrie in his Principles of Christian Theology, (New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1966), p. 101.

> In other words, the fundamental contrast between being and nothing would seem to be made possible only in so far as being includes becoming and gets differentiated, otherwise being and nothing would be indistinguishable.[180]

This seems to be a reasonable retort to those who complain that a philosophy or theology resting on Being is bound to be static in its outlook. Their complaint seems to equate Being with static substance, but we have already asserted that Being lets-be, is dynamic, and is not static substance.[181] Being gives meaning to becoming, i.e., becoming is unintelligible apart from Being in which becoming is included else becoming ends up in a chaotic flux. Becoming is only meaningful if there is unity and stability, unity and stability provided by the letting-be of Being.

We now deal with Being and God. To begin with, it is quite obvious that Being and God are not synonymous. For most people, the word "God" presupposes an attitude of faith and commitment. Thus "God" is a loaded word, signifying an attitude of commitment, reverence, worship, etc. Being, on the other hand, is a "neutral" word, but our exposition of the letting-be of Being, the empowering power that enables

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[180] Principles, p. 101.

[181] Thus Heidegger's concept of being . . . is not the traditional concept of fixed, static being, but the concept of a reality that is by its very nature historic, dynamic, and becoming, embracing, essentially the features also focused by Whitehead's "creativity" or Hartshorne's "process." The Later Heidegger, ed. J. M. Robinson and J. B. Cobb, Jr., (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), p. 171.

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things to be, the prior condition of anything that may be, shows that it is more than a neutral word. It, too, is loaded though it does not have the usual reverential aroma which surrounds the word "God." Heidegger seemed to have substituted Being for God in his philosophy. Naturally, Heidegger himself denied that Being is synonymous with God. According to him: "Das Sein--das ist nicht Gott und nicht ein Weltgrund. . . .[182] Heidegger might hesitate equating Being with God, but his exposition of Being gives us adequate confidence to assert that his concept of Being comes pretty close to what Christians have affirmed concerning God.

The idea of God has undergone numerous changes. Initially, God was conceived of in mythological terms, possessing anthropomorphical attributes. Then the anthropomorphisms were eliminated in due course by traditional theism which spotlighted the transcendental features of God. According to traditional theism, God was the almighty being in addition to the beings that are in the world. He "dwelt" metaphorically beyond the world. This is a weakness of traditional theism that current philosophy tries to eliminate. God is not a being, albeit almighty, but to borrow Heidegger's term, he is Being-itself--the power that lets-be, the prior condition of anything that may be. In this sense God is Being-itself.

In trying to explain the world, philosophers and scientists have to grapple with the "creator," or "source of origin" of this world. Heidegger posed the problem this way: "Why is there Being at all--why not far rather Nothing?"[183] To Heidegger, the empowering power is Being; to Christians it is God. It is on this level and in this context that we equate God with Being-itself.[184]

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[182] M. Heidegger, Uber Den Humanismus, (Frankfurt A. M.: Vittorio Klostermann, 1949), p. 19.

Our exposition of Heidegger's teaching on Being as the empowering power, enabling beings and Daseins to be, and primarily known by Daseins; the relation of Dasein to other Daseins and the world; temporality as the ecstatical unity of the past, present, and future reflects the contemporary Weltanschauung's mood and understanding of life in general. As such Heidegger's philosophy has its place in our life. We will now proceed to see how Heidegger's philosophy is made use of in Macquarrie's existential-ontological perspective.

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[183] What is Metaphysics?, p. 380.

[184] Karl Löwith admitted the difficulty of focusing the exact meaning of Being in Heidegger's philosophy; he sarcastically added: "Those who will come nearest to understanding it are believers, who think they find in Heidegger's ontological talk of 'revelation' and 'unveiling' an access to the Christian revelation of God who too is not a being--believers who as such do not pretend to comprehend with the reason the God of revelation." Quoted in The Later Heidegger and Theology, p. 14. Our reply to Löwith is: any conceptual tool is a help to us in our attempt to explicate the meaning of God.

CHAPTER III

THE FOUNDATION-STONE OF MACQUARRIE'S THEOLOGY

It is the purpose of this chapter to analyse the existential-ontological perspective of Macquarrie's theology. In many ways this chapter is repetitious in the sense that Macquarrie utilizes Heidegger's philosophy in his attempt to relate Christian theology to the contemporary mind,[1] and we have made quite an extensive study of Heidegger's basic philosophy in the previous chapter. However, the emphasis is different.

Macquarrie's task and major problem is ". . . the question of how one makes the transition from the language of existence to the language of being . . . which is the question of God-talk."[2] Three things call for immediate and careful consideration, viz., existence,

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[1] Therefore it is Macquarrie's intention to spotlight the Heideggerian emphasis on existence and Being, and to relate that emphasis to Christian theology. Like Bultmann, Macquarrie uses Heidegger's philosophy as a hermeneutical tool, but there is a qualitative difference between Bultmann's and Macquarrie's use of Heidegger's philosophy. Bultmann's use of Heidegger rests primarily on the earlier Heidegger's emphasis as set forth in Being and Time, whereas Macquarrie uses the earlier and later Heidegger. In this sense Macquarrie comes quite close to Heinrich Ott with one important qualification, viz., Macquarrie is not as sympathetic to Barth as Ott is. Cf. James M. Robinson and John B. Cobb, Jr. (eds.), The Later Heidegger and Theology, (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), pp. 3-76.

[2] John Macquarrie, God-talk: An Examination of the Language and Logic of Theology, (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), p. 239.

Being,[3] and the transition from existence to Being. What does this mean? To answer this question we need to probe into, analyse, and unwrap every meaning that we can find in Macquarrie's understanding of existence, Being, and the transition from existence to Being.

There are four stages in our investigation of the transition from the language of existence to the language of Being. The first stage shows how Macquarrie regards selfhood and temporality.[4] Macquarrie departs from an understanding of the self as a material entity and opts for an understanding of the self in terms of temporality. Macquarrie finds that the traditional explanatory model for the self is thinghood.[5] Such a concept is too static for Macquarrie, who articulates a more dynamic view of the self.[6] The second stage shows how Macquarrie expresses his understanding of existence in the light of what he has said concerning selfhood and temporality. The third stage shows the transition from the language of existence to the language of Being. Finally, Macquarrie articulates his understanding of Being. An analysis of these four stages will give us a better comprehension of Macquarrie's existential-ontological perspective.

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[3] "The word 'Being' (capitalized) will be used to translate das Sein; the German expression das seiende, 'that which is,' will be variously translated as 'being' (lower case) or 'entity'." John Macquarrie, Martin Heidegger, (Richmond, Virginia: John Knox Press, 1968), p. 4. Supra, p. 40.

[4] John Macquarrie, Studies in Christian Existentialism, (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1965), pp. 59-76.

[5] Ibid., p. 60.

[6] Ibid., pp. 59-76.

1) Selfhood and Temporality

It has been noticed that Heidegger wished to escalate the war against the traditional formulation of the self as a material entity.[7] Heidegger's contribution here is his emphasis on temporality. Macquarrie thinks that Heidegger's treatment of the self is the key to a better understanding of the self, i.e., "the model for such an understanding of the self is not substantiality or thinghood but rather temporality"[8] which serves as a more viable model in our attempt to understand the self. Three preliminary remarks demand our attention.

To begin with, selfhood is not something tailor-made or a given, but it is something to be won, something to be hammered out in life. The self is not "something" implanted during our birth, but it is a possibility to be actualized or lost. It is unity in the making. In advocating this position, Macquarrie is not alone.[9]

Secondly, if selfhood is something in process, the explanatory model for it cannot be thinghood or substantiality. It has to be temporality. If the basic elucidatory model is thinghood, then the self is likened to and sometimes even understood as an enduring permanent entity, something that is fixed. Since the ongoing developmental character of the self has been affirmed, thinghood as a fundamental explanatory model has been ruled out. Another model is required and this is found in temporality, with its three dimensions of what is, what has been, and what is to come. Obviously, the three ecstases of temporality correspond to the threefold structure of care as possibility (the projecting of what is to come), facticity (the appropriation of what has been), and falling (the concern with the present). The raison d'etre of man is care and it is care that differentiates man from an animal. Therefore, we need to digress temporarily and set forth the threefold structure of care.

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[7] Supra, pp. 48-53, 112-113. [8] Principles, p. 66.

[9] According to Macquarrie, Aristotle spoke of the soul as the "entelechy" of the body, i.e., "the bringing to fulfillment of those potentialities provided by an embodied existence in the world." Augustine's conception of the temporal character of human existence, "a moving process which yet constitutes a whole, reaching back into the past by memory, judging in the present by intellect, and directed into the future by will" serves to buttress Macquarrie's point. Studies, pp. 62-63. Cf. ante, pp. 89-96.

Man is possibility because his existence is in the making. In his case existence precedes essence and not vice versa. Therefore, he always stands in the future, or, to change the metaphor, he always has one foot in what is to come. His being is incomplete because he is on the way to becoming. To all intents and purposes, a rock has a ready-made nature but not so with man. He has to fight for his selfhood. Thus man is possibility. So Macquarrie can say that:

> Dasein is never complete in its Being. To exist is always to be on the way, so that one can never, as it were, pin down the existent at any precise moment and give an exhaustive description. He is constituted by possibilities rather than properties.[10]

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[10] Martin Heidegger, pp. 12-13. For a further discussion on care, see Being and Time, pp. 235-241 and supra, pp. 89-96, which form the basis of our discussion on care.

Man is facticity, i.e., he never has pure possibilities. He finds himself thrown into the world with all its "givens," e.g., race, sex, intelligence, and a host of things that history and society and heredity have chosen for him:

> In other words, he always is as something that has been, so that if possibility relates to the temporal dimension of what is to come, facticity relates to that of what has been. A man's whole past, what he has already done, what others have done before him, the whole situation into which he is "thrown"--these all narrow down the range of possibility before which he stands at any given moment.[11]

The third element in care is falling, which has to do with the present. Falling has to do with man's refusal to accept the past and his tendency to shy away from responsibility towards what is to come. Therefore, man tends to be solely concerned with the present with no thought for the past and the future.

To have care is to hold in balance the three elements of possibility, facticity, and falling,[12] and this is why care is distinctively human because the self is constituted by bringing into unity the complex time-relationship of the past, present, and future. Thinghood with its preoccupation with what is enduringly permanent is too inadequate a tool to articulate selfhood--thus we turn to temporality to express selfhood.

A third preliminary remark has to be made before we fully consider selfhood and temporality. Selfhood has to do with man's active concerns with the world and his active concerns are seen in the chosen courses of action in the world, which are determined by what he wills. In willing man subjects all biological drives to an intelligent will,[13] utilizing all the possibilities provided by the past, present, and future. Willing is definitely different from mere day-dreaming which conjures up unrealistic if not ridiculous possibilities that ignore the role played by the past, present, and future.

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[11] Studies, p. 64.

[12] Care will be better understood when we consider inauthentic and authentic existence. See infra, p. 131.

It is against this background that Macquarrie works out his understanding of selfhood and temporality. We can say that a thing endures through a series of "nows," and we can even say that what a thing is now is affected by the past, and what it will be in the future is contingent on what it is now. However the past, present, and future are related only as successive instants; the only instant which is now is real, while those of the past and the future are unreal. Man is different. He is open to the past and the future in such wise that they are brought into and affect the present:

> Man exists in . . . the three "ecstases" of temporality; he does not just "hop," as it were, from one "now" to the next "now," but "temporalizes" as something that always is in the way of having been and in the way of projecting itself upon what is to come.[14]

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[13] The will is simply a way to describe the whole self in action, or as Austin Farrer expresses it, "'will' is action itself, in the full and personal sense of the verb to 'act'." Quoted by Macquarrie in Studies, p. 64.

[14] Studies, p. 66.

So far we have contrasted what the past, present, and future mean to a thing and to man by saying that man differs from things in the sense that man is so constituted that his past and future do crucially determine and are brought together into his present. We now push the problem a bit harder. The problem of holding the three ecstases of temporality in equilibrium is better appreciated by contrasting authentic and inauthentic existence. This is not a moral evaluation, but a way of affirming whether a self has realized itself or has allowed itself to slip into and merge with the they-self. To realize oneself is to hold in balance the three ecstases of temporality, whereas to live in the they-self is to live solely for the present. In other words, to realize oneself is to be resolute, whereas to sink into the they-self is to be irresolute.

To be inauthentic is to be irresolute, i.e., to be unhealthily preoccupied with the present, to live on the level of an animal or a thing. Thus one hops from one concern to another, from one "now" to another. The controlling factors in such an existence are the chance circumstances and the failure to exercise one's will. Its decisions are made up for it by the they-self or the group. This is not a denial of the inauthentic self's ability to realize itself; it means its potentiality for being a self has been arrested or modified. Its arrestment is seen in the fact that it screens off the future and the past, "and so restricts the temporal dimensions of existence."[15]

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[15] *Ibid.*, p. 67.

We have affirmed that to live in the they-self is to be unhealthily concerned with the present with no thought for the future and the past, and that is inauthentic existence. One is inauthentic too when one does not seriously consider the past and future. Sometimes the future is "taken into consideration," but this is a modified form of screening off the future. This utopian future is seen in the inauthentic self's preoccupation with an unreal future, conjuring up impossible and ridiculous possibilities, a day-dreaming, so to speak. This is different from resoluteness which only considers realistic possibilities. Day-dreaming does not present a person with a choice because the options are impossible, unrealistic, and ludicrous. One, too, can be inauthentically concerned with the past by finding false security with the familiar, but this does not expose oneself to novelty. Thus there is no resoluteness or willing in an inauthentic existence because the three ecstases of temporality are not held in balance; one gets emphasized at the expense and to the detriment of the others and thus the ecstases are not held together:

> By way of summary, we may say then that the inauthentic modes of existence are characterized by the absence of anything like will, decision or resoluteness; and that this condition can be described in temporal terms as an imbalance among the ecstases of temporality. In such imbalance, there is preoccupation with one of the three ecstases to the exclusion or at least the dimming down of the others, and the *typical* [italic mine] case is a dwelling in the present, which modifies existence in the direction of the kind of being belonging to things or animals, conceived as enduring through a succession of mutually exclusive "nows."[16]

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[16] *Ibid.*, pp. 67-68.

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On the other hand, authentic existence holds the ecstases of temporality in balance. There is resoluteness or willing; the self exercises its will to make realistic decisions. It is no longer the morbid concern with the past, present, and future but a realistic acceptance of the heritage of the past, an acknowledgement of actual present possibilities, and a level-headed forging of future possibilities. It is the Augenblick, the moment of vision in which are disclosed the three ecstases of temporality.[17] How then is this authentic existence achieved? Through death and conscience. Actually we have dealt with them in our treatment of Heidegger, but since death and conscience have relevance in Macquarrie's existential-ontological perspective we will deal with them in the appropriate places.[18]

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[17] Footnote #12 indicated that care will be better understood when we deal with inauthentic and authentic existence; yet the above treatment on inauthentic and authentic existence says nothing concerning the place and meaning of care. That was done on purpose, i.e., we wanted to contrast inauthentic and authentic existence, a contrast that will be vitiated by the introduction of care. Thus we prefer to footnote the explanation of care.

The existential analytic discloses a threefold structure in existence, viz., (a) man is ahead-of-himself--here are the phenomena of possibility, projecting, and understanding; (b) man is already-in-a-world--here are the phenomena of facticity, thrownness, and effective states; (c) man is close-to-his-world, so much so that he gets absorbed in it--here are the phenomena of falling, the they-self, and the scattering of possibilities. This threefold structure of possibility, facticity, and falling constitutes man in his everydayness. This is what is known as "care."

However, this is not the last word on "care." We have considered "care"in terms of the everyday or inauthentic existence. We have also said that "care" is the distinctive feature of man, i.e., animals only care for the present, but it is man's ability to utilize the past, present, and future which correspond to the threefold structure of care, viz., facticity, falling, and possibility. We have also said that man usually lives inauthentically, which means that the threefold structure of care or the ecstases of temporality are not held together. Therefore, to hold in balance the threefold structure of care or the ecstases of temporality authentic existence is needed. It is Heidegger's belief that death and conscience make possible the quest for authentic existence.

To articulate further the meaning of the temporality of selfhood, Macquarrie considers the unity of the self, the acceptance of the self, the self in relation to conscience, guilt, and care, and the immortality of the self.

The unity of the self is seen in the fact that we hold a person responsible for a crime he committed in the past. There is an assertion that the accused is the same person who committed the crime. The accused might plead that he was beside himself (in an abnormal state of mind) when he committed the crime, but the fact that he and no one else is accused of the crime shows a common belief that there is such a thing as the unity of the self. How then do we explain the unity of the self?

To explain this unity of the self in terms of the traditional concept of an enduring soul-substance is to court trouble. If we presuppose an enduring soul-substance and if we further presuppose that the same soul might be joined to successive and different bodies, then it is conceivable that Abraham, Socrates, Pilate, Lyndon B. Johnson might be the same person. This is one strong reason why it is inadvisable to base a teaching of the self in an enduring soul-substance. It is more reasonable to affirm that ". . . it is consciousness that constitutes the unity

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[18] For a discussion on death and conscience, see supra, pp. 75-88 and infra, pp. 135-142.

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of the self, so that if . . . I remember an action as my own action, then the same 'I' is involved, and the question about a 'substance' is beside the point."[19]

The point is: the kind of unity exhibited by a chair (substance) as it persists through time differs from the unity in diversity which constitutes a self. The thinghood or substantiality that underlies the unity of the self cannot be applied to the unity of the self because the self is far more complex than a chair. How then can we regard the unity of the self if the self is thought of in terms of temporality rather than substantiality?

If the self is thought of in terms of temporality, the unity of the self is seen and achieved in the master possibility that holds the three ecstases of temporality in balance. The master possibility enjoins us to accept what has been, to utilize what is, and to be open to novelty. The master possibility can be likened to a master perspective which holds everything in position, e.g., a religious faith-commitment engages the whole being of a believer, giving unity, meaning, and direction to all his thoughts and actions.[20]

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[19] Ibid., p. 69.

[20] Studies, p. 70. Cf. Tillich called it "ultimate concern." Systematic Theology (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951), I, 12-14. Whatever name is given, there is the idea that the master possibility provides a perspective that holds together the various concerns of the existent.

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The question of the acceptance of the self calls for a clarification of the content of the master possibility. Nazism has given coherence to the lives of many people. Does it mean that it is as good as Christianity? Macquarrie does not think so.[21] By contrasting willing and mere wishing, Macquarrie points out that the latter overlooks the importance and place of the factical possibilities in that it neglects the heritage and contribution of the past, and deceives itself into thinking that all possibilities are open. This leads to unrealistic possibilities, e.g., the Nazi dream of the master race, which leads to inaction or mal-action and to fantasy. Therefore, the self is not accepted as it is; past actions and events that shape the formation of the present self are not acknowledged, and one dreams of a fantastic future instead of dealing with realistic possibilities.

We are now in a position to ask: What is this master possibility? The answer is death. But before we can elaborate on this we have to digress temporarily to set the discussion on death in its proper setting.

In our discussion on inauthentic and authentic existence we said that the former is characterized by fragmentation, i.e., the ecstases of temporality are not held in balance, and interests and concerns are not held in proper perspective. Therefore, there is no wholeness in inauthentic existence. Secondly, inauthentic existence is characterized by living in the they-self which imposes its conventions and criteria on man living inauthentically. Man is not authentic in the sense of not being his true

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[21] Studies, p. 71.

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self.[22] To break this inauthenticity two phenomena are needed, viz., death, the master perspective that enables man to grasp existence in its wholeness; and conscience, which discloses to man his authentic possibility. Thus the two related phenomena of death and conscience are needed to achieve authentic existence which is characterized by the ecstases of temporality being held together.

After this brief digression we return to death which is regarded as the master possibility that enables us to see existence in its wholeness. *Prima facie* this claim sounds ridiculous. Generally death is regarded as a negative phenomenon especially when we think of the self as something in the making, always ahead of itself, projecting itself into its possibilities. When death strikes, our future chances of gaining completion, selfhood, etc., are obliterated. Therefore, how can death be regarded as a master possibility?

Following Heidegger, Macquarrie asserts that death is not just a rounding off of existence, because frequently death strikes before a man's abilities have reached maturity or it comes long after a man has reached the zenith of his power.[23] Thus death does not bring potentiality into its full fruition, but death does set a boundary. It marks off man, as being-in-the-world, from the nothing into which he sinks when he dies. To be distinguished from the nothing in this fashion is precisely to stand out [*ex-sist*] from it. This is to live authentically because the recognition of the boundary of existence makes one aware that this is his *own* existence. Thus death is one's *ownmost* possibility; authentic existence is existence that has been made one's very own.[24]

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[22] *Supra*, pp. 68-70.

[23] *Studies*, pp. 71-72. See *Supra*, pp. 75-81 for Heidegger's view on death which greatly influences Macquarrie's view; to avoid repetition we presuppose the preceding remarks on death as given in pages 75-81.

If we do not anticipate death, the future is regarded as stretching out indefinitely; thus the sense of urgency and responsibility in life is diminished. But to anticipate death is to acknowledge and accept the fact that all existence is death-oriented, and to do this is to have turned in the direction of authentic existence. Death-oriented existence is existence that is conscious of urgency and responsibility in an existence whose end is just round the corner, and an existence that is moulded and unified by its awareness of the end:

> But to anticipate death and to recognize the boundary of one's existence is to achieve an overarching unity that gathers up the possibilities of existence. We may think of all the possibilities of life as lying this side of the final, decisive possibility of death, so that it is in the face of death that they must be organized into a coherent pattern. Again, the expression is not Heidegger's own, but it may be helpful to us to think of death as a kind of "perspective;" just as a picture is organized and unified by the convergence of its perspectives toward the vanishing-point, so in human life death is the unifying point around which the possibilities of life are to be organized.[25]

This aspect of death as the master possibility emphasizes the unifying perspective in the dimension that lies ahead. We now reverse

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[24] Cf. *Being and Time*, p. 294.

[25] *Martin Heidegger*, p. 31.

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gear and consider facticity, the situation into which we have been thrown and from which alone our possibilities avail.[26] Facticity affirms the many "givens" in life, e.g., man did not choose his race, intelligence, physique, etc.; they were just there and he was born into them. They are the givens in life. In making death the master possibility, the supreme given, Macquarrie asserts ". . . the fact that any authentic resoluteness, any genuine act of commitment, must take up and accept into itself that which is factically given in the situation!"[27]

Thus man is summoned by death to accept the situation into which he has been thrown and from which alone his possibilities are found, i.e., an acceptance of the self and the actual situation in which the self finds itself. It is in this sense that death enables us to see existence in its totality and not as a fragmented entity; there is an unequivocal acceptance of what is factically given in any situation, taking into account what has been given, and being open to novelty.

If death enables us to see existence in its wholeness, conscience will permit us to see existence in its authenticity. Let us unpack this parcel of puzzlement. One basic feature of existence is that man has a relation to himself, i.e., man can be at one with or at war against himself.[28] "Conscience is precisely the disclosure to someone of what he ought to be, of his authentic self."[29] Thus conscience is a Ruf of the authentic self (the unified self) to the self absorbed in the world of the das Man (scattered in its inauthentic immediate concerns). This is possible because the self does not possess a fixed essence, but is always projecting itself into its possibilities. It is possibility or potentiality. It could be what it is supposed to be, and this is what we mean when we say that conscience is the authentic self summoning or addressing the inauthentic self to leave the they-self and be its true self. Thus we need not think that conscience comes to man from outside of himself which ". . . in theological terms [is understood] as the address of God or in naturalistic terms as the veiled utterance of society . . . ."[30] In fact, the call of conscience is different from the voice of society which is the everyday conscience.

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[26] "Heidegger's view that death is the master possibility is not, as is sometimes supposed, an expression of nihilism. Rather it is the recognition in the fullest degree that any resoluteness that can unify the self in more than an illusory way, and that is to say, anything that can properly be called 'willing' rather than mere 'wish,' must have regard to the full temporalizing of existence in all three of its ecstases." Studies., p. 71.

[27] Studies, p. 72.

The everyday conscience is the voice of the they-self that sets its own norms, criteria, and conventions; this is not authentic itself, neither is it conducive to an authentic existence. It is just another way in which the "I" gets buried in and dominated by the "they," depriving the "I" of its possibilities. Man, in his everydayness, is absorbed and lost in the faceless, collective mass known as das Man or the they-self. To secure his authenticity he must dislodge himself from the they-self:

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[28] Supra, pp. 44-45.

[29] Martin Heidegger, p. 32. Also see supra, pp. 81-88 for Heidegger's view on conscience which forms the background of our discussion.

[30] Studies, p. 73.

> It is here that we see the connection between conscience and death . . . for it is death, as the ownmost possibility, that isolates the existent and permits him to be confronted with his true self. Conscience summons the existent to take upon himself the being that is delivered over to death and to project himself resolutely upon it. An authentic existence is in fact a resolute as opposed to an irresolute existence. The latter is scattered, but the former keeps the end in view and in doing so achieves not only a wholeness but also . . . a certain joy in the dispersion of illusions and the exercise of a genuinely free existence.[31]

So far we have dealt with the self in relation to conscience. We now say more of the self in relation to guilt and grace. How guilty is the self? and what is grace? Macquarrie's answer lies in a ". . . frank recognition that will, resoluteness, decision and the like are constantly attended by failure and carry the seeds of guilt within themselves,"[32] i.e., conscience calls one to novelty or potentiality for being, but what has been is so strong that it limits one's choice for novelty. If conscience discloses the possibility of authentic existence but lacks the power to effect its appropriation, then either conscience per se is ineffective or some divine grace is needed to assist man attain authenticity. An elaboration is required to clear up this cryptic remark.[33]

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[31] Martin Heidegger, p. 33.

[32] Studies, p. 74.

A discussion on the relation between conscience and guilt is called for, and here we depend on Heidegger to set the stage for our discussion. We have said that it was Heidegger's contention that hearing and responding to the call of conscience is to be summoned to guiltiness.[34] At first sight this seems paradoxical because ordinarily to respond to the Ruf of conscience is to head for authenticity. At the same time to be guilty implies that something is owing for which one is answerable. However, Heidegger insisted that this understanding of guilt belongs to the world of practical concerns, i.e., it belongs to the world in which fallen man understands himself. To understand properly guilt and conscience is to see that "the summons of conscience to guiltiness is precisely a summons out of the fallen existence that is based on worldly concern."[35] Thus what is lacking is the power to execute the possibilities which conscience requires, viz., responsibility. So guilt comes before every guilty act; as soon as man accepts responsibility, he is guilty because he realizes his inability to execute his responsibility. So he flees from responsibility. If this is true, Heidegger's earlier claim, that

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[33] Macquarrie's treatment of the relation between conscience and guilt in Studies is rather scanty; a more elaborate discussion is found in his An Existentialist Theology: A Comparison of Heidegger and Bultmann, (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1965), pp. 144-153.

[34] Supra, pp. 86-88.

[35] Studies, p. 74.

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conscience discloses to man his authentic possibility and awakens in man in his everydayness an awareness of a lost possibility for authenticity, must be modified.

Judged solely on his understanding on conscience as found in *Being and Time*, Heidegger's concept of conscience is inadequate because conscience discloses to man his authentic possibility, and at the same time when man tries to achieve his authenticity he finds himself unable to do so. Therefore, it was only logical that, in his later writings, Heidegger stressed the initiative and graciousness of Being that enable man to attain to his authentic being. In a word; grace. Conscience discloses to man his authentic possibility, and in doing so it creates dissatisfaction with fallen existence, drives out the satisfaction of living in the they-self, and directs man to his authentic possibilities. However, conscience *per se* cannot effect the quest for authenticity. Grace or the graciousness of Being is needed to enable man to attain to authenticity. Macquarrie explains it thus:

> Conscience . . . can at best awaken in fallen man the awareness of a lost possibility of being. It can disclose to him his ontological or existential possibility of authenticity. But it cannot by any means empower him to choose that possibility. It cannot bring before him the *existentiell* or ontical possibility of authenticity for which he can decide. And it now appears that only some Power, grace, or graciousness of Being outside man, some Power not fallen as man is fallen, can bring to man this concrete possibility of regaining his authentic being. And yet even such a Power could only hold that *existentiell* possibility because it falls within the horizon of man's existential possibility of authenticity, and can therefore be appropriated by man and made his own.[36]

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[36] *An Existentialist Theology*, pp. 148-149. See *supra*, pp. 81-88 on

This is the way Macquarrie provisionally discusses the self in relation to conscience, guilt, and grace, a discussion that will be more fully dealt with. We now move on to the discussion on immortality and the self which will conclude our analysis of selfhood and temporality. This discussion concludes the first stage of our examination of Macquarrie's existential-ontological perspective.

The rejection of the concept of the self as an enduring soul-substance rules out any belief in a continuation of the individual's life beyond death, i.e., "if indeed 'immortality' is conceived of as the unending existence in time of an imperishable soul-substance, conceived on the analogy of the indestructibility of matter, then this does seem to be ruled out."[37] Belief in "natural" immortality, as Macquarrie calls it, is rejected by his assertion that selfhood is something to be won, something that is achieved in the steeple-chase of life. After rejecting

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conscience, and pp. 48-49, 84 on the difference between ontological/ontical existential/existentiell possibilities. In Macquarrie's own words: "An existential ontological possibility is one which is revealed by existential analysis and which belongs to all human existence in virtue of the way this existence is constituted. An existentiell [ontical] possibility is one which is open to me in a particular situation so that I can decide for it. All existentiell possibilities must lie within the horizon of existential possibility; but there may be existential possibilities which are not existentiell possibilities for a given individual at a given time." The Scope of Demythologizing, (London: S.C.M. Press, Ltd., 1960), p. 148.

[37] Studies, p. 75.

the Cartesian dualism, it is difficult, if not impossible, to see how the self could outlive the body and continue indefinitely in time. Furthermore, if the self is conceived of in temporal terms, a timeless self is contradictory.

Macquarrie prefers to affirm "conditional" immortality by which he means ". . . simply that transcending of transience, that rising above the succession of 'now,' which constitutes authentic selfhood itself; so that immortality, or perhaps better, eternal life is . . . the achievement of self hood here in this world."[38] Macquarrie further suggests that God or Being gathers up all time in a vaster unity and that beings, in participating and sharing in Being's overcoming of transience in so far as they are caught up in Being's graciousness, have conditional immortality.[39] Beyond this there is mere speculation concerning immortality.

Let us summarize what we have said so far. We have affirmed that selfhood is something in the making, is an emergent individual. Therefore thinghood or substantiality is too inadequate a handle or tool to serve as a model for understanding selfhood because it is too static. Temporality with its emphasis on the ongoing character, diversity-in-unity, the necessity to hold in balance the three ecstases or its related understanding of possibility, facticity, and falling, the function of death to enable man to see himself in his wholeness, the role of conscience in summoning man to his authentic possibility and grace in effecting that summons, seems to be a more effective basic explanatory model for understanding selfhood. We now turn to Macquarrie's understanding of existence which is the second stage in our investigation of Macquarrie's existential-ontological perspective.

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[38] Ibid., pp. 75-76.

[39] More will be said on Being and grace. See infra, pp. 230-240.

II. Existence.

What is man? Who am I? What constitutes a genuinely human existence? These questions are not new; they have been asked before, e.g., the poignant question of the Psalmist when he queried: "What is man that thou art mindful of him or the son of man that thou dost care for him?"[40] Existence may be defined simply as the fact or state of human life. This definition lacks depth. We now hope to deepen this preliminary definition. Our task is a difficult one and Macquarrie acknowledges this difficulty when he says that "human existence is not only variable, it is also ambiguous and polar, so that even what professes to be only a description of the phenomena of existence is in danger of becoming one-sided."[41]

One way to obtain a clearer understanding of existence is to see what differentiates man from other beings. We have said that existence can be taken to mean "standing out" [ex-sistere, to stand out]. Existence is restrictively used for the kind of Being that belongs to man; cats, hills, trees, etc., are but man alone is said to exist.[42] In confining "existence" to man, we are not, for a moment, denying the reality of cats, hills, trees, etc.; they are real enough, but they lack the kind of Being that permits them to "exist" in the peculiar sense of human existence. Admittedly, this is a tautological way of differentiating man from other beings in the world.

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[40] Psalms 8:4.

[41] Principles, p. 54.

We need to explore the meaning of "standing out." Macquarrie explains it thus:

> Men, cats, trees, rocks all are; they have being, we come across them in the world. But so far as we know, only man is open to his being, in the sense that he not only is, but is aware that he is, and aware, too, in some degree, of what he is. He has his being disclosed to him, and this disclosure, . . . comes not only in understanding but also over the whole range of his affective and conative existing in a world. The expression "in a world" is to be noted. It is not man's inner life that is disclosed to him in some kind of subjective introspection, but his life as already involved in a world of things and persons; without some world, there could not be an existence such as man's.[43]

Three things call for attention: (a) man is possibility; (b) man is individual; and (c) man has a relation to himself of such a kind that he can be at one with or at war against himself.[44]

Man is possibility because he is never complete in his Being, is always in the process of becoming, and is constituted by possibilities rather than properties. Therefore, his existence precedes his essence, i.e., he has to make his "essence" by fulfilling his possibilities or allowing them to pass away. Man is individual; he is himself and not someone else. [Jemeinigkeit]. To all intents and purposes, all cricket-balls are alike; they have the same weight, colour, rotundity, etc., but we cannot say this of man. He is sui generis. Finally man has a relation to himself, i.e., he can be himself or lose himself. He can either exist (to stand out) or he can lose himself in the faceless collective mass.

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[42] Supra, pp. 44, 51-53.

[43] Principles, p. 54.

[44] Supra, pp. 51-53.

Because man is possibility, himself and no one else, and can be or lose himself, his existence is understood as a choice between different possibilities of being and man must use his discretion to choose the different potentialities for becoming.[45] Since existence is a potentiality that has to be responsibly realized or lost, man can either attain to authentic or inauthentic existence. He experiences within himself the tensions between being his true self or just a "number," the tensions between realizing or losing his true self, and he has to fight for his selfhood. Consequently, tensions or polarities are characteristics of the structures of existence, and Macquarrie spells out four sets of tensions or polarities to express further his understanding of existence.[46]

(a) The first set deals with possibility and facticity. Man is possibility because ". . . he stands before potentialities for being and action and . . . responsibly decides among them and commits himself to some definite policy."[47] This is so because his existence is not a ready-made given, but is something which is to be realized or lost. However there are limits to what he can do and choose, i.e., his possibilities are factical, not unrealistic ones. By facticity, we mean the "thrownness" of human existence. Man finds himself thrown into a given culture, intelligence, race, etc. These are the things he cannot choose; he was born into them, in a manner of speaking. Heredity, environment, cultural-historical factors can be so overwhelming that the freedom to choose might be very slim--at least it is restricted. So freedom is pitched against a limitation that can cut down a man to size, thus the tension between possibility and facticity.[48]

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[45] Principles, p. 64.

[46] Ibid., pp. 56-58.

(b) The tension between rationality and irrationality reminds us of the first polarity. No one can deny that man is a rational creature exhibiting the ability to discriminate, judge, interpret, and understand. As such there is no need to depreciate man's rational faculty. However, man's rationality is a limited one. Psychiatry has frequently revealed how devastating man's irrationality can be. Man very frequently acts from mixed motives. Often times he does not fully understand his actions and the motives for his activities. Not seldom he even deceives himself into thinking that he acts from pure motives when actually he has been motivated by base ones, e.g., a man thinks he wants to serve God by being a priest when actually, no matter how unconsciously, he is using the ministry to inflate his insecure ego. Thus man lives and moves in truth as well as untruth, rationally and irrationally. While man can utilize his rationality to order his life, his irrationality can undo the order his rationality has created.[49]

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[47] *Ibid.*, p. 56.

[48] *Ibid.*

(c) The tension between community and individuality introduces a sociological note into our discussion on existence. It is quite axiomatic that no man is an island. Eremitism changed into cenobitism when the desert-hermits realized that living as individual hermits they failed to "Love your neighbour" as enjoined by the principle of their religion. Community is more than just a collection of individuals. Biologically, a man needs a woman because, sexually speaking, man is an incomplete being. Economically, society as we know it now comprises the buyers and the sellers. In sports, a man needs an opponent. Who enjoys playing tennis all by himself? Language, too, unifies a community, e.g., one of the first things a young nation does is to persuade and sometimes to compel its people to learn first the national language, then the provincial dialects. Such biological, economical, athletical, and linguistic factors indicate that a man needs a community to realize himself. Yet at the same time there is such a thing as individuality. No man is an island; yet Mr. Jones is as different from Mr. Chen as a cat is different from a dog. We have asserted that man is a *sui generis* individual;

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[49] *Ibid*., pp. 56-57.

so individuals are not identical. Thus man finds himself sitting on the twin horns of community and individuality.[50]

(d) Finally there is the tension between responsibility and impotence. Man has to decide his ways of being. This means he has to exercise his responsibility, more so when he hears the call of conscience. By now it should be clear that we understand conscience as the call of authentic existence to the inauthentic existence to forsake the they-self and be a person. Macquarrie, as we have seen, parts company with those who interpret conscience to mean that:

> This phenomenon [conscience] is sometimes explained in terms of factors outside of the individual who experiences conscience, either in terms of a divine influence which warns or approves, or of a social convention which has been built in, so to speak, as a super-ego and which likewise warns or approves.[51]

The call of conscience is either obeyed or disobeyed. Man acts responsibly when he heeds the call of conscience. However, as already mentioned, he might find himself incapable of responding to the call of conscience even though he recognizes the oughtness of the situation; he just cannot bring himself to execute what is demanded of him. Thus the tension between responsibility and impotence.[52]

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[50] Ibid., p. 58.

[51] Ibid.

[52] Ibid. Cf. Tillich's three sets of tensions, viz., the polarity between individuality and participation, dynamics and form, and freedom and destiny. Two elements underlie the three sets of tensions, viz., "the self-relatedness of being, its power of being something for itself . . . the belongingness of being, its character of being a part of a universe of being." (italics mine). Man can so stress individuality

The polarities or tensions in human existence have led some philosophers to regard life as ridiculously self-contradictory. As mentioned by Macquarrie, Sartre calls life, "a useless passion" because life is such that it negates man's aspirations and potentialities:[53]

> And indeed, we have still to add the final touch to the picture--death. This existence of man, an existence that is throughout subjected to the tensions between its opposing poles, will terminate in any case in death, and this looks like the triumph of finitude and negativity over whatever sparks of positive and affirmative being show themselves in man. An existence of contradictions, coming finally to nothing in death--this is absurdity.[54]

However it is difficult to accept life as absurd as evidenced by the fact that the very philosophers who regard existence as absurd are the very ones who attempt to transcend the absurdity and futility of life, indicating that it is more advisable to stick to the tensions in existence rather than to regard life as absurd. By adhering to the

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that he becomes an island all by himself and so loses universality, the hinterland. On the other hand, he can be so at one with the world that he disappears into complete collectivization and so loses his individuality. So he oscillates between individuality and universality, knowing full well that should he lose one pole he would lose both. The form of anything is its essentia, "its definite power of being." Dynamics is the potentiality of being. The tension between form and dynamics hovers between the effort to actualize the potentiality of being and the chance of heading for chaos should the effort fail. The tension between freedom and destiny is actually the tension between possibility and facticity in our language. Man has freedom to choose (possibility), but his freedom is found within the context of his destiny understood as the ". . . situation in which man finds himself, facing the world to which, at the same time, he belongs," (facticity). Tillich discussed this tension in terms of the tension between vitality ("the power which keeps a living being alive and growing") and intentionality ("being related to meaningful structures, living in universals, grasping and shaping reality."). Man might grow into a final form which threatens his potentiality to grow further. Systematic Theology, I, 165, 178, 182-183, 198-200.

[53] Principles, p. 58.

[54] Ibid.

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tensions in existence, one is committed to try to live authentically. If life is absurd, there is no need to try to realize one's potentialities. Furthermore, observations show that an idle life is most destructive to a personality, whereas by striving one experiences the therapeutic value of meaning-filled activity.

Any discussion on existence is incomplete without a factual appraisal of the existing conditions man finds himself in. Macquarrie believes that one can discern a disorder of existence which he describes as an existential imbalance,[55] i.e., the polarities that are not held together; one overcomes the other, leading to a disorder or imbalance. Macquarrie also thinks that the imbalance can be divided into two camps.[56] Disorders like tyranny, pride, utopianism, and angelism in their various forms spring from the reluctance or inability to accept the facticity, finitude, and limitations of existence, leading to a desire to be a superman or a godlike creature, unshackled by the limitations of life. Disorders like "sensual indulgence, insensitivity to others, despair, and the irresponsibility of collectivism" reflect or "retreat from possibility, decision-making, responsibility, individual liability and even from rationality."[57] This is the sub-human mode of existence, comparable to that type of animal existence that only lives for the present without utilizing the heritage of the past and without any constructive thought

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[55] Ibid., p. 60.

[56] Ibid.

[57] Ibid.

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for the future.

Society, on the whole, shows these two types of disorder. The first is obviously discernible in the few individuals who act as if they were more than human; the second is quite characteristic of the masses. The above mentioned disorders run deep in every individual and attempts have been made, since the dawn of history, to explain the extent of these disorders and to solve them. Our task is to acknowledge the reality of these disorders and find the remedy to solve them.

We begin by acknowledging the universality of disorders in human existence, horizontally at least. We are only too aware of the imperfections in individuals and society. This imbalance in existence can be better understood, so Macquarrie believes, in terms of "falling," "alienation," or "lostness." "Falling" has had religious connotations and might be suspect to secular philosophers, but Heidegger's work has shown how relevant it can be.[58] Heidegger understood "falling" to mean the failure to actualize one's potentiality, to "fall" away from an authentic possibility without implying an antecedent achievement of authentic possibility and a subsequent fall from it.[59] Macquarrie accepts this definition.[60]

"Alienation" is basically an alienation from oneself caused by the hopping from one polarity to another, e.g., hopping from possibility

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[58] Supra, pp. 68-69.

[59] Being and Time, p. 220.

[60] Principles, p. 62.

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to facticity. Again, man is caught between individuality and community, and thus feels lost or alienated. Lostness is shown by one's inability to find his own true being or the being of others, and, more crucially, to find meaning in Being. Thus he is lost in or alienated from the world.[61]

In religious language, "sin" is the word used to describe the alienation from oneself, from others, and from God. Even the most cynical skeptic sees some truth in this statement; he feels a sense of despair in man as evidenced by the numerous visits by various people to the psychiatrist's couch. The imbalance in existence leads to despair in one degree or another. Despair drives one to ask whether there is any meaning in life. Or to formulate the agony differently: Is there a remedy for the existential imbalance?

Macquarrie positively affirms that there is a solution to this existential imbalance. An examination of Macquarrie's solution forms the third stage in our investigation of Macquarrie's existential-ontological perspective, viz., the transition from existence to Being or the passage from inauthentic to authentic existence.

Right now, we will summarize what Macquarrie has said on existence. Man is different from other beings in the world because only man is open to his being and is on the way to becoming. Because man is an emergent individuality, he has to fight for his selfhood which leads to tensions in existence. Thus Macquarrie feels compelled to spell out the four sets of tension which characterize existence. The tension between possibility and facticity shows man's attempt to embrace novelty in the face of the givens in life; the tension between rationality and irrationality is the struggle for order in the midst of disorder; the tension between individuality and community is the right to be a person in the presence of the tendency and threat to fall into complete collectivization; finally the tension between responsibility and impotence is the dilemma of wishing to exercise responsibility and at the same time feeling the lack of power to execute that change. The tensions lead to the existential imbalance and the search for a cure to eliminate or overcome them.

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[61] *Ibid*.

III. Transition from Existence to Being.

The transition from existence to Being is Macquarrie's way of describing the remedy that is needed to overcome the tensions experienced in existence. That there are tensions in existence we do not deny. We also affirm the universality of disorder in society and it seems that man *per se* is not able to overcome this perennial imbalance in life. How else does one explain the chronic presence of the disorders? Awareness of the ongoing imbalance in existence drives some, e.g., Sartre, to assert that life is a "useless passion." On this view, the best one can do is to patch up here and there without achieving a complete cure of the disordered life. On the other hand, there are some, e.g., Macquarrie, who try to make sense of life by acknowledging the need for some external help in bringing about order and meaning in life, and at the same time

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asserting that the human personality is such that it is able to co-operate with that external help in overcoming the existential imbalance. We will now elaborate Macquarrie's solution to cure the disorders of life.

In the previous chapter we mentioned that existence is so structured that it can be termed as being-unto-death. In our consciousness of being-unto-death, it is not only our finitude but being-as-such in its finitude that slips into the pit of non-being. For our consciousness, non-being is not a matter of the future; it already appears in our human present as death which swallows all being and life.[62] The Buddhist idea of samsara (the wheel of life and death) is a radical expression of this being-unto-death.[63] Acceptance of this view of life does not mean a withdrawal or escape from our busy world. On the contrary, such a view forms the necessary guarantee that he can awaken from this life's boring routine and be alert to the whole environment.[64]

Awakening happens, generally speaking, when something extraordinary occurs in the midst of the drudgery of the daily routine, i.e., the routinization of the everydayness is shattered by something extraordinary and man is made aware of something wonderful that is going to happen.

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[62] Supra, pp. 75-81.

[63] Daisetz T. Suzuki, The Essentials of Zen Buddhism, ed. Bernard Philips (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1962), pp. 336, 359.

[64] The following pages are actually an elaboration and provisional explanation of a limit-situation which will be explained later on. See infra, pp. 162-164.

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The term "everydayness" has been chosen after some deliberation. It is meant to cover one's personal as well as his social life. The object of investigation is the common ontological structure of one's daily life, whether social or personal. Awakening takes place when the extraordinary suddenly takes hold of the taken-for-granted pattern of man's ordinary daily life and roughs it up. In days gone by, epidemics, wars, calamities, etc., played the role of awakening the everyday dormant life. In more sober times sickness, death, or a serious accident have similar effects on a man. In such a situation, man is lifted from the realm of the ordinary to something extraordinary, and he begins to react. The question is: how is such a movement of consciousness possible at all?[64]

To begin with, we note that the very pattern of ordinary life does not permit awakening to function in a concrete way, i.e., except as abstract knowledge or propositions. That is to say, everyday existence is too preoccupied with the they-self to allow the individual to think for himself. As such we are not aware of the extraordinary. We realize the shock and results of the extraordinary because it jettisons us out of the structure of the daily life. Admittedly, this daily life has many departments, but the department that is being probed by the shock is the most basic one.[65] It is the department where life's routine is being performed. For most people, today is very much like yesterday and tomorrow will not be any different from today. The extraordinary breaks

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[64] An Existentialist Theology, pp. 74-76.

[65] Ibid., pp. 126-127.

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this tediousness, and true learning then begins. For example, one can find one's way around the house quite easily even in the dark, but change the position of the pieces of furniture and one is likely to stumble into something even in the broad daylight. The point is: the drudgery is taken away, and one begins to be aware and alert.

The example of the furniture in the house brings us to another point we need to note. The stereotyped repetitions of the everydayness are not only repetitious in time, e.g., hours, days, weeks, etc., but they also impinge on the dimensional aspects of living. The space in which I live represents my ordinary life. The coffee table has its place, so has a living human being. Like the cogs in a cuckoo clock, every part of space turns its wheel when its tooth is touched by that of another. Thus they are in contact with each other, so that the ever-repeating repetition of ordinary life, like the minute hand of the cuckoo clock, is derived from all the respective parts of the cogs.[66] Thus far we have described the ontological structure of everyday existence. We continue.

The extraordinary then suddenly happens. It upsets the round of ordinary life. But a disorder within ordinary life does not necessarily mean the awareness of the extraordinary. There must be something else. The extraordinary implies the negation of life itself. Threatened with negation, life feels anxiety toward the extraordinary. Thus anxiety reflects the inner tension and relation between the extraordinary and the ordinary.[67] The impact of the extraordinary upon the ordinary should not be immediate, else this would mean the destruction of meaning without permitting time for the awakening to occur. As a matter of fact, there is some distance between the ordinary and the extraordinary, so that the former, while waiting, may prepare itself for the visitation of the latter. The extraordinary, which is in the thick of life and yet keeps it at an arm's length, becomes a problem to man. This threat to life is portrayed by anxiety which makes possible the awareness of non-being.[68]

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[66] Cf. Being-in-the-world. Supra, pp. 53-59.

Anxiety is the awareness of the shock of non-being. From this feeling we have the famous question of being. Following Leibniz, Heidegger posed the problem thus: "Why is there any being at all--why not rather nothing?" (or nothingness in our language).[69] Macquarrie explains it thus:

> It [anxiety] discloses him man as thrown into an existence, of which the ultimate rationale, if any, is disclosed to him. Anxiety discloses the precariousness of human existence which is, so to speak, poised all the time over the void of non-existence. Anxiety makes manifest the nullity, the possibility of ceasing to be, that enters into the very constitution of man's being. We can say then that anxiety in the face of death and finitude brings man to confront nothing (nothingness in our language).[70]

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[67] An Existentialist Theology, pp. 67-81.

[68] Studies, pp. 82-94, also supra, pp. 101-103.

[69] We need to differentiate "nothing" and "nothingness." "Nothing" signifies sheer negativity, whereas "nothingness" has the four-fold meaning as explained in the following pages. Making this distinction will avoid the awkward procedure of having to put inverted commas over "nothing" to signify that one means nothingness.

[70] Studies, p. 82.

Two strands of emphasis call for some untangling. One deals with anxiety and nothingness, and the other tries to demonstrate the role of nothingness as a bridge that links existence to ontology, i.e., nothingness makes it possible for us to see the transition from the language of existence to that of Being.

It is anxiety that makes man aware of nothingness. Anxiety, in the face of death, jerks man from the forgetfulness of Being and opens his eyes to the wonder of Being or the wonder of wonders. Anxiety is the state of mind which reveals existence as a being-unto-death. It shows man his facticity, his thrownness into an existence that is finite and transient. Anxiety makes man aware that he is very likely to fall into non-being and this possibility of ceasing to be is part of the structure of existence; thus anxiety lights up nothingness and brings man to confront nothingness.

Does confronting nothingness make sense? If nothing means the absence of anything, how can one confront nothingness? Macquarrie contends that such questions portray a basic misunderstanding of Heidegger, who asserted that in such a situation language must be "stretched" in order to express the meaning of confronting nothingness.[71] So Macquarrie

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[71] Cf. ". . . it is one thing to give a report in which we tell about entities, but quite another to grasp entities in their Being. For the latter task we lack not only most of the words but, above all, the 'grammar'." "The task of liberating grammar from logic requires beforehand a positive understanding of the basic a priori structure of discourse in general as an existentiale." Being and Time, pp. 63, 209.

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claims that:

> The language must be put into the existential situation in which human existence knows itself to be given over to finitude, death, and anxiety--this talk not only makes sense, but very good sense indeed. Obviously it can never be as straightforward as the kind of talk in which we discuss ordinary empirical matters of fact, and since our language is designed for such everyday matters, it is bound to be stretched if one wishes to express something different.[72]

Macquarrie wants to say that nothingness is not negation because "the logical idea of negation presupposes the ontological confrontation with the nullity that belongs to existence itself, and is derived from it."[73] Traditional logic has confined itself to one language-game, to use Wittgenstein's phraseology, but Macquarrie wanted to extend it to cover other language-games. In his case, he wanted to make sense of nothingness because nothingness has a crucial place in his perspective. Macquarrie's language is grounded on the language of existence in association with the ontological language. The bridge that connects existence and ontology is nothingness. Therefore it is imperative to know the idea of nothingness or the word "nothingness."

Macquarrie finds at least four nuances in the word "nothingness."

(1) Nothingness signifies the nullity in one's existence, i.e., as finite and being-unto-death, the possibility of slipping into nonbeing constitutes the structure of one's existence, a possibility made known to us by anxiety.

(2) In anxiety, the world of entities sinks to nothingness because a transvaluation of values [Umwertung aller Werte] occurs in the

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[72] Studies, p. 83.

[73] Ibid., p. 84.

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face of the impending end, i.e., that which normally demands our attention and energy is dimmed down and brought to emptiness in the face of death.

(3) The third nuance says that:

> In a further sense, "nothing" (nothingness in our language) becomes the foil for Being, and with this something like a positive sense is being given to the word, just as a positive significance is brought into the notion of death when Heidegger exhibits it as the unifying factor. "Nothing" makes it possible for us to recognize entities as entities, that is to say, as things that are.[74]

Nothingness makes us aware of things qua things and directs us to inquire into the being in virtue of which they are. Against this background, one comes to see "the wonder of Being" or the wonder of wonders, and asks Leibniz's famous question: "Why is there anything at all, and not just nothing?" In Macquarrie's own words:

> It is against the foil of nothing that for the first time our eyes are opened to the wonder of being, and this happens with the force of revelation. Being is all the time around us, but for the most part it does not get explicitly noticed. What we see are particular beings, the things and persons that are: only when these sink to nothing are we seized with the awareness of the being in virtue of which they are. This is not another being or a property of beings like their colour or size or shape. It is different from any particular being or any property, yet we are aware of it as more beingful, so to speak, than anything else, for it is the condition that there may be anything whatsoever.[75]

(4) Nothingness is paradoxically synonymous with Being itself. Western philosophy, so claimed Heidegger, has been forgetful of Being, so much so that its main interest is in entities and nothing else, and then proceeds to ask about this "nothing else."[76] Macquarrie notes that

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[74] Studies, p. 85.

[75] Principles, p. 78.

[76] Being and Time, pp. 21-22.

it was Heidegger's belief that Being cannot be regarded as an entity because ". . . Being, by which is meant the 'is-hood' in virtue of which anything that is, is, cannot itself be regarded as another entity, as something else that is."[77] Thus it is a "non-entity," and Western philosophy's penchant for concerning itself with what is and nothing else, relegates Being to the "nothing else."

In this way Macquarrie believes that confrontation with nothingness makes us aware of the wonder of Being and this serves to initiate the transition from existence to Being. To clarify this rather obfuscating statement, we will resort to the limit-situation (as Jaspers called it)[78] to express more clearly and to enable us to see more enlighteningly the transition from existence to Being.

In human existence, there comes a time when the structures and the ways of existence are stretched to the last degree, leading to a limit-situation. In this situation existence itself has been reduced to nothing, or, to change the figure of speech, all its resources have evaporated. Linking the limit-situation with the tensions in existence helps to express the meaning of both the limit-situation and the tensions. Trying to overcome the tensions demands the last ounce of energy, and after using up all his resources man still finds himself facing and experiencing the tensions. This leads him to a blind alley. It is in such a situation that man is most alert to and aware of the transcendence, the something that is needed to help him overcome the tensions since his level-best effort was not effective enough to do the job.

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[77] Studies, p. 85.

[78] Karl Jaspers, The Perennial Scope of Philosophy, trans. Ralph Manheim (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1950), pp. 33-34, 101.

We need to say that limit-situations do not automatically reveal transcendence, the something that is required to effect the passage from inauthentic existence (characterized by the scattering possibilities, thus the tensions) to authentic existence (characterized by the unified self). Man has the remarkable knack to level down everything that happens so that even the extraordinary becomes manageable and the familiar.[79] However, if man is to become aware of Being, the most likely time will be when he is in a limit-situation.[80] We will now analyse in greater detail an account of an experience which brings us to the frontier of existence and so to the so-claimed confrontation with Being.

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[79] "It is a terrifying fact that today despite all the upheaval and devastation, we are still in danger of living and thinking as though nothing really important has happened. It is as though a great misfortune had merely disturbed the life of us poor victims, but as though life might now be continued in the old way . . . . For the great danger is that what has happened may pass, considered as nothing but a great misfortune, without anything happening to us men as men, without our hearing the voice of transcendence, without our attaining to any insight and acting with insight." The Perennial Scope of Philosophy, p. 162. Quoted by Macquarrie in The Scope of Demythologizing, pp. 174-175.

[80] It is Macquarrie's contention that Karl Barth misunderstood Jaspers by denying that man can learn about God in limit-situations. Jaspers himself admitted that man can be in tight corners and yet learn nothing. Furthermore Barth seemed to have misunderstood the nature of a limitation-situation when he presupposed that any overwhelming event that befalls man automatically leads to a limit-situation. Jaspers himself, as we have seen, contended that man has the ability to level down everything so that even the extraordinary becomes familiar. What Jaspers wanted to affirm is the fact that sometimes certain events drive man up the wall and make him aware of the limits of his existence in such wise that he becomes aware of transcendence. Finally, Barth's position can be

Commitment and acceptance have to be present if a limit-situation is to have any value. Commitment is the signal that existence has a master possibility which makes possible the subordination of other possibilities with the intention of moving toward unified existence. Lack of a master possibility results in the hopping from one possibility to another, from an immediate concern to the next, leading to an existence that is decided by chance circumstances or changing desires. This is what we mean by the scattering of possibilities. Acceptance requires man to assent to the givens that already obtain and in which man finds himself:

> If anything like unified selfhood is to be reached, the facticity of the situation has to be accepted in its entirety, with no loose ends rejected. Only if there is this frank and total acceptance can the commitment in turn be a realistic one. For not just any commitment can lead to unified selfhood. A fantastic commitment that was not related to an acceptance of the factical situation could be utterly disruptive.[81]

Death, by summoning us to see and accept the wholeness of existence, makes it possible for us to accept fully our factical situation. We have sufficiently expressed our understanding of death and thus need no repetition.[82] We only wish to re-affirm that death is the ultimate

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turned against himself. If the limit-situations experienced during the two global wars fail to make man aware of transcendence, the same thing might be said of the preaching of the Christian Gospel over a longer period of time. The Scope of Demythologizing, pp. 174-175.

[81] Principles, p. 68.

[82] Supra, pp. 75-81, 136-138.

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given in existence and thus screens off the future; whatever may be said for the other possibilities they are evaluated in the light of the last possibility--death. In theological language, death is the ἔσχατον and awareness of the impending termination of life ought to be able to introduce a sense of concern and responsibility which otherwise are normally neglected.

That death is destructive in the sense that it terminates any chance for the fruition of possibilities we need not deny. We accept that as axiomatic. However, we wish to highlight the way death can be a creative force in existence. Death, as the ultimate possibility of ceasing to be, gives man a master perspective from which he can judge his actions and desires. It reveals the superficiality and triviality of the actions that consume man's energy in the sense that it makes him see that everyday existence is not too infrequently a flight from responsibility, is an unwillingness to accept the finitude of existence, is a hopping from one immediate concern to another, and is a quest for illusory security in the they-self:[83]

> Our consideration of the polarities of human existence has already made it clear that to make, let us say, sensual pleasure or self-aggrandizement the leading concern of one's existence would be to distort that existence, but the fact of death makes clear in a more dramatic fashion the transient and nugatory character of the achievements of the man who does not take into account the full range of possibility and facticity.[84]

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[83] Being and Time, pp. 236-238.

[84] Principles, p. 69.

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We have said that death ought to be able to introduce a sense of urgency and responsibility in existence, but the fact remains that in many cases it does not. To formulate the same sentiment in quite a different way, we can say that often times man *per se* is not able to overcome the tensions in his life. This suggests that for man to attain to authentic existence he must see beyond himself to someone or something to help him effect the passage from inauthentic to authentic existence. In Macquarrie's language, faith in Being is needed to help man achieve authentic existence. To say this is to jump the gun. So we will reserve this for our discussion on Being which is the fourth and final stage in our investigation of Macquarrie's existential-ontological perspective.

To summarize: In a manner of speaking, tensions in existence drive some to liquor and others to serious thinking. Acceptance of our existence as being-unto-death should yield a master perspective that lends meaning and order to man's activities. Also anxiety discloses finitude, makes us aware of non-being, and opens our eyes to the wonder of Being. It is our contention that death and anxiety make us dissatisfied with everyday existence, but they do not help us to attain to unified existence. To put it differently, death and anxiety open the door to religion but they are not religion itself. Something else is needed to push man through the door of religion to religion itself and that something is faith in Being.

IV. Being.

What is this "Being" that has been so frequently mentioned? To get an answer we will see what Being is not. This *via negationis* will

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not lead us very far, but it will help clear the underbrush and define more clearly the area where Being's meaning is to be found.

Being (*das Sein* or *το εἶναι*) cannot be regarded as an entity or a property; it is not something that is. In English the difference between Being and a being is seen in the fact that we understand Being as the act or state or condition of anything that may be, whereas we understand a being as something that is. The difference between Being and a being can be further accentuated by observing that when we consider the being of trees, mountains, insects, etc., we do not add "Being" to such a list.

Our language is geared to talk about entities or beings. ". . . it is one thing to give a report in which we tell about *entities*, but another to grasp entities in their *Being*. For the latter task we lack not only most of the words, but, above all, the 'grammar'."[85] If we desire to talk about Being, we need to "stretch" our grammar in order to make sense.

We next notice that Being is not a property though it is common to all the beings. If we list the properties of a being like its rotundity, weight, blueness, etc., we see that to add to the list "being" understood as the condition, act, or state of anything that is, would be to do something that is different from listing the properties. Being is in a different category from the properties, and is thus not a property.

If Being is not an entity and not a property, it is also not a class. We construct classes on the basis of properties, and since Being

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[85] *Being and Time*, p. 63.

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is not a property it is not a class. The point of classification is to make distinctions within the total realm of things that are, and it is pointless to make this total realm itself into a class.

Being is not substance understood as the ὑποκεῖμενον that undergirds the phenomenal features of beings. Since they lie outside the scope of our dissertation we will not dwell on the multi-faceted problems encountered in a consideration of substance. Here we only wish to make an analogy between existence and Being. We have stated that existence implies both stability and dynamism. Existence has stability because it already is, but at the same time it has dynamism because it not only already is but is also in the process of becoming. Being has this twofold characteristic too. So Macquarrie can say that ". . . 'being'. . . has a double meaning, suggesting the act or energy of existing and also the existent entity in which this act expresses and manifests itself."[86] Being is the prior condition of anything that may be and thus is quite different from substance as traditionally understood.

Finally, Being is not what the philosophers have termed the "absolute," whether understood as "the all-inclusive being or as the totality of beings or as the sum of beings; for it would be hard to see how such an absolute could be other than a being . . . ,"[87] albeit almighty. We have affirmed that Being is not *a* being, not even the almighty being. Even if there is this almighty being, we still have to inquire into the being of this almighty being.

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[86] *Principles*, p. 99. [87] *Ibid*., p. 100.

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If Being is not an entity, not a property, not a class, not substance, and not the absolute, then what is it? Macquarrie has three things to say in answer to this question.

To begin with, there is a limit to what we can say about Being, especially when it does not fall within the usual categories used to describe beings. In this sense Being can be regarded as the incomparable, and that is why we speak of the "mystery" and "wonder" of Being. Yet the incomparability of Being is not the same as incomprehensibility so that "Being" becomes an empty word. We have already said that "we ourselves are and know that we are, and . . . it can be claimed that the idea of Being is the first idea to fall under our minds."[88] Because Being is the incomparable it can be described as the "_transcendens_ pure and simple,"[89] where transcendence signifies the relation between entities and Being.[90] This enigmatic statement needs clarification.

We want to say two things, viz., the wholly-other character of Being, and Being's relation to the beings. As such we need to steer away from the traditional concept of the transcendent wherein one understands it as standing over and beyond the world. When we say that Being is the _transcendens_ we mean to affirm that Being is the "wholly other" to all entities, i.e., the beings are entities, but Being, as we have asserted, is a non-entity, is "the nothing else." To put it more positively, Being is the prior condition of anything that may be; as such Being is not the same as the beings whose being is contingent on Being's letting-be.[91] So Being is different from the beings; yet the latter is related to the former.

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[88] _Studies_, p. 89.

[89] _Being and Time_, p. 62.

[90] M. Heidegger, _The Question of Being_, (New York: Twayne, 1958) pp. 56-57. Quoted by Macquarrie in _Studies_, p. 89.

It is empty talk to speak of Being apart from the things that are, i.e., Being is transcendent as well as immanent. Among the things that are is that creature called man, and he is special because while things like rocks, chairs, tables, etc., are, man exists:

> He _exists_, he can as it were stand out from the world of entities and become aware of his being and of his responsibility for his being. . . man is the clearing [_Lichtung_] in Being, the place where Being becomes transparent to itself. Man exists in the truth of Being, where truth is understood in the original sense of ἀλήθεια the unhiddenness of Being.[92]

In saying that Being is the incomparable we wish to say that it is the _transcendens_, the something that is different from the beings; we also wish to affirm that though Being is the "wholly other," yet beings, man in particular, can know Being. This is so because Being "lets-be," which brings us to our next point.

The letting-be of Being is its power to enable or empower beings to be, to bring beings into being. It is the prior condition that there may be particular beings:

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[91] _Infra_, pp. 171-174, for a clarification of Being's letting-be.

[92] _Studies_, pp. 89-90.

> Being, strictly speaking, "is" not; but being "lets-be," and since letting-be is prior to particular instances of being, though other than these, we are justified in claiming that being is more beingful than any particular that it lets-be, and we have justification too for using, with proper care and qualification, the expression "being-is."[93]

This is another way of differentiating beings from Being and at the same time of asserting their relationship. Being is the condition that there may be any beings whatsoever. A being is in virtue of the fact that it is, but Being is not something that is but lets-be and therefore precedes any is-ness. So Being is different from beings, yet it is the spring and origin of all beings; the beings are contingent on and originate from Being. "This letting-be is the creativity of Being and the dependence of the beings is their creatureliness."[94] Letting-be is creativity because it confers, sustains, and makes perfect the beings.

But letting-be is love too, precisely because letting-be is the ontological basis of love, i.e., letting-be is self-giving, self-spending, so that Being's creativity is a work of love and self-giving, pouring out Being, moving out to manifest itself to beings who have the freedom to reject its overture of love.

> Love is letting-be, not of course in the sense of standing off from someone or something, but in the positive and active sense of enabling-to-be. When we talk of "letting-be," we are to understand both parts of this hyphenated expression in a strong sense--"letting" as "empowering" (we may add, creating), and "be" as enjoying the maximal range of being that is open to the particular being concerned. Most typically, "letting-be" means helping a person into the full realization of his potentialities for being; and the greatest love will be

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[93] Principles, p. 103.

[94] Ibid., p. 195.

costly since it will be accomplished by the spending of one's own being.[95]

How do we know or sense Being's letting-be? Through presence and manifestation. We have just stated that it is empty talk to speak of Being apart from beings.[96] "Being . . . is nothing apart from its appearances in and through and with particular beings."[97] When we see beings in depth, we realize the presence of Being, the something in virtue of which beings can be and which mediates itself through the beings. Being, the *transcendens*, the "wholly other," is also at the same time very close to beings because it is present in every being. Beings participate in Being in virtue of their creatureliness and Being's creativity; so Being is present, open, and accessible to the beings, ". . . as over against its distance and transcendence as the mysterious act or energy of letting-be. Being is, paradoxically, both the closest and the furthest."[98]

Manifestation refers to Being's self-disclosure to the beings. The manifestation is possible any time and anywhere because Being is present in the beings yet most of the time it is not obvious. We are forgetful of Being and are more interested in the beings; only in a limit-situation do we become alert to Being's manifestation, though at the same time we need to add that even in limit-situations we do miss the boat, so to speak.[99] Whether we are in a limit-situation or not, the word "manifestation" refers to the many possible ways in which Being discloses and communicates itself to the beings that it lets-be. So every being is a clue to Being and Being manifests itself in the beings because the latter expresses and participates in the former. We will have more to say on presence and manifestation, but in the meantime we can conclude by saying that "being 'is' the incomparable that lets-be and that is present and manifests itself in and through the beings."[100]

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[95] *Ibid.*, pp. 310-311. More will be said on "letting-be" when we treat of revelation in the next chapter.

[96] *Supra*, p. 170.

[97] *Principles*, p. 104. [98] *Ibid.*

In our summary of the transition from existence to Being we said that anxiety discloses finitude, makes us conscious of the non-being, and opens our eyes to the wonder of Being; acceptance of our existence as death-oriented should yield a master perspective from which all other perspectives and possibilities gain integration and meaning; both anxiety and death make us dissatisfied with the everydayness of our existence but are incapable of overcoming our discontent. Something else is needed to effect the passage from inauthentic to authentic existence and that something is Being in our language. We have said enough on Being for the moment, and it behooves us to make explicit the meaning of the transition from existence to Being. This is where we deal with "faith in Being."

Tensions in existence, anxiety, and death seem to indicate the futility of man's actions and concerns, and have led to nihilism in some cases and an attitude of faith in others. By contrasting nihilism and faith we get a better understanding of the latter. Nihilism shows the absurdity of existence, the futility of man's activities, and a devaluation of human aspiration. By way of contrast, an attitude of faith accepts no less the facticity of existence, recognizing the chasm between what man possesses (facticity) and what he aspires to (the potentialities or possibilities that are disclosed). It seeks to make sense of this situation by acknowledging that facticity is of a piece with possibility, and that facticity and possibility were not meant to be in perpetual conflict, "but that they are both rooted in the wider context of being within which man has his being."[101] So Macquarrie could say that:

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[99] Supra, pp. 46-48. [100] Principles, p. 105.

> Human existence can make sense if this wider being supports and supplements the meagre heritage of our finite being as we strive to fulfill the potentialities of our being. To adopt words of St. Augustine, human existence makes sense if being grants what it commands, that is to say, if there are resources beyond our human resources to help us fulfill the claims that our existence lays upon us.
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> The attitude described is what the religious man calls "faith." It is obvious that faith is not a mere belief but an existential attitude.[102]

What Macquarrie wants to drive hime is this: The man of faith looks beyond himself to get at the meaning of existence, and as such differs from the man without faith who makes man the measure of all things. So the man of faith fully acknowledges the facticity of existence and commits himself to novelty, but he does this in the wider context of Being within which his existence originates. The man without

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[101] *Ibid.*, p. 70.

[102] *Ibid.*

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faith looks for no support beyond himself and relies only on his own resources. We have affirmed that man *per se* does not seem capable of achieving authenticity as evidenced by the perennial presence of the existential imbalance.[103] Therefore, it seems rather logical and reasonable to look beyond man to understand and appreciate more fully the meaning of existence. This is what we mean by faith in Being.

Faith in Being is not a luxury, i.e., the attitude of faith is part and parcel of existence. As such it is not a foreign commodity that is introduced into existence; it springs from our quest for a unified self.

There are not a few people who question the above statement; they claim that man is mighty enough to solve the tensions in existence through his own skill and knowledge. Thus man should avoid things like faith in Being and concentrate instead on building his own values, meaning, social structures, etc., without any reference to anything beyond man. That there is a ring of truth in this statement we do not deny. "Faith" should not be a short-cut to problem-solving, and belief in a God-in-the-gaps or *deus ex machina* should be repudiated.[104] But faith in Being is never so infantile as the *deus ex machina* concept.

> Faith in being, understood as commitment and acceptance, or as the submission of the human existent to the grace and judgment of being, has its own maturity, and we have claimed that some such faith is

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[103] *Supra*, pp. 144-154.

[104] Cf. John A. T. Robinson, *Honest to God*, (London: SCM Press, Ltd., 1963), *et passim*.

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> demanded by the structure of any finite existence, ancient or modern, with its tensions, disorders, alienations, and yet with its questing for selfhood, wholeness, and meaning.[105]

We now face two positions that are diametrically opposed. The man of faith represents the position that it is reasonable to look to faith in Being to get at the wholeness of life, whereas the man without faith represents the position that man himself can attain to authenticity. Who is right? seems a wrong question. It is not a matter of rightness or wrongness, but a matter of adequacy and inadequacy. It is Macquarrie's belief that the man of faith represents a more adequate position. He has carefully laid out his understanding of existence and he invites others to examine the adequacy and truth of his analysis, in particular, the disorders in human existence, the element of "lostness" or "alienation," and the perennial existential imbalance as an indication of man's inability to "heal himself" that he has emphasized. If they agree, and Macquarrie sees no reason why they should not, then his position is not only reasonable but adequate too.

There is a second reason why Macquarrie thinks his position is adequate. The man without faith or man come of age[106] as he is now known stresses autonomy. Macquarrie has no quarrel with autonomy if it is properly understood, but when it is stressed to the extent that responsibility and interdependence are lost sight of then something has gone wrong. Insistence on autonomy without any regard

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[105] *Principles*, p. 72.

[106] D. Bonhoeffer, *Letters and Papers from Prison*, ed. Eberhard Bethge (3rd ed. London: S.C.M. Press, 1967) *et passim*.

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for responsibility represents an adolescent not an adult. An adult knows that freedom is not license;[107] it carries with it responsibility. Independence per se is meaningless. Man lives in a network of interdependence, in a nexus of totalities with reference to connections and interactions between the various totalities. Thus man finds himself in a complex maze of relationships in which he, directly or indirectly, inherits the past and creates the future for his successors. There is such a thing as mutual dependence.[108]

For these two reasons we think that it is sensible to believe in faith in Being; this does not call for the type of "dependence" that leaves everything to Being. For this reason Macquarrie calls for a position that talks "rather in terms of man's co-operation with being, since this better recognizes our genuine responsibility;" however, Macquarrie wants to make it known that ". . . man's position is a decidedly subordinate one, and his effective co-working is made possible by grace."[109] He concludes by saying that:

> So the religious man, or the man of faith, speaks not so much of his quest [for a unified self] as of the object of this quest meeting him; or, better still, that he becomes the object of a search directed toward him; that the initiative comes from beyond himself, and that faith, while indeed it has its roots within himself, is established

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[107] E.g., A. S. Neill, Talking of Summerhill, (London: Victor Gollancz, Ltd., 1967), pp. 7-19.

[108] Supra, pp. 12-13, 24.

[109] Principles, p. 73.

> only when he is grasped, as it were, by that for which he was dimly and ignorantly seeking.[110]

We can now summarize our analysis of Macquarrie's existential-ontological perspective by observing how he calls for (a) a view of existence that is based on possibility, facticity, falling, conscience, death, etc., and not on the traditional concept of the self in terms of thinghood or substantiality; and (b) a view of Being that permits an ontology in which Being's graciousness is complemented by the response of the beings that participate in Being.[111] It is Macquarrie's belief that his existential-ontological approach is as old and revered as the one employed by some New Testament writers, the church fathers, and contemporary theologians. We will now summarily see how he elaborates this claim.

Macquarrie contends that Paul's usage of "spirit," "flesh," "conscience," "heart," etc., indicates an interpretative framework in which ". . . the phenomena designated by the various words that have been mentioned constitute a unity in any given individual existence," an interpretative framework that ". . . was remarkably adequate for the task which he set himself, that of setting forth the characteristics of a Christian existence, and showing what is distinctive in it."[112]

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[110] _Ibid_., p. 74.

[111] Once in a while we have mentioned words like "grace" or the "graciousness of Being" without any explanation. This was done on purpose because it is our intention to deal with them more fully in the next chapter.

[112] _God-talk_, pp. 240-241.

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Macquarrie selects Athanasius' De Incarnatione to show how existential his approach was.[113] Closer to our time theologians like Schleiermacher, Otto, Herrmann, and Bultmann have all employed the language of existence to explicate Christian theology. In his study of religious consciousness, Schleiermacher emphasized a sense of the numinous instead of the traditional proofs of God's existence and zeroed in on the feeling of absolute dependence.[114] Otto carried further the incipient insights provided by Schleiermacher and elaborated the phenomenological analysis of the elements in *mysterium tremendum et fascinans*.[115] More recently Herrmann and Bultmann have theologized along similar lines.

These theologians share a few things in common. They shy away from the objectifying language of myth and the obfuscating metaphysical nomenclatures. They insist that theological discourse is mainly existential talk, but this does not mean advocating pure subjectivity in the doing of theology. The "content" of one's experience and the reality of what has been experienced provide the objectivity of one's theologizing:

> A phenomenology of faith, expressed in a language of existence, tells us about the structure of an existence in faith. It describes what it is like to live in accordance with an attitude of faith, and it may show us also how such an attitude differs from that of the secular self-sufficient man . . . . The description of religious attitudes and

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[113] *Ibid.*, pp. 123-146.

[114] F. Schleiermacher, *The Christian Faith*, eds. H. R. Mackintosh and J. S. Stewart, (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1963), I, 12-13, 19-21.

[115] R. Otto, *The Idea of the Holy*, trans. J. W. Harvey (Middlesex: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1959), *et passim*.

> states of mind is certainly something of value, and it is something that must be taken into account if we are to understand what a religious faith is and to estimate its claims. But theology is commonly understood to be more than a psychology of religion, and faith as more than a state of mind. Theology claims some kind of transubjective validity for the experiences which belong to the life of faith. In particular, God and Christ are regarded not merely as elements in human experience, but as standing independently over against man.[116]

God is known in so far as he relates himself to us. This does not mean that God is just a mere factor in human experience or an ideal of our aspirations. This view presents a one-sided picture of reality; the other side needs to be emphasized too. We need to add that man is a creature of God who takes the initiative in revealing himself to man. Thus existentially, God is seen as the ultimate goal of existence, explained in terms of the ultimate concern, highest love, etc. Ontologically, God is regarded as the holy Being from whom we move and have our being. All entities participate in or are bearers of Being; some "reflect" Being more conspicuously than others and various symbols are used by various communities to "light up" their experience of Being.[117] Therefore:

> It may seem that talk about existence and Being is a far cry from Christian theology as it is ordinarily expressed, and a still farther cry from the language of Christian faith and devotion. No doubt it is. In any actual theology, the bare language of existence and Being becomes clothed, so to speak, in the concrete symbolism of a particular religious faith. This is possible because every entity, as something that is, is a bearer of or a participant in Being. It can therefore function as a symbol of Being. Obviously some entities manifest

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[116] God-talk, p. 242; Studies, pp. 88ff.; Principles, pp. 103-105.

[117] Principles, pp. 131-134.

> Being more than others, and on more levels, and can therefore function more adequately as symbols. In the Christian religion, with its symbol of the Christ, it is the being of man, this very entity which exists in the light of Being, that becomes the symbol for Being itself. But while any actual theology must thus clothe itself in a concrete symbolism it is necessary for us sometimes to investigate the foundations of theology and of its procedures of thinking and discoursing.[118]

Naturally Macquarrie regards his existential-ontological perspective as fulfilling two requirements, viz., (a) the necessity to hold together the existential and ontological languages, and (b) to provide a means to investigate the philosophical-scientific basis of the doing of theology.[119] Our exposition of Macquarrie's perspective bears out his claim. It is salutary, yea, imperative for a theologian to explicate the connection between existence and ontology, faith and theology, man and his experience of and the reality of God, and the natural and the supernatural, not conceived of as two realms but as one. It is imperative for a theologian to theologize in a philosophical manner, i.e., to supply a sound basis for everything he says, to be able to communicate with academicians of other disciplines because of a shared interest in the pursuit of knowledge, and to be relevantly useful in this world of ongoing activities. Macquarrie's description of the structures of human existence does reflect the ordinary and everyday ways of being that we are acquainted with, and as such there is much to learn from Macquarrie by studying what he has to say. In particular, his portrayal of the transition from existence to ontology holds true as a description of man's search for and experience of God.

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[118] Studies, p. 95.

[119] God-talk, pp. 246-247.

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We now proceed to see in more detail how Macquarrie spells out the revelatory situation, i.e., a more detailed description of Macquarrie's thinking on revelation and religion.

To summarize: At the beginning of this chapter, we mentioned Heidegger's influence on Macquarrie, a fact readily acknowledged by Macquarrie himself and evidently seen in Macquarrie's existential-ontological perspective which begins with existence and ends with Being.[120] However, the emphasis is different. Macquarrie's existential-ontological perspective is decidedly theological, i.e., it attempts to unveil the transition from existence to Being. In Christian theology, such a transition is called a revelatory situation. The basic "ingredients" in such a situation are: existence temporally conceived, its tensions which lead to an existential imbalance precipitating in a quest for an authentic or unified existence, and finally Being the incomparable, the transcendens, and the prior enabling condition which gives itself to man and assists man to attain to authenticity.

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[120] E.g., Principles, pp. 81-82, 105-106; Studies, pp. 79-96; God-talk, pp. 222-223.

We remind ourselves that in order to understand Being, Heidegger began with an analysis of Dasein precisely because only Dasein can understand Being. This premise is then corrected and/or confirmed by Being. This present chapter can be regarded as corresponding to Heidegger's analysis of Dasein; the next chapter will amplify the second part, viz., an elaboration of Being via an examination of a relevatory situation.

V. Some Questions.

It is the purpose of this section to see how Macquarrie views death, conscience,[121] and Being's letting-be as forms of creativity, and to see how he relates the letting-be of death and conscience to that of Being. In other words, our goal is to probe the way Macquarrie tries to justify the way he understands the transition from existence to Being.[122] Therefore, we delimit our examination of Macquarrie's existential-ontological perspective to the analytical level, confining ourselves to the problems encountered in relating death and conscience to Being's letting-be as forms of creativity. We will begin with death and conscience and then see how they are related to or affected by Being's letting-be.

Macquarrie is solely interested in death as an existential phenomenon. Questions like "does man have a life after death or does

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[121] We may also say that historical-cultural factors are a form of creativity, e.g., the formation of a man's character is greatly influenced by such an incidental factor as the influence of a friend.

[122] In Macquarrie's existential-ontological perspective, the transition from existence to Being is the transition from inauthenticity to authenticity, or the transition from the ontological to the ontical. Therefore, we need to examine the way Macquarrie understands and explains the transition, with the intention of showing the absence of any trace of a deus ex machina in Macquarrie's theology.

Our treatment of Heidegger's philosophy has shown the meaning of existence and Being, but it was clear that Heidegger himself did not try to delineate the transition from existence to Being; or if he did, he did it in such an obfuscating fashion that nothing is clear. It is true that he did leave many clues to be further developed, and Macquarrie's existential-ontological perspective is one such effort to work out the embryonic ideas. We will use two phenomena (death and conscience) to indicate the way Macquarrie explains the transition from existence to Being.

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he have another kind of being in the after-world?" do not concern Macquarrie, who is more anxious to examine the character of death as a phenomenon immanent in existence than the speculative questions concerning the existence and/or nature of life after death. Thus Macquarrie desires to examine the significance of death as something belonging to man's existence, as one of the many givens in life.

We have seen that death is man's most intimate and ownmost possibility, for existence itself is a being-unto-death; thus death is the common property of mankind. As possibility, death is futural. "Indeed, it lies at the very boundary of the future, closing it off. Death is the uttermost possibility, the possibility that cannot be outstripped, in the sense that there is no further possibility beyond death."[123] Thus we cannot get behind or beyond death, as it were. Naturally by possibility, Macquarrie does not mean just something that will happen in the near future. Rather he wants to assert that to exist is to stand before possibilities; man stands before various ways of being and acting that are available to him in any situation, and for one or another of which he may decide. If death is a possibility, it is a possibility of a very unique kind; it is the possibility of ceasing to be, the possibility of not having any further possibilities. In this sense, death is man's ownmost and uttermost possibility. As such man must take death seriously; he must not regard it as something that will happen in the bye-and-bye. On the contrary, man must regard this uttermost possibility as the capital possibility before which all other possibilities are to be evaluated. To do this is to live in one's uttermost and untransferable possibility.

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[123] Studies, pp. 53-54.

If death relates to the future as possibility, it also relates to the past as facticity. Death is not an accidental factor in existence, but is something germane to existence; to be born is to be caught up in the process of dying. Such is the factical constitution of existence, and in this sense death is the common heritage of mankind. We can regard such a situation as good or bad, but we cannot avoid it; death belongs to the facticity of existence.

In a sense, death is already presently felt in inauthentic and authentic existence. In the former, the reality of death is covered up as evidenced by the belief of those who interpret the indefiniteness of death as something that will happen but not now, the emphasis being on the indifference to what a careful consideration of the meaning of death might do to make existence more meaningful. The latter, however, resolutely anticipates death, and in doing so acquires a master possibility wherein all lesser possibilities are subordinated to this capital possibility. In this sense, death is integrative rather than destructive, because by anticipating death the triviality of everyday existence is overcome, and unity and meaning in life are achieved. Thus death becomes creative of selfhood and is a form of creativity. By making this untransferable and intrinsic possibility his own, a man attains to a unified selfhood. To use a biblical image, to live in anticipation of death is to live in the eschaton, to live before the imminent end, in

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whose presence all responsible decisions must be made and all possibilities evaluated. This leads man to see how trivial many of his actions are, resulting in seriousness, resolution, and meaning in life.

Macquarrie then goes on to show that anxiety in the face of death recalls man from the forgetfulness of Being and awakens him to the wonder of Being. This is what we meant when we said that the awareness of nothingness brings awareness of Being,[124] preparing us to see dimensions in life that usually escape our attention.

The above consideration of death does not remove the negativity of death; death is still the termination of all futural possibilities. Man still dies. If so, are the lives of a drunkard and a great philanthropist of equal value or are both equally pointless? This assertion of the absurdity of existence provides the stage for Macquarrie to present his view on Being's letting-be, a view that acknowledges the facticity of existence and sees the chasm between human resources (the givens) and the demands to which man is called upon to fulfill (the realization of man's potentialities). Let us allow Macquarrie to speak for himself:

> It [Macquarrie's view] seeks sense in this situation, and it sees that the condition that there is sense in it is that the being which we are given (the factical pole of existence) is of a piece with the being to which we are summoned (the pole of possibility); that these are not accidentally conjoined or destined to be in perpetual and frustrating conflict with each other, but that they are both rooted in the wider context of being within which man has his being. Human

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[124] Supra, pp. 160-162.

> existence can make sense if this wider being supports and supplements the meagre heritage of our finite being as we strive to fulfill the potentialities of our being. To adapt words of St. Augustine, human existence makes sense if being grants what it commands, that is to say, if there are resources beyond our human resources to help us fulfill the claims that our very existence lays upon us.[125]

Macquarrie calls the above-mentioned attitude "faith," an existential attitude that includes both acceptance and commitment[126] and at the same time acknowledges a "wider being" in the context of which man has his own being. Considered in conjunction with death, faith acknowledges that death is a form of creativity and at the same time looks to resources beyond those of man to overcome the sting of death. So there seem to be two forms of creativity--death and the wider being or Being's letting-be within which man has his own being. Our task is to examine the way Macquarrie tries to justify such a position. Why the two forms of creativity? How are they related? Why should one be adequate, while the other is inadequate? Is there a contradiction in Macquarrie's position? We may say that he certainly has a problem. Let us see how he settles his problem.[127]

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[125] *Principles*, p. 70; *Supra*, p. 174.

[126] *Supra*, p. 164.

[127] Let it be made explicitly clear that we are interested in the way Macquarrie tries to justify his position. Therefore, it is our intention to probe into his analysis. There are several points where we disagree with Macquarrie or where we think he has not adequately analyzed his problem, but our disagreements should not be made into an obstacle in our endeavour to unwrap Macquarrie's position. We say this to indicate our intention to delimit ourselves to one problem, viz., the problem of Macquarrie's attempt to explain the transition from existence to Being and how that attempt influences his understanding of revelation and religion in general.

Macquarrie begins with the fundamental ontological structure of man. This is where man is man _qua_ man, making it possible for him to be authentic or inauthentic. To this basic ontology belong the concepts of existence, understanding, moods, etc. Man in his formal structure is the same whether he is a Muslim or a Christian, white or Negro, authentic or inauthentic. It is that in virtue of which it can be said that he is _homo sapiens_. Applied to death, this means that whatever possibilities may emerge, they emerge precisely because they are native, indigenous, or germane to existence. Applied to authenticity, this means that the quest for authenticity springs from existence; ontologically there is nothing to bar man from attaining to authenticity. Existence _per se_ exhibits the ontological possibilities for achieving authenticity. The question of the way the ontological possibilities are achieved raises the ontical problem which has to do with the _realization_ of the ontological possibilities.

Macquarrie acknowledges that death, considered as a master possibility, is a form of creativity or is an ontic possibility. It is a call to man to attain to wholeness, or, as we have said, death becomes creative of selfhood. Yet Macquarrie wants to complement or make more adequate death's ontic possibility by introducing Being's letting-be, or by asking man to seek meaning in life in the wider context of being within which man has his being. If death is an ontic possibility, as Macquarrie has readily conceded, and furthermore if Being's letting-be is a complementing form of creativity, then how are they related, if they are to be related? There are three points we wish to note here. (a) Macquarrie does not deal with the question of the relation between death as creativity and Being's letting-be as a more adequate form of creativity in his treatment of death and Being's letting-be. Instead he goes on to the very sources of faith like revelation and religion to show how Being's letting-be complements and makes more adequate death's letting-be. We will come back to this point after our consideration of conscience.

(b) Macquarrie wants to say that Being's letting-be enables man to overcome the sting of death, or, to use a biblical phrase, to be a new creature.[128] From the very start it must be stated that becoming a new creature cannot mean that the whole constitution of man's former being is abrogated, and that he has been constituted afresh and differently,[129] because that is substitution, not creativity. It is substitution because through some inscrutable and incredible means a man suddenly loses his former self and becomes an entirely new and different person. Being's letting-be does not function that way. Macquarrie wants to say that Being's letting-be effects an ontical or existentiell change in man. It brings about a radical re-orientation of a man who yet retains his same basic ontological structure.[130] It gives man a new understanding of himself and enables him to project himself on new possibilities.

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[128] While acknowledging that death is a resource for living, at the same time we admit that the natural man--natural man taken to mean a member of the they-self--might argue that, if ultimately every existence comes to an end, there is very little to choose between one way of being and another. In answer to the natural man's view on death we have to say that he is hindering the way death can act as a momentum to live beyond a succession of "nows." That is to say, the natural man's view on death ultimately leads to pessimism if not nihilism. As such we disagree with his view; we prefer to make death a resource for living.

[129] _An Existentialist Theology_, p. 129.

Being's letting-be is possible and can only function insofar as man can appropriate it, so that it must fall within the arena or horizon of his ontologico-existential possibility. Otherwise we are not talking about man but about a mere thing, to which properties may be added or taken away, as a house may be painted white or avocado-green. So when Macquarrie affirms the fact that Being's creativity enables man to overcome the sting of death, he is actually asserting the belief that Being changes the situation by making it possible for man to have a new life, ontically, that is. Ontologically, man still retains his former structure, but ontically Being's letting-be imparts to him a new understanding of himself, a radical re-orientation of himself, and enables him to project himself on new possibilities.[131]

(c) There is a deficiency in Heidegger's explication of death that we need to note. Macquarrie is implicated because of his sympathy for Heidegger. We have seen Heidegger's contention that death enables man to grasp his existence in its wholeness, delivers him from the domination of _das Man_, and brings about this authenticity. In a word, anticipation of death enables man to be his true self. Herein lies its weakness.

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[130] An Existentialist Theology, p. 129.

[131] Cf. Scope, p. 149.

If to be authentic means to be dislodged from the they-self, then authentic man seems to be a separate entity, different from and seemingly having nothing to do with society.[132] This seems to set the authentic individual against society, or at least to make the authentic self a separate entity or existent. His relationships with other Daseins, authentic and/or inauthentic, seem to have no important significance. If death isolates and permits man to be confronted with his true self, it also must take into consideration the ramifications of the isolated authentic individual's relationships with others. To be adequate Being's letting-be must show how even authentic selves need to be inextricably related to others. At this point, we readily acknowledge that death is a resource for living, but as explained by Heidegger and accepted by Macquarrie, it leaves much to be desired.

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[132] Macquarrie is aware of this problem, but he is too sympathetic to Heidegger to push the problem to its logical conclusion. In his _Martin Heidegger_, Macquarrie argues that (a) death, as man's ownmost possibility, isolates and allows man to be confronted with his true self; and (b) conscience calls man to accept his nature as a being-unto-death and to project himself resolutely upon it. Macquarrie goes on to point out that being-with-others or being-in-the-world is a fundamental _existentiale_ of man and therefore the community is needed even by authentic men. Macquarrie agrees that, because man is caught in the death-trap of the they-self, he must first be isolated from the faceless mass, but this does not mean that authentic selves do not need a community. They do. Herein lies the rub.

Assuming that authentic men need a community and that being-with-others is a _sine qua non_, we still need to ask for a guarantee that domination does not exist in an authentic community. It will be difficult if not impossible to guarantee that an authentic self living in an authentic community does not get buried in and dominated by some other authentic selves. This suggests that the Heideggerian concept of authenticity has to be modified to make room for the intricate network of interdependence and interrelationships. We also need to point out that Heidegger spoke a lot about being-in-the-world in his treatment of Dasein, but there is hardly any word about being-in-the-world in his consideration of authentic selves. If authentic men need to be with-others it has to be spelled out. As it is, we have to rest authentic men's need of a community on inferences.

Macquarrie is aware of this deficiency as when he points out the weakness of Heidegger's philosophy as being too interested in individual existence. Heidegger's interest seems to gravitate to an individual rather than the community in spite of his talk on being-in-the-world. _An Existentialist Theology_, pp. 215-224. It is rather unfortunate that Macquarrie has not spelled out his objections.

We now turn to conscience as a resource for living. We have said that conscience is the call of the authentic self to the inauthentic self to leave the they-self and be a true self.[133] The call of conscience creates dissatisfaction with the contentment of a life solely concerned with the concerns of the they-self, and thus directs man to the quest of his authentic being.[134] However, it was Heidegger's belief that the call of conscience was a summons to guiltiness [Schuldigsein.] Man hears the call of conscience, and is shown the ontological possibility for authenticity, but he lacks the power to achieve the ontical possibility for authenticity. So ontologically the transition from inauthenticity to authenticity is "there," but ontically it is still to be achieved.

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[133] Supra, pp. 81-88; 137-142.

[134] Supra, pp. 137-142. Heidegger made an invaluable contribution when he said that dissatisfaction with the they-self, caused by conscience, results in an individual's protest against the accepted norms of the mass. So conscience speaks out against the claims of fallen humanity, and refuses to kow-tow to the conventions of the crowd.

In Heidegger's terminology, we can say that man finds himself lost in the they-self--his ways of being are chosen for him by the crowd. His life lacks genuine choices. To be his authentic self he must dislodge himself from the masses and be his original, true self. To do that he must be shown to himself in his authentic possibility, and this is done through the Ruf of conscience. Paradoxically, the call of conscience shows man's ontical impotence, as it were, to execute the demand of conscience. So, argues Macquarrie, something must be done to enable man to obtain the ontical possibility.

The ontical possibility, for the inauthentic man, is a bare formal possibility, which has to be realized to enable him to live authentically. Because he is so lost in the they-self, he cannot of himself decide to obtain the existentiell possibility as evidenced by the call of conscience to Schuldigsein. Conscience might arouse in man the dissatisfaction with the they-self, but it cannot empower him to obtain the existentiell possibility to be authentic. Therefore, Macquarrie argues, some "power" is needed to bring about the ontical possibility. In his own words:

> And it now appears that only some Power outside man, some Power not fallen as man is fallen, can bring to man this concrete possibility of regaining his authentic being. And yet such a Power could only hold out that existentiell possibility because it falls within the horizon of man's existential possibility of authenticity, and can therefore be appropriated by man and made his own.[135]

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[135] An Existential Theology, pp. 148-149.

This brings us back to our main problem, viz., the need to explain this something "extra" that is required to bring about man's authenticity, the faith in Being's letting-be that, in the case of man, enables him to appropriate and enjoy the maximal range of his being. The problem centres on the "extra" that is an extra but is still within man's range or horizon of being. In Macquarrie's theology, this "extra" is Being's creativity that imparts the existentiell possibility to man. Death and conscience, as explained above, point to the _availability_ of the ontical possibility, and in this sense they are resources for living, albeit incomplete or inadequate. Macquarrie wishes to point to Being's creativity as a lure to man to be authentic, to be more beingful, to appropriate the ontical possibility.

This leads us to ask: is there a "jump" in the transition from existence to Being? Macquarrie tries to answer this question in various ways. Naturally, he wants to assert that there is no "jump" in the transition from existence to Being. He is anxious to show that "faith in Being" is part and parcel of the structure of existence and is not a "foreign" commodity introduced to support the _argumentum ex ignorantia_. Macquarrie contends that we must not try to discover gaps in our scientific-technological knowledge in order to find a place for Being-as-God in an otherwise orderly and immanent world.[136]

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[136] _Principles_, p. 72.

Macquarrie is the first person to be most conscious of this problem. Repeatedly he finds himself coming back to this basic thorny question--the question of the transition from the language of existence to the language of Being.[137] That this is true is seen in the number of times he tries to explain the transition and the various ways he

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[137] Macquarrie admits that "the major problem [in the existential-ontological perspective] is . . . how one makes the transition from the language of existence to the language of being." *God-talk*, p. 239. The phrase "language of existence" is used to describe both the phenomenological analysis of the structures of Dasein and the primitive attempts of people like Paul to describe the basic ways of being in this world. Macquarrie then endeavours to demonstrate how God is creative and holds the initiative in man's experience of the holy, pointing to the way Bultmann contended that Paul's theology may be regarded as an anthropology, ". . . in which there is set forth first the understanding of human existence in its fallen or sinful state, and then the movement toward wholeness and restoration in the life of faith." *God-talk*, p. 241. He then selects the theology of people like Schleiermacher to show that the Christian experience of authenticity is grounded on an experience in a reality that transcends human consciousness, in Being-itself that is. So God-talk is talk about man's experience of a real Other that stands over against the self in encounter. So man attributes the transition from existence to Being to the letting-be or creativity of Being. The agonizing difficulty in trying to explain the role of Being's creativity in the transition from existence to Being is seen in Macquarrie's words: "Frankly, I do not suppose there is any way in which one could prove that the assertions of faith and of theology do refer to a Reality (God) that is independent of and prior to the experiences which we call 'experiences of God.' In order to prove that there is an encounter with a real One, one would somehow need to get behind the experience, or find a second route to that which we know in the experience, and this is not possible. Yet on the other hand the conviction that there *is* a real Other in this experience is extremely deep-rooted." *Ibid.*, p. 244.

As the saying goes, we bleed with Macquarrie, but as an interpreter of his theology we have to do what he is wise enough not to go into in depth. That is to say, we have to explore the ramifications caused by asserting Being's creativity and see how they affect the transition from existence to Being. Therefore we will raise a few vital questions and see how they affect Macquarrie's theology.

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goes about explaining it. His favourite way of explaining the transition from existence to Being is by using Being's letting-be or creativity, which empowers man to enjoy the maximal range of being. It helps a person to realize fully his potentiality for being and this is done in the transition from existence to Being. Therefore, man finds his full existence by living within the wider being which supports and complements his heritage of being. Thus there are resources "beyond" man's human resources to assist him to fulfill his call of duty, as it were. Yet Macquarrie wants to say that these "outside" forces would be totally ineffective if they were not somehow already found in man. In other words, ontical possibilities would fail to work if ontologically they were not already in man's possession. This brings us to our question that has been dogging us all along, the question that we live with by day and a nightmare by night, viz., how does man appropriate the ontical possibilities? To ask the same question differently: how does one explain the modus operandi of Being's creativity? A host of related questions immediately spring up, questions like the relation of the letting-be of death and conscience and that of Being and how they are related. Why are death and conscience inadequate resources? Why is it that man can respond to Being's letting-be, but cannot respond to conscience's call to be a true self? What does Macquarrie mean by asserting the empowering dynamis of Being to effect the transition from existence to Being? We raise these questions to set the stage for a closer examination of Macquarrie's reasons for putting so much emphasis on Being's letting-be or creativity.

We will now lay bare Macquarrie's emphasis on Being's letting-be as the form of creativity, in addition to and making more adequate other forms of creativity like those provided by death, conscience, historical-cultural factors, etc. Let it be said from the very start that Macquarrie does not deny the validity of death, conscience, and historical-cultural factors as forms of creativity. They are, but they are just inadequate so Macquarrie believes. What makes Macquarrie believe that they are inadequate? Two main reasons. (i) Macquarrie's analysis of existence convinces him that Being's letting-be is needed in addition to the creativity supplied by death, conscience, and historical-cultural factors; and (ii) his theology of revelation and religion depends on the role played by Being's letting-be as the form of creativity that effects the passage from inauthenticity to authenticity.

Let us see why Macquarrie's analysis of existence leads him to believe that Being's letting-be is needed in addition to that provided by death, etc. It is Macquarrie's belief that the existential imbalance is quite widespread; it just seems that the existential imbalance is perennial as evidenced by the fact that man is constantly trying to hold the tensions or polarities in equilibrium. Furthermore, man seems to be constantly "falling," i.e., man appears to fail to realize his potentiality, to "fall" away from or fail to actualize his authentic possibility.[138] Macquarrie also indicates the way man

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[138] Principles, p. 62. Cf. Being and Time, p. 220.

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is alienated from himself, an alienation caused by his hopping from one polarity to another, e.g., the hopping from individuality to community makes him feel "lost" in this world. As a parenthesis, we may add that the failure to "find" himself or to experience membership in the community and the shuttling from one to the other, has led to numerous visits to the psychiatrist's couch on the part of man.

Man, as Macquarrie sees him, is constantly "falling" away from his authentic being in spite of the fact that there are creative factors like death, conscience, and historical-cultural forces to help him to actualize his ontic possibilities. Awareness of this perennial existential imbalance in life might drive some to women and wine, so to speak, and might convince them that the most that they can do is to patch up here and there, without achieving any real cure or finding a solution to remedy the constant "falling" away or "alienation." To elaborate his position Macquarrie uses a religious word, "sin," to describe the falling away or alienation from oneself, from others, and from God, and tops it off with an illustration from the life of Jean Valjean.[139]

He first distinguishes the difference between an ontologico-existential and an ontico-existentiell possibility. Love is an example of an existential possibility, because it is a native or indigenous property of human existence. Thus ontologically, every man has the ability to love another person or can authentically "be with" another. However, circumstances may make a person lose the existentiell possibility to love another. For example, Jean Valjean, because he stole bread to feed some starving children, was imprisoned for twenty years, and upon his release he was an embittered man. He hated mankind and he seemed to have lost all his virtues. One day a bishop helped him and Jean returned the bishop's kindness with a theft. But when his theft was still met with kindness from the bishop, Jean once again experienced the stirrings of virtue, goodness, and love. He was "converted," and once again he came to know the meaning of love and self-sacrifice. In his embittered days, love was not an existentiell possibility though it was still an ontological possibility. Something was needed to effect the change from the ontological to the ontic. (In the case of Jean Valjean it was an historical factor, the love and kindness of the bishop. As such historical-cultural factors are a form of creativity).

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[139] Scope, p. 149; Supra, pp. 68-69.

It is in some such way that Macquarrie understands the necessity for Being's letting-be. Now we come to a vital question: if death, conscience, and historical-cultural forces are forms of creativity, why does man need Being's creativity? This question brings us to a discussion of fallen man and the depth of his fallenness.

Macquarrie believes that fallen man, by virtue of his being a man, has an existential possibility for authenticity, but this may not be an existentiell possibility for an individual in a particular situation. The story of people like Jean Valjean and others, and the presence of the perennial existential imbalance seem to suggest that Macquarrie is right when he suggests that:

> It may require a gracious act from beyond [man] himself to make the possibility one which he can choose in his situation. Yet this act will not be something utterly foreign, the grace is not imposed but received, because the existential possibility is already there.[140]

The emphasis on the need for Being's letting-be shows Macquarrie's appraisal of the crippling effects of sin in man. Sin is here understood as the force that alienates man not only from Being but also from his own authentic self and from other Daseins. How else does he explain the constant falling away from one's authentic being? Let it be clearly known that Macquarrie is not one to dwell morbidly on "total depravity," but he does wish to assert that man can be so totally fallen into the they-self that he really lacks the power to make genuine choices. Death, conscience, and historical-cultural factors are genuine forms of creativity, but they are inadequate for two reasons.

To begin with, their inadequacy is seen in the fact that though they are constantly at work in man, yet they do not seem to help man to overcome his perennial existential imbalance. That they do help Macquarrie does not deny, but at the same time Macquarrie wants to affirm that their creativity can be enhanced and made more adequate by Being's letting-be. This leads us to the second reason which follows from and elaborates on the first.

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[140] Scope, pp. 149-150; Supra, pp. 68-69, which form the basis of our discussion on the fallenness of man.

In considering how death, conscience, and historical-cultural factors are forms of creativity, and how and why Being's creativity is needed in addition to the letting-be of death, etc., Macquarrie wants to make sure that nobody is left outside the pale of Being's letting-be. Translated into religious terms, what is "natural" to one man needs a "work of grace" in another.[141] Thus the letting-be of death, etc., might be adequate for some men to attain to authenticity, but many others seem to require something "extra" to expedite the process or transition from inauthenticity to authenticity. Death, conscience, and historical-cultural factors per se might be sufficient for the few healthy-minded, who have only to perceive their creativity to come alive to it. That is to say, for these few fortunate souls the creativity of death, etc., is sufficiently adequate to effect the passage from the ontological to the ontic. That this is true Macquarrie does not deny. But the point is surely this, that if death, conscience, and historical-cultural factors fail to "save" the many "sin-sick souls," then Being's letting-be is needed to enhance the creativity of death, etc. So we recall William James' wise words: "whether the sentiment of human helplessness may not open a profounder view . . . of the situation."[142]

Macquarrie also believes that people like Paul, Augustine,

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[141] Ibid., p. 151.

[142] William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, (London: Longmans, Green & Co., Inc., 1952), p. 133. Quoted by Macquarrie in Scope, p. 152.

Luther, etc., had access to death, etc., as means of creativity, but they were transformed not by the letting-be of death, etc., but by Being's letting-be, which naturally makes use of the creativity of death, etc. So Being's creativity is needed to make sure that everyone comes under the orbit of Being's graciousness--both those who are healthy-minded enough to respond to the letting-be of death, etc., and those who need Being's letting-be in addition to the letting-be of death, etc., to be their authentic selves. Macquarrie's analysis of existence and his study of history convince him that the majority of people need this something "extra" to effect the passage from inauthenticity to authenticity.[143] As a matter of fact, that is the very essence of revelation which is the disclosure of a possibility for man _to be_ his true self, a disclosure made known to man by the divine initiative. To make anything more than a casual reference to revelation at this juncture is to jump the gun. Therefore, we will confine ourselves to Macquarrie's idea on revelation insofar as it explains the reasons for Macquarrie's Scottish stubbornness in adhering to Being's letting-be as an additional and complementing form of creativity on top of the letting-be of death, etc.

If Macquarrie's description of existence is accurate and reliable--the need to understand the dynamic self in terms of temporality rather than substance or thinghood which is characterized by the four sets of tension man experiences because he is possibility and not a fixed, static fact--then Being's letting-be is needed to assist man in realizing his full potentiality. Applied to revelation this means that man's quest for the sense of existence is met by the gift of a sense for existence, which comes about through the divine initiative. To be more precise, "in so far as it [divine initiative] brings him a new understanding both of himself and of the wider being within which he has his being (for the understanding of these is correlative), then it may be called 'revelation'."[144] In short, revelation is the moment when man "sees" Being's creativity--we may add, in addition to the creativity of death, etc.,--at work in him, helping him to overcome the existential imbalance. How this is done will be discussed in the next chapter, but for the present let us illuminate the role of Being's letting-be in revelation.

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[143] E.g., "For the Christian it is God who gives to man the _existentiell_ possibility of authentic being, though admittedly the gift can only be given because man in his fallen existence retains the existential possibility--if not, he would have ceased to be man." _An Existentialist Theology_, pp. 154-155.

Macquarrie gives prominent emphasis to Being's creativity because, among other things, it accounts for revelation. That is to say, Being's letting-be is the "force" that sets in motion the movement towards Being. To put it even more affirmatively, Being's creativity discloses its self-gifting, self-giving to man, and to "see" this self-gifting of Being is to "see" revelation.

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[144] Principles, p. 75.

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We freely admit that the above description of how Being's letting-be is responsible for revelation is rather skeletal, but we have to mention it, albeit inadequately, to show how and why Being's letting-be is needed in addition to the creativity provided by death, etc., to explain Macquarrie's stubborn adherence to Being's creativity, and finally to prepare us for a more detailed analysis of the meaning of revelation as understood by Macquarrie. However, before doing that we wish to reiterate a few vital questions. All of them have to do with the *relation* of Being's creativity to that of death, conscience, and historical-cultural forces.

Why is is that man can respond to Being's letting-be, but cannot respond to conscience's offer of ontic possibility? What is the difference between Being's letting-be and that of conscience? Is the difference one of intensity or of qualitative difference? If death provides the master possibility which gives sense and meaning to existence, how is that different from Being's letting-be which gives man a new re-orientation and understanding of himself? *What exactly* does Macquarrie mean by the empowering *dynamis* of Being? *How* does it function?

Naturally Macquarrie would want to regard these questions as premature because it is his intention to answer them in his treatment of revelation. That is to say, instead of directly answering the question of, say, the relation between Being's creativity and that of death, Macquarrie goes on to the very sources of faith like revelation

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for enlightenment, and in doing so he hopes to demonstrate the difference between the letting-be of Being and that of death.

We think that it is most unfortunate that Macquarrie has chosen this particular *modus operandi*, because we find ourselves constantly needling him for a clearer picture and statement on the difference between the creativity of Being and that of death, conscience, and historical-cultural factors. We salve our conscience (irony intended) by saying that we are delimiting Macquarrie's existential-ontological perspective to the *analytical* level. If we were to deal with his existential-ontological perspective on an *elucidatory* level, we will have to work out more fully a view or theory on Being's creativity and its relation to that of death, conscience, historical-cultural factors, etc. As it is, our intention is to see how Macquarrie's existential-ontological perspective can help us better understand revelation. That is to say, the substance of our dissertation is to see how Macquarrie's existential-ontological perspective acts as an interpretative framework within which we can better understand revelation. It is not meant to be strictly an elucidatory examination of Macquarrie's existential-ontological perspective *per se*. We admit that it is most difficult to differentiate the two, but we mention it to indicate our intention to *delimit* the area of treatment of Macquarrie's understanding of revelation.

We conclude this chapter with an observation on the structural-qualitative difference between Being's letting-be and that of death,

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etc. We wish to mention a distinctive characteristic of Being's creativity that gives it an identity or form, that illuminates the peculiar nature of Being's letting-be, and that helps to show the structural-qualitative difference between Being's letting-be and that of death, etc. In a way Macquarrie has dealt with this point, e.g., when he characterized Being's letting-be as love and self-giving, he asserted that Being, through its self-giving, empowers a person to enjoy maximally his range of being.[145] Unfortunately, Macquarrie has not adequately articulated his understanding of the structural-qualitative difference between the creativity of Being as self-gifting and that of death, etc. As such he exposes himself to possible ambiguity. Our "delineation" of the structural-qualitative difference between Being's letting-be and that of death, etc., is offered as a *suggestion* or a *theoretical possibility* in our attempt to understand more clearly Being's creativity, and as a bridge in linking the transition from existence to Being to revelation, which is the moment when man "sees" this transition.

Let us begin with the letting-be of death, etc. There the call to authenticity is "impersonal" in the sense that the call comes from man *qua* man in his factical existence. It is the call of the better self, as it were, to the inauthentic self who experiences, among other things, death, conscience, and historical-cultural factors that are "there." They are the "factors" or "conditions" of life, existing as impersonal lures for becoming. They are the cold, impersonal, isolated will that calls man to authenticity. The letting-be of death, etc., is impersonal in yet another sense. There is no sense of a community at all. It is just the authentic self summoning the inauthentic self to authenticity. Because the letting-be of death, etc., is impersonal, it does not seem to work too well with man, who seems to need something more personal, something that he seems to find in Being's creativity.

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[145] *Supra*, pp. 171-172.

Being's letting-be is personal in the sense that Being-as-God discloses himself to man, an event known as "revelation," which is the subject matter of our next chapter. Being's letting-be is a personal call or lure to man to leave the they-self. To formulate the same conviction in another way: in experiencing Being's letting-be man experiences the divine initiative in gifting itself to man. So the letting-be of Being enables man to have an experience of the personal dimension of reality, and man's response to Being's letting-be is the realization of his authentic self. So the personal dimension of ontic existence is the key to ontological reality. In short, Being's creativity enables man to respond to a person, so to speak, instead of to death, conscience, and historical-cultural factors that are just "there," and that are the "conditions" or "factors" in life. In parenthesis, we may add that this is one nuance of Macquarrie's claim that Being empowers man to enjoy maximally his range of being.

Maybe we can highlight the importance of the need for a

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personal summons to authenticity by using the story of Jean Valjean. In his embittered days his authentic self might have summoned him to authenticity, but that summons was a cold, impersonal, and isolated one; it was a call originating from himself, his true, original, authentic self to be sure, but it was still a summons from himself. As such it was quite ineffective. However, when the bishop gave him a helping hand, Valjean received a personal call to authenticity, a summons that came from a friend. It is in some such way that we understand Being's creativity as a personal call to man to attain to his authentic existence, a call that comes about through Being's self-disclosure, self-gifting, and self-offering to man.

Being's letting-be is personal in yet another sense. It takes into account the community of authentic selves and the intricate network of interdependence and interrelatedness that makes up the fabric of existence. This contrasts with the impersonal summons of death, etc., to authenticity which only emphasizes the call of authentic man to the fallen self, neglecting the nexus of interdependence and interrelationships and the presence of other authentic selves who share the same nexus.

Our "delineation" of the structural-qualitative difference between Being's creativity and that of death, etc., gives Being's creativity an identity, a form which is distinguishable from that of the letting-be of death, etc. It also helps to set the stage for our analysis of Macquarrie's understanding of revelation by pointing out

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the fact that Being's letting-be has to do with its self-gifting to man, an event known to us as "revelation." Finally, let us reiterate the fact that our "delineation" of the structural identity or form of Being's letting-be is only a suggestion or a theoretical possibility to understand more clearly Macquarrie's teaching on the transition from inauthenticity to authenticity, or the process from the ontological to the ontic. As such it is not meant to be taken as a full-blown endeavour to delineate the structural identity or form of Being's letting-be.

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CHAPTER IV

REVELATION

It is the purpose of this chapter to see how Macquarrie understands revelation from his existential-ontological perspective. The previous chapter has stressed the crucial significance of Being's letting-be in effecting the transition from existence to Being or the passage from inauthenticity to authenticity, with the emphasis laid on the personal. We now aim at explicating Macquarrie's understanding of revelation as viewed from his existential-ontological perspective on an elucidatory or analytical level, trying to unwrap Macquarrie's concept of the personal in revelation. So this chapter intends to see in greater detail the way Macquarrie goes about explaining the personal in Being's letting-be. To achieve his goal, Macquarrie utilizes anxiety as a catalyst in precipitationg revelation[1] and Being's creativity in bringing about revelation. The emphasis in the latter is on the personal, which is expressed by Macquarrie as Being's self-gifting to man. The fascinosum and appetitus are ways used by Macquarrie to indicate the personal in Being's creativity.[2]

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[1] In the next chapter we will raise some questions concerning the role of anxiety and ask why Being's creativity is needed in addition to that of anxiety. For the present we will attempt to see why Macquarrie insists on the necessity of Being's creativity in addition to that of anxiety.

Two preliminary remarks are called for. To begin with, it is our intention to exegete Macquarrie's view of revelation on his own terms, leaving our criticisms, suggestions, etc., for the next chapter. It is our intention to glean the various hints in Macquarrie's writings and present them in a coherent picture, so as to give a sustained presentation of Macquarrie's teaching on revelation. Since Macquarrie's work on revelation is not extensive or comprehensive, we have to use our imagination to present a cogent picture, basing our exegesis on the numerous hints left by Macquarrie and on some possible inferences.

Secondly, we wish to affirm the provisional nature of Macquarrie's teaching on revelation. That is to say, as it now stands Macquarrie's conception of revelation may be adequate but certainly not perfect or "definitive." There might be revisions of Macquarrie's view of revelation, especially when Macquarrie himself has not fully developed a mature teaching on revelation. In this sense we can regard Macquarrie's understanding of revelation as a foundation for further analyses of the meaning of revelation as it is understood from both Christian and non-Christian premises.

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[2] Macquarrie uses the person and work of Jesus Christ as a paradigmatic illustration to indicate the personal element in Being's creativity. In addition to this, the fascinosum and appetitus are ways to describe the personal.

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I. A General Description of Revelation.

Macquarrie recognizes the numerous problems one comes across in considering revelation. Quoting Abraham Heschel, Macquarrie observes that social science maintains that man is too great to be in need of revelation. Natural science, on the other hand, thinks that man is too insignificant to deserve divine attention.[3] On both counts, revelation does not seem to make much sense.

Faced with this situation, it might seem tempting to find haven in appealing to some private source of knowledge to account for revelation. This, in turn, would transform theology into some purely esoteric body of knowledge that is supposedly based on a divine revelation and is different from and discontinuous with ordinary knowledge. This revelation would be self-contained and self-authenticating; it could neither be confirmed nor refuted by human reason.[4] In Macquarrie's view, this would amount to escapism, if not dishonesty, precisely because even if through revelation we get to know the "wholly other" which is supposedly qualitatively different from ordinary realities, ". . . the knowing is not itself qualitatively different from other knowing--if it were, we could not speak of 'knowing.'"[5] Knowledge gained through revelation--otherwise known as revealed knowledge--cannot refute or contradict ordinary knowledge unless it is in some logical relation with it, and unless both are connected by some kind of logic. If they are not, then we cannot talk of "knowing." Consequently, revealed knowledge cannot be purely esoteric and totally different from ordinary knowledge. This is no denial of the fact that revelation is unique, but it does emphatically repudiate any resort to some private source of esoteric knowledge to bypass the difficulty in explaining and relating revelation to the ordinary modes of knowing. Macquarrie illuminates this problem in terms of theology's relationship to revelation thus:

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[3] "One maintained that man was too great to be in need of divine guidance, and the other maintained that man was too small to be worthy of divine guidance. The first conception came from social science, and the second from natural science." Abraham Heschel, *God in Search of Man*, (New York: Farrer, Straus & Cudahy, 1955), p. 169. Quoted by Macquarrie in *Principles*, p. 75.

[4] *Principles*, p. 79.

[5] *Studies*, p. 22.

> Theology, however, as reflection upon and explication of such revelation, is not identical with the revelation. It is a branch of inquiry which must have regard for logic, and part of its task is to clarify the relations between what it claims to know and what we get to know in other disciplines. The theologian, if he is not going to live in a private world, must be prepared somehow to emerge from the circle of theological ideas. If he gains nothing by minimizing the difference between his subject and other branches of study, he loses everything by making that difference absolute. It is part of his service--and this at least is implied in the name of "theology"--to make his discourse as intelligible as possible (pace Kierkegaard and the "knight of faith").[6]

If recourse to esoteric knowledge to explain revelation is unsatisfactory, neither is it satisfactory to minimize the importance and place of revelation. While it is true that theologians should not use revelation as a trump-card to silence disturbing questions, and in doing so confuse and abuse revelation, at the same time they must seriously reckon with revelation. After all, theology has to do with the cognitive aspects of religion and there is no escape from the necessity to spell out the meaning, content, and implications of revelation, especially when revelation is ". . . the primary source of theology, and is also a basic category in theological thinking."[7] Therefore, there is no possibility whatsoever of dodging revelation. What then is revelation, and when does it occur? To answer these questions, we need to see how anxiety and Being's letting-be "cause" revelation to occur.

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[6] Studies, p. 22.

We have a twin task to perform, viz., to show how anxiety prepares man to discern the dimensions in a situation which normally escape his eye, and how in that enlightened stage he feels the magnetic pull of Being's creativity. Since anxiety has been previously considered, our present treatment of it will be confined to its role in preparing man to see the availability of the ontico-existentiell possibility for being one's true self. We will then analyze the way Macquarrie understands the impartation of the ontico-existentiell possibility or the transition from the ontological to the ontic, a transition effected by Being's letting-be. To "see" this process is to "see" revelation.

There are moments in a man's life when he seriously examines the structures of his existence, e.g., when a serious accident breaks the monotony of the everyday activities and affords him an occasion for some reflective thinking. He sizes up his successes and his failures, makes plans to amend his mistakes and to strengthen his successes, and in all this he becomes aware of an ongoing process of becoming of which his existence is a fragment, a portion in the overall backdrop of universal becoming.[8] He can explain away the fragmentary character of his being by regarding it as being nothing more than just a mere accident or coincidence, or he can conclude that his fragmented existence is a "useless" passion, an absurdity. Macquarrie rejects both explanations and prefers to explain the fragmentary character of man's existence in terms of his involvement in the universal process of becoming.

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[7] Principles, p. 6.

Macquarrie believes that man should regard his fragmented existence as a gift of Being. That is to say, man should regard his continuous becoming as a challenge and responsibility to be more beingful, and this he does in conjunction with Being's creativity. So Macquarrie could say that:

> It is when he goes on to understand this fragmentary existence as the gift of Being, as a responsibility laid upon him and yet a responsibility in which he is sustained and supported by Being, that he begins to understand his creaturely status. This takes place when the quest for meaning that is inherent in human existence is met by Being's self-revelation. So the basic meaning of creatureliness is dependence. To know oneself as creature is to see oneself in the light of Being, that is to say, not as an autonomous being, but as a being who is at once answerable for his being and *empowered to fuller being* [italics mine], at once the subject of a demand and the recipient of grace.[9]

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[8] *Principles*, pp. 59-64. We understand the fragmentary character of man's existence to mean that, since man is possibility, he is still in the process of becoming, still a person in the making, and as such he faces and has the choice of various ways of being. He is not "whole" but "fragmented" in the sense that his ultimate wholeness or authenticity is something in the making.

[9] *Principles*, p. 196.

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Three items call for attention, one of which has to be analysed. (a) There is the assertion of a fragmentary character in existence which man is enjoined to accept as a gift of Being; man should regard the various ways of being as a challenge to attain to fuller being. Awareness of the infinite possibilities for being should act as a catalyst in seeking meaning in life beyond the horizon of man's own being, e.g., man should be aware of the network of interdependence and interrelationships. (b) There is also the assertion that the quest for the sense of existence originates from man's existence itself and not from a vacuum; man is so constituted that he is able to seek ways to overcome the polarities or tensions in his existence. For example, death, conscience, and historical-cultural factors, complemented by Being's creativity, are forms of creativity and are resources used by man to overcome the existential imbalance. Since these two points have been dealt with in our previous chapter, we need not labour on them here. Instead we will mention the third point and elaborate on it. (c) Being reveals itself to man as the prior enabling condition of all that may be; it empowers man to realize his full potentiality for being without dehumanizing him. Man "sees" the meaning of this statement in revelation. We will now proceed to articulate this enigmatic assertion by utilizing the concept of anxiety as a form of creativity and of Being's creativity.

Our task is to describe, certainly not to explain, how anxiety can be a form of creativity by making men dissatisfied with the static what-is and by driving him to the dynamic what-can-be. Anxiety reveals man's total situation in the world, disclosing ". . . him as thrown into an existence, of which the ultimate rationale, if any, is concealed from him, but the finite and transient character of which is disclosed to him."[10] Anxiety not only discloses what is--the ontological quiddity--but it also shows the precariousness of existence, which is poised on the brink of non-being. So anxiety reveals the possibility of ceasing to be, the nullity that constitutes existence, making man aware of nothingness and making him dissatisfied with what is. This, in turn, makes man turn to what can be.

Nothingness shows the nullity in existence; as a finite being-unto-death, man experiences the possibility of ceasing to be, a possibility made known to man by anxiety. Anxiety also shows how the world of entities sinks into nothingness. That is to say, the things and concerns which usually absorb man's energy become nugatory in the face of death, making it possible for the Umwertung aller Werte (transvaluation of values) to occur. Furthermore, nothingness becomes the foil for Being, making man wonder why there is anything at all, and not just nothing. Finally, nothingness is paradoxically Being. Man is so preoccupied with what is that he forgets the prior condition of whatever may be. To be brought back to the awareness of the prior enabling energy that empowers entitles to be is to be brought back to Being, and this is where man begins to be concerned with what can be instead of what is.[11]

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[10] Studies, p. 82.

In anxiety, man becomes aware that his essence is not a static fact but possibility, that he is exposed to not one way but several ways of being. That is to say, man is not solely destined to die, but he is meant to embrace the several ways of being even before his death. Anxiety makes man aware of the fact that he need not remain in inauthenticity; he can have authenticity. The ontico-existentiell possibility is available to him.[12] The question is: how can he appropriate it? Before dealing with this crucial question, let us probe further into the role of anxiety as a catalyst in precipitating man to discern the offer of authenticity made by Being's letting-be.

"Anxiety is not only anxiety in the face of something, but, as a state of mind, it is also anxiety about something;"[13] it is anxious about its Being-in-the-world itself. In anxiety entities ans what is environmentally ready-to-hand lose their significance. The "world" and the Dasein-with of Others are not of much help to man. In fact, anxiety makes it impossible for man to understand himself in terms of the world and the way things have been publicly understood insofar as they arrest his growth. Anxiety makes man conscious of and concerned with his authentic potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world. "Anxiety individualizes Dasein for its ownmost Being-in-the-world, which as something that understands, projects itself essentially upon possibilities."[14] [Italics mine]. Anxiety discloses Dasein as Being-possible, declaring to Dasein its Being towards its ownmost potentiality-for-Being, or informing Dasein of its Being-free for becoming its true self, of becoming its true self, of its Being-free for the authenticity of its Being.[15]

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[11] Since the fourfold meaning of nothing has been previously dealt with, we need not repeat ourselves. Supra, pp. 161-163.

[12] Supra, pp. 141-142.

[13] Being and Time, p. 232.

Anxiety then shatters man's tranquilized familiarity with the they-self, lighting up the disillusion secured from the concerns with the they-world. Anxiety makes man feel uneasy with the "at-homeness" of publicness, resulting in an uncanniness or not-being-at-home [das Nichtzuhause-sein] with the publicness of the they-self. So anxiety upsets the tranquilized self-assurance provided by or derived from the faceless mass, and in this way it brings man back from his absorption in the they-self. "Everyday familiarity collapses. Dasein has been individualized, but individualized as Being-in-the-world."[16]

In recalling man from the they-self, anxiety is a form of creativity like death, conscience, and historical-cultural factors in the sense that it calls man to something new, to project himself upon new possibilities.[17] However, like death, conscience and historical-cultural factors, anxiety is too impersonal a factor to effect the passage from inauthenticity to authenticity, seeing that it is merely a "condition" or "factor" in life.[18] So anxiety, again like death, conscience, and historical-cultural factors, shows the ontologico-existential possibility, but does not actualize the ontico-existentiell possibility.[19]

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[14] Ibid., p. 232. [15] Ibid., p. 232. [16] Ibid., p. 232.

[17] Cf. Principles, p. 78, where Macquarrie talks of the role of anxiety in predisposing man to recognize the approach of holy Being.

If through anxiety the ontological possibility of being one's true self is "there" though it is not ontically realized or appropriated, then anxiety can be considered as a preparatory catalyst for realizing one's authentic self, i.e., anxiety serves as a _harbinger_ of revelation, revelation understood as the occurrence of the impartation of the gift of a sense for existence in answer to man's quest for the sense of existence. In short, anxiety prepares man to be a recipient of the giving of the ontico-existentiell possibility for being one's true self, and as such anxiety is a form of creativity in the sense that it makes man dissatisfied with the false security provided by _das Man_. It makes man unhappy with just what is, indicating the process of creative becoming or what can be.[20] In this sense anxiety reminds us of death, conscience, and historical cultural factors which are all forms of creativity, no matter how incomplete or inadequate they might be. In their own way they remind man that he can have a fuller being because his essence is not "is-ness" but possibility. Thus anxiety shows the presence of the ontologico-existential possibility (what is) and the availability of the ontico-existentiell possibility for becoming more beingful (what can be). Anxiety poses an ontologico-existential possibility for being one's true self; as such it is still a bare horizon of possibility that has to be made into an ontico-existentiell possibility. Such an appropriation of the ontico-existentiell possibility is seen in the experience of religious awe. So Macquarrie can say that:

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[18] _Supra_, p. 207.

[19] _Supra_, pp. 185-194.

[20] Theologically, Macquarrie explains the function of anxiety in terms of making man dissatisfied with the fact "that he is thrown into the ocean of being, alien and even hostile to himself, in which he must exist . . . ," and making him turn to ". . . a ground of being, which means simply a Creator who is author both of man's being and of the being of nature." _An Existential Theology_, p. 74.

This anxiety, so Macquarrie believes, is the _cor inquietum_ of Christian experience which makes man turn to God, "who is the ground of being, Creator of both man and the world." _Ibid_., p. 71.

> Such an existentiell possibility is the experience of religious awe. This may be regarded as rooted in ontological anxiety, and there are obvious similarities--'creature feeling,' for instance, is mentioned by Otto as a primary characteristic of the experience of the numinous awe. The distinction between the broad existential concept of anxiety or dread and the special religious concept of awe appears to me to be that whereas in anxiety the primary disclosure is of man's own being, while the possibility of God is lit up on the periphery, as it were, in awe the positions have changed, God's revelation of himself is central, while the being of man is now disclosed on the periphery.[21]

This brings us back to the impartation of the ontico-existentiell possibility and how that is related to Being's creativity.[22]

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[21] An Existentialist Theology, p. 76.

[22] Supra, pp. 183-209. In our "Some Questions," we complained that Macquarrie prefers to postpone the attempt to relate Being's creativity to that of death, conscience, historical-cultural factors, and anxiety, because, among other things, he left the vital point in correlating Being's creativity and that of death, etc., dangling in midair. Macquarrie now tries to make up for that deficiency.

We now describe Macquarrie's contention that Being's creativity imparts the ontico-existentiell possibility to man to enable him to become his authentic self; we now try to "see" how Being's letting-be effects the transition from the ontological to the ontic. Before doing that, let us end this section by reiterating the relation of revelation to moods.

Macquarrie has on several occasions noticed and affirmed the fact that moods do refer to some state of affairs beyond themselves, and thus are not purely subjective. The verbalization of affective states presupposes the situations in which moods occur and in which the person who has the affective states is himself the participant. In this situation, the Cartesian dualism of the subject-object split loses its meaning, because we are referring to ". . . the unbroken unity of subject and object within a situation."[23] To examine a mood is to take into account the person who experiences it plus the environment, event, or object that causes the mood to arise. Thus to have affective states is to be attuned to the environment, to be aware of and responsive to the total situation. This does not ignore subjectivity; what is emphasized is the alertness to the details in a situation that usually escape our attention--hence the preparatory function of moods to enable us to see things in depth, a thing that happens in revelation. Anxiety, as we have noted, is one such affective state that opens us up to the total environment by showing the availability of the ontico-existentiell possibility for a more beingful existence. The brevity of our consideration of anxiety is due to the fact that anxiety has been previously dealt with and analysed. Therefore, we need not repeat ourselves except to indicate the way it acts as a catalyst to precipitate the occurrence of revelation.[24]

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[23] Principles, p. 88. "We are concerned here with something that is neither subjective nor objective, to an unbroken unity of subject and object within a situation or structure that is known from within." Ibid.

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[24] Supra, pp. 217-221. The idea that anxiety equals neurosis is based on a misunderstanding of anxiety and its role. We have already characterized anxiety as a form of creativity in the sense that it arouses man from his lethargy and contentment with what is to what can be. Furthermore, since existence is possibility it makes sense to affirm that anxiety is germane to existence. That is to say, "anxiety belongs essentially to man's being and discloses him in the very centre of that being as thrown possibility." Principles, p. 89. Therefore, to equate anxiety with neurosis is to misunderstand anxiety as we understand it.

To acknowledge the presence of anxiety is to admit that there are occasions in a man's life when he becomes aware of what he could be instead of what he is, that he should continue to become instead of remaining static. A remarkable similarity is seen in Heidegger's answer to the question, "Why are there essents rather than nothing?" His reply is: "And yet each of us is grazed at least once, perhaps more than once, by the hidden power of this question, even if he is not aware of what is happening to him." An Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 1.

In summary, we can say that anxiety makes it possible for the world and all its entities to sink into nothing, and in this way presents man with the possibility for being his true self. That is to say, anxiety makes us aware that the things which we normally treasure lose their value and meaning in the presence of nothingness, and in this way anxiety poses the availability of the ontico-existentiell possibility for being one's true self.

Cf. "Anxiety makes manifest in Dasein its Dasein, its Being-towards its ownmost potentiality-for-Being--that is, its Being-free for the freedom of choosing itself and taking hold of itself. Anxiety brings Dasein face to face with its Being-free for . . . the authenticity of its Being, and for this authenticity as a possibility which it always is. But at the same time, this is the Being to which Dasein as Being-in-the-world has been delivered over." Being and Time, pp. 232-233.

Macquarrie utilizes Being's creativity to explain how it acts as a lure for becoming. Thus Macquarrie is interested in how Being's letting-be acts as a lure for becoming, an invitation in the surge into novelty, or a catalyst not only to precipitate but also to actualize the process of becoming. Linked to anxiety, which makes man aware of the presence of the ontologic-existential possibility and the availability of the ontico-existentiell possibility for a more complete beingful existence, Being's creativity, with its luring appeal, magnetic pull, or invitational element to join and participate in the surge into novelty, will demonstrate how a man "becomes" a person in the fullest sense of the word, and in this way anxiety and Being's creativity indicate the meaning of "revelation," which is the moment when man "sees" the process of his becoming a person.[25]

To get at the way Being's creativity attracts, lures, or appeals to man, fascinosum and appetitus are used as ways in which Being draws man to itself. Needless to say, fascinosum and appetitus have much in common in the sense that they both attract man to Being.

In primitive times, the fascinosum is seen in the attempt of man to master the mysterious, to fill himself and even to identify himself with it via curious modes of behaviour and mediation. For example, magical formulae, ordination, exorcism, and self-fulfillment in ecstasy and exaltation are ways of primitive men to identify themselves with the fascinosum. However, we do not stop here because to do so is to advocate magic and not religion. Possession of and identification with the numen take on a different meaning, i.e., instead of attempting to master the mysterious, the process of being "consumed" by the fascinosum is directed to the adoration instead of the exploitation of the mysterious.

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[25] At first sight this definition of revelation looks awkward, but examined in depth it is what Christian theologians have been trying to say in their own way. For example, when Christians claim that salvation has to do with making man whole, they imply that a man is a Christian in the making. Revelation is the moment when he sees in the Christ-event the actualization of this belief.

The fascinosum then becomes the strange and powerful propulsion towards the ideal good, an attraction known to man's mind in yearning and presentiment and recognized in the inadequate symbols used by men to express this mysterious attraction they have experienced. Language fails to do justice when it tries to formulate the unutterableness of the experienced fascinosum, but the experience is seen in the blissful excitement, rapture, and exaltation felt by man when Being gives itself to him.[26]

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[26] Cf. "Widely various as these states, e.g., exaltation, ecstasy, consecration, etc., are, yet they have this element in common, that in them the mysterium is experienced in its essential, positive, and specific character, as something that bestows upon man a beatitude beyond compare, but one whose real nature he can neither proclaim in speech nor conceive in thought, but may know only by a direct and living experience. It is a bliss which embraces all those blessings that are indicated or suggested in positive fashion by any 'doctrine of salvation,' and it quickens all of them through and through; but these do not exhaust it. Rather by its all-pervading, penetrating glow it makes of these very blessings more than the intellect can conceive in them or affirm of them. It gives the peace that passes understanding, and of which the tongue can only stammer brokenly. Only from afar, by metaphors and analogies, do we come to apprehend what it is in itself, and even so our notion is but inadequate and confused." Rudolph Otto, The Idea of the Holy, trans. John W. Harvery (Middlesex: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1959)., pp. 47-48. Otto's fascinosum is here used by Macquarrie to show the way Being "attracts" man to itself by its self-giving, giving meaning to man's search for

In connection with revelation, the fascinosum wants to say that revelation is not propositional, i.e., revelation is the self-gifting of Being to man to enable him to attain to wholeness, not a giving of eternal truths. From the viewpoint of man, the moment he "sees" this fact he "sees" revelation. No propositions, no matter how cleverly formulated, can be identified with the self-gifting or self-offering of Being to mankind. If revelation is not an impartation of eternal truths, then what can it be? This is where the fascinosum comes in.

The fascinosum is Being's magnetic power or attraction over man to enable him to see Being's creativity functioning in his life, making him conscious of Being's creative and transforming power in helping him to become whole or authentic. Thus the fascinosum is a way Being attracts man to itself with the purpose of making him see the process of transformation that makes man whole, that takes away scatteredness, and that gives integration. It is a way Being attracts man to the place or point where he can "see" the creative transformation. It prepares man to see and accept the movement or overture to make him whole, but it does more than that. It is Being's own way of attracting man to itself.

God and encountering him in his search. So Macquarrie can say that "the fascinans points to what we have already called the 'grace' of being which has unveiled itself so that we can understand that it gives itself to us, that it is the source of our being and strengthens our being with its presence." Principles, p. 76. The meaning of this rather enigmatic statement will be clarified when we proceed to express more fully our understanding of the fascinosum and its relation to Being's creativity and to man.

The *fascinosum* is Being's way of reaching out to man by summoning him to the ideal or wholeness.[27] It is the force or power that directs man to and gives him integration, making available it man the acquisition of authenticity and an increase of beingfulness. It is Being's way of helping man to divert himself from secondary and insignificant concerns to a master possibility or concern, which deepens the insight of man in his endeavour to encounter the realities or facts of life. It lures and challenges man to develop a deeper appreciative understanding of himself and of his relation to Being, other Daseins, and the environment. This naturally leads us to the aesthetic as a means of explaining the *fascinosum*.

We have said that man is possibility, is on the way to becoming. In relation to man's becoming, the *fascinosum* is that which brings about an appreciative awareness and concretion of man's potentiality; the *fascinosum* makes it possible for man to apprehend that realm or order in which his potentiality obtains its full fruition. The many different features of man's being--the various structures of existence--are lured by the *fascinosum* to generate a single total cumulative force which makes possible and expedites the creative process of man's becoming. Of course this aesthetic awareness of the ontic possibility for authenticity is not a "foreign" commodity introduced by the *fascinosum* into existence.[28] Rather it is the special awareness and appreciation of man's true authenticity made possible by the *fascinosum*, which makes man see how the total order of being is focused and compacted in a certain event or person. In our terminology, the fascinosum makes man see in Being as the all-pervading prior enabling condition of anything that may be, and in relation to man it is the force or dynamis which brings man's potentiality into full fruition. Man sees this creative transformation or process of becoming in the aesthetic, the realm where man's eyes are opened to every facet or dimension of the situation, making him realize that Being's creativity is responsible for gathering up and packing his potentiality so that it could be "released" in existence, so that man can be made whole. In other words, the fascinosum attracts man to where he can experience the impartation of the ontico-existentiell possibility for authenticity. He experiences Being's self-gifting which gives concreteness to his existence and hence actuality to his potentiality; he experiences Being's self-offering which sustains the making and becoming of every entity. All this he experiences because of the fascinosum. It is in some such way that Macquarrie understands the fascinosum. Macquarrie then proceeds to the appetitus to make the same point but from a different angle. The emphasis is the same, but there is a slight variation in the thrust.

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[27] *Principles*, p. 79.

[28] *Ibid*., p. 86.

The appetitus, as the word suggests, is Being's appetition or appetancy to man to become whole. It is Being's invitation to man to reorganize and refocalize his structures of existence so that he can effect wholeness. This is in line with Macquarrie's assertion that, since man is possibility, he is constantly undergoing reorganization and refocalization, because the creative process of becoming is continuous (the becoming of continuity) and man survives as he adapts and reorganizes himself to this becoming of continuity.[29]

Applied to Being's creativity and man's authenticity, this means that Being's letting-be constantly reorganizes man's possibilities in order to conserve and augment the wholeness of man's existence. We hasten to say that Being does not accomplish this externally, precisely because it is already the prior condition of anything that may be, and is the sustaining _dynamis_ by virtue of which man's possibilities are reorganized and refocalized. The reorganization and refocalization of possibilities happens in the ontic realm. That is to say, new possibilities cannot arise if they were not already there ontologically; so the reorganization and refocalization of possibilities has to do with the ontic.

The _appetitus_ "appeals" to man to embrace that course of action (possibility) which is adaptive and responsive to Being's letting-be. It is an appeal to man to react to and interact comprehensively and continuously with Being's creativity, other Daseins, and the environment so as to effect authenticity, which comes about when man overcomes the scatteredness of his existence. The _appetutus_ thus lures man to that sensitivity which alone can be most aware of the whole world and can "prehend" the world most extensively. Let us use beauty as an example. It has been said that beauty is that accident of nature that graces a few. It is an accepted fact that

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[29] _Supra_, pp. 123-142.

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the face, mouth, and ears of Sophia Loren are too big, yet when put together they produce a face whose beauty is universally acknowledged. So a beautiful face is one in which every part brings all the rest to a focusing point where beauty is seen; beautiful objects are objects in which each part participates in all the others. It is in some such way that Macquarrie understands the appetitus as a reorganization and refocalization of possibilities, and man's adaptation and responsiveness to Being's creativity or letting-be. So when Macquarrie says that Being's creativity acts as an appetitus to man to become whole, he means to say, among other things, that man's response and adaptation to the appetitus will result in a reorganization and refocalization of his possibilities so as to produce integration and wholeness or authenticity in his existence.[30]

Up to this point Macquarrie has made a few preliminary remarks on (1) revelation, (2) anxiety as a form of creativity in making man aware of the availability of the ontico-existentiell possibility for authenticity, and (3) the fascinosum and appetitus as ways in which Being attracts man to itself. He then deals in greater detail with Being's creativity which is Being's self-gifting

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[30] Cf. "For the moment, let us be content with recalling that once Leibniz expanded the notion of subject so that it embraced not only the human ego (Descartes) but all being, insofar as they are dynamic, sc. have an appetitus ('will') for further dynamism, the entire drift of modern thought was to conceive Being as the dynamism of dynamic beings, in one way or another as will." Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought, p. 365.

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to mankind. Here he uses es gibt Sein to describe, certainly not to explain, the way Being gives itself to man.

In the previous chapter we mentioned the grace, creativity, letting-be, or graciousness of Being without any elaboration. It behooves us now to explain more precisely what Macquarrie means by the letting-be of Being or the graciousness in Being's self-gifting. To accomplish this task we observe that Macquarrie utilizes Heidegger's teaching on primordial thinking as a way in which man "hears" the address of Being and "sees" the self-offering of Being.[31]

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[31] It is most appropriate that we give a brief analysis of Heidegger's thinking on calculative and primordial thinking. Calculative thinking is the most common mode of thinking we ordinarily engage in. This is the type of thinking that makes use of the object-subject approach. The subject is the thinker; the object is the entity thought of, the something that stands over and against the thinker. The purpose of such thinking is to see how the object can be employed to serve our needs; technology is the acme of such thinking. "Calculative thinking computes. It computes ever new, ever more promising and at the same time more economical possibilities. Calculative thinking never stops, never collects itself. Calculative thinking is not meditative thinking, not thinking which contemplates the meaning which reigns in everything that is." Martin Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking, trans. John M. Anderson and E. Hans Freun (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1966), p. 46. Discourse on Thinking is a translation of Heidegger's Gelassenheit, containing his Memorial Address and Conversation on a Country Path About Thinking, henceforth known as Address and Conversation.

Primordial thinking has a content which is the field of awareness itself; primordial thinking allows content to emerge within awareness. Primordial thinking is then open to content, open to what is given. By way of contrast and as a means to explicate further the meaning of primordial or essential thinking, we say that calculative thinking constructs a world of objects and understands them, whereas primordial thinking begins with an awareness of the Being in virtue of which the objects are. In other words, essential thinking or meditative thinking begins with Being ("That-which-regions [Being] surrounds us and reveals itself to us as the horizon") rather than with the objects of ordinary understanding. In meditative thinking man is open to what is given, and the ability to be open to what is given is a fundamentally human asset. The ability to be open makes it possible for man to know Being; thus primordial thinking can be metaphorically characterized as

We have already noted the contrast between calculative and primordial thinking by observing that primordial thinking is the opposite of calculative.[32] The latter deals with beings and aims at mastering and utilizing them; in contrast primordial thinking has a meditative receptive character and the emphasis is on Being rather than on beings.[33] Instead of man's taking the initiative as is the

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walking along a path that leads to Being. "Releasement" [*Gelassenheit*] is the word Heidegger used to portray the relation of primordial thinking to openness, making it possible for man to have a direct reference beyond man to Being. To acquire the full impact of this claim, we need to express more fully the meaning of releasement. "As you have said, in waiting we are released from our transcendental relation to the horizon. This-being-released from is the first aspect of releasement; yet that does not hit its nature exactly, let alone exhaust it. Releasement comes out of that-which-regions because in releasement man stays released to that-which-regions . . . . He is released to it in his being." *Conversation*, p. 73.

The *Conversation* can be said to be a treatise on releasement and thus our task has been made easier by Heidegger, who spoke of the two aspects of releasement. The first is to be *released from*, and the second *released to*. To be released to means more than just being open to Being; it involves a resolve to know Being. That is to say, in meditative thinking man is open to Being and resolves its disclosure. However, this resolve to know Being's self-disclosure is not attained through human power but through a kind of dwelling in Being. Heidegger put it thus: "Releasement comes out of that-which-regions because in releasement man stays released to that-which-regions and, indeed, through this itself. He is released to it in his being, insofar as he originally belongs to it. He belongs to it insofar as he is *appropriated* initially to that-which-regions and, indeed, through this itself." *Ibid*., p. 75.

[32] *Supra*, pp. 105-106.

[33] Cf., "In spite of all similarities, 'essential' thinking is distinguished from the historical inquiring and interpreting of 'repetitive' thinking by the fact that it no longer 'justifies' itself in terms of the historicity and temporality of Dasein, but in terms of Being itself which prevails and permits [*vermogend-mogend*]. According to Heidegger, this thinking is an 'occurrence' of Being itself, Being itself shows itself or conceals itself in it, 'transmits' itself or 'withdraws' itself, and is to this extent a Being with a fate or history." Werner Marx, *Heidegger und die Tradition*, (Tubingen: Niemeter, 1962), p. 123. Quoted by Macquarrie in *Studies*, pp. 91-92.

case in calculative thinking where man inquires, predicts, experiments, and employs the results of his investigation for his own ends, in primordial thinking the initiative passes over to Being, who gives itself to man. So Macquarrie can say that:

> The initiative seems to have passed from man to Being, and this primordial thinking about Being is variously said to be a thinking that is submissive to Being, a thinking that hears the quiet word of Being, a thinking that stands in sharpest opposition to the kind of thinking that goes on in the sciences. The essential submissive thinking is the kind of thinking that arises out of the wonder of Being when we have been brought to experience this through becoming aware of the nothing.[34]

As we have dealt with the two different types of thinking we need not elaborate on primordial thinking which is introduced here to set the stage for our discussion on the graciousness of Being. We have just stated that in primordial thinking Being takes the initiative, but what does this mean? To answer this question Macquarrie takes a sentence from Being and Time: "Of course only as long as Dasein is (that is, only as long as an understanding of Being is ontically possible), 'is there' [gibt es] Being."[35] The phrase es gibt Sein is of considerable importance because it illuminates what Macquarrie means by the "grace" or creativity of Being. Ordinarily es gibt means "there is," but literally it means "it gives." It is from this literal meaning that Macquarrie proceeds to articulate the meaning of Being's graciousness. Strictly speaking, he cannot say that "there is Being" because the clause suggests that Being is an

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[34] Studies, p. 92. Cf. Ante, pp. 160-163, on the fourfold meaning of nothingness and its role in preparing man to "see" Being.

[35] Being and Time, p. 255. The emphasis here is to see how Macquarrie uses es gibt Sein to explain the grace, creativity, or self-gifting of Being.

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entity, and he has vehemently denied that.[36] If Macquarrie translates es gibt Sein to mean "it gives Being," then we have to ask him, "What gives being?" The only possible answer is: Being gives Being. That is to say, Macquarrie translates ". . . only as long as Dasein is . . . 'is there' Being" to mean that man is the only entity to which Being gifts, discloses, or manifests itself. Man is the only entity, as far as he can tell, that Being entrusts itself to, and in this sense man becomes the guardian of Being.[37]

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[36] Supra, pp. 100-105.

[37] Heidegger himself in his Über den Humanismus, p. 22, says that es gibt is deliberately used to mean "it gives." Being's gifting indicates the essence of Being which gives and confers its truth. Es gibt, literally used, avoids the clause "Being is" because the verb "is" applies to entities but not to Being itself. Thus we try not to say "Being is" and prefer to say "Being lets-be," or gifts itself to man. In this way we totally avoid the error of saying that Being itself is the creation of the human existent, an error Thoman Langan made when he said that Dasein ist Transcendenz schlechtin. See his The Meaning of Heidegger, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 212. Langan's error is compounded when he attributes to man the power to endow the Seienden with Being. This error is totally unnecessary and inexcusable especially after Heidegger himself has said that Sein ist das transcendenz schlechthin (Being is the transcendens pure and simple) in his Being and Time, p. 62.

It is not inappropriate that at this point we briefly say a few lines on man, primordial thinking, and Being. Essential thinking is directly related to the nature of man, where man is understood as standing out where Being becomes clear. To express the same sentiment in another way, we say that man stands ecstatically within the truth of Being. Man becomes man when he is addressed by Being; man is the locus where Being's Lichtung shines forth. So man is the place where Being opens up and discloses itself. So Heidegger could say that "it is the place of man thus defined that is the origin of thinking. Thinking 'carries out' man's nature. If man is the being where being itself dawns on the beings, then this basic 'clearing' of being, which constitutes man's nature, is synonymous with thinking about being. Thus the act most fundamentally related to man's nature is the act of thinking. Thinking is indeed the form in which the action of being upon man manifests itself." Existence and Being, p. 289. So in primordial thinking Being makes itself known to man.

The gifting of Being can be understood in two ways, viz., as the prior enabling condition of all existents it is the ground of entities, and more fundamentally it gives itself to man. In this sense Macquarrie talks of the grace or favour of Being, i.e., the understanding of Being is in the nature of a gift as when in primordial thinking man listens to and awaits the address of Being. This differs from the type of thinking that investigates the properties of entities.

To press the problem a bit harder, Macquarrie says that es gibt Sein--Being bestows an understanding of itself to man--makes it possible for man to awaken himself to an understanding of Being. This, as he has said, arises out of the wonder of Being when Dasein has been brought to understand this through his awareness of nothingness.[38] So Macquarrie is brought back to Leibnitz's famous question: "Why are there entities rather than just nothing at all?" This question makes us open to Being, i.e., this question gets answered as we become aware of Being's self-manifestation. This philosophical stance does not seem to be every person's cup of tea, seeing that most men are forgetful of Being and are only concerned with entities, the things that are. Albeit the increasing preoccupation with the beings, the forgetting of Being, the closing off of the holy, etc., will of themselves awaken a man to Being. This occurs when Dasein realizes that his preoccupations with the everyday busyness still fall short of securing the full contentment that he yearns for, e.g., an average breadwinner does his level best to clothe, feed, and provide his family with the luxuries of life, yet in the midst of his successful efforts he realizes that life is more than just earning money and feeding his family. He realizes that in the moments of happiness or depression and in the interval between elation and depression life is more than just mere living. Translated into existentialist terms we say that in moods like anxiety, joy, boredom, etc., we awaken to an understanding of Being though we might not be aware of what is happening. We quote a passage from Heidegger to illustrate what we mean:

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[38] Supra, pp. 161-163, where we dealt with the four shades of meaning found in "nothingness." We now give an analysis of the same notion but with a different motive, viz., to see how nothingness can help us to see and understand the meaning of the grace of Being. In this way we avoid the criticism that introductory remarks are developed in different contexts, making our analysis jumpy and repetitious, because we are following our intention to probe the meaning of Being and existence in their proper places.

> And yet each of us is grazed at least once, perhaps more than once, by the hidden power of this question why are there entities rather than just nothing at all?, even if he is not aware of what is happening to him. The question looms large in moments of great despair, when things tend to lose all their weight and all meaning becomes obscured . . . . It is present in moments of rejoicing when all the things around us are transfigured and seem to be there for the first time, as if it might be easier to think they are not than to understand that they are and are as they are. The question is upon us in boredom, when we are equally removed from despair and joy, and everything about us seems so hopelessly commonplace that we no longer care whether anything is or is not--and with this the question "Why are there essents rather than nothing?" is evoked in a particular form.[39]

By the grace of Being is meant the lighting-up process by which beings are shown to be what they are, i.e., instead of seeing particular beings, the ways people and things are, a man sees or is made to realize the Being in virtue of which they are. In other words, the grace of Being makes him conscious of the condition that there may be anything at all; it "explains" the process of the coming-to-pass of the beings. In this process, Being has the initiative in the sense that Being gifts itself to the beings, in particular man. In imparting itself to the beings, man in particular, the primacy of Being is never doubted; that beings come to pass is the result of Being "emitting" itself among them.

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[39] Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans., Ralph Manheim, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), pp. 1-2.

To put the same conviction in another way Macquarrie says that the grace of Being can be described as that which lets-be beings and man, makes them be, is the cause and ground of their existence. Macquarrie understands "making be" and "cause and ground" in a more primordial way than the ordinary usage which has to do with producing, manufacturing, creating, or causing. The ordinary usage of making be is not meaningless *per se*, but it fails to express the primordial meaning of making be. In the words of Joseph Kockelmanns:

> Being itself is that which lets things be primordially as beings, it originally uncovers them, it makes them come to light and stands in unconcealment (*a-letheia*). The primordial experience of Being itself in this sense is essentially connected with the essence of truth considered as *a-letheia*.[40]

Poverty of speech hinders our analysis of Macquarrie's understanding of the grace of Being or the self-gifting of Being; still we need to probe into this letting-be of Being. We can characterize the letting-be of Being as the origin, spring, or source [*Ursprung*] which gives rise to beings. However, in giving rise to beings it nonetheless remains the source of the beings' existence, i.e., it does not lose itself in what has sprung forth. This ability to remain itself without dissolving into what has come to pass is a "holding fast" to what originates from it. This is the way Being gifts itself to man; it gives itself to man, but it does not get lost in man, as it were.

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[40] Joseph J. Kockelmanns, *Martin Heidegger; A First Introduction to His Philosophy*, (Pittsburgh, Pa.: Duquesne University Press, 1965), p. 160.

To explain the meaning of the self-gifting of Being we have resorted to words like source, ground, origin, spring, etc.; this clearly indicates the frustrating difficulty in laying down what Macquarrie means by the self-offering of Being which is the same as its creativity. To create, in Macquarrie's sense, is to give oneself totally and unreservedly. Thus one can fully sympathize and agree with Heidegger when he said: "But Being--what is it? It is Itself. Future thinking must learn to experience and express it in words."[41] Before leaving the subject on the grace, creativity, letting-be, self-gifting, etc., of Being, let us make one final effort to express the raison d'etre of the graciousness or favour or grace of Being in its self-offering.

We begin with the relation of anxiety to Being, a relation in which Being's supremacy is seen in disclosing itself; this relation becomes more obvious when it is seen in relation to anxiety. Anxiety, as we have indicated, predisposes us to discover ourselves as being-there; it reveals our thrownness and nothing more. It is anxiety that makes man aware of nothingness, i.e., through anxiety man becomes

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[41] Uber den Humanismus, p. 19.

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conscious of the contingency of being and is struck by the fact that there is something at all rather than nothing.[42] It is through anxiety that Being makes man conscious of his unique relation to Being, viz., Being, in bestowing itself upon man, appeals to man to become man in the fullest sense of the word.[43]

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[42] Uber den Humanismus, p. 19.

[43] In Heidegger's words, Being entrusts itself to man so that man may become the guardian of its truth, but his guardianship is established by reason of man's relation to Being which Being itself has brought to pass and which forms the essence of man. So the grace of Being is the conferring of a special status to man which makes him the watchman of Being, but a status initiated and conferred by Being itself.

We note the difference between Heidegger and Macquarrie in their understanding of the self-disclosure of Being. In what ways, if any, does Macquarrie go beyond Heidegger in his understanding of Being's self-disclosure? What is the unique contribution of Macquarrie in his understanding of revelation?

According to Heidegger, Dasein is characterized by ek-sistence, i.e., it is in the truth. As far as we know man alone is free, but it does not mean that he has freedom. Man does not possess freedom as a characteristic; rather "freedom, or ex-sistent, revelatory Dasein possesses man and moreover in so original a manner that it alone confers upon him that relationship with what-is-in-totality . . . ." Existence and Being, p. 336. In other words, freedom is the source of man, and man "has" freedom insofar as freedom uses him as a means of unveiling the essence of truth, which is meant to signify the self-disclosure of Being. Thus man is needed by Being to disclose itself, but man is no longer a sufficient ground; the final authority rests with Being because man is no longer on his own.

Truth, as the self-disclosure of Being, is the accomplishment of Being. In other words, "Being is disclosed, the disclosure of Being happens, as the essential happening of truth, i.e., as the happening of the disclosure of Being." Versenyi, p. 109. Being itself rests in its disclosure; Being is its disclosure, self-manifestation, or self-revelation. So ἀλήθεια (unhiddenness) is the self-disclosure of Being. How does one come to this conclusion? There can only be one answer: through man via thought. Thought thinks Being, but the latter is not a product of the former. On the contrary, "it is more likely that essential thinking is an occurrence of Being." Existence and Being, p. 387. "Occurrence" or "event" has a more primordial meaning than the casual one. It means both event (e-venire: to come out) and advent (ad-venire: to come to, to arrive). Thinking, or to be more exact, primordial thinking is the event of the

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The personal element in Being's creativity is seen in the self-gifting or self-offering of Being; it gives itself to man. It does this by first attracting man to itself, hence the elements of the fascinosum and the appetitus. One might object by saying that Macquarrie's portrayal of Being's self-gifting is impersonal, and in a sense the objection is true because we are still examining the way Macquarrie utilizes the later Heidegger's philosophy on the favour or graciousness of Being understood through primordial thinking to set the stage for his understanding of revelation. That is to say, we still have to describe the personal element in Macquarrie's understanding of revelation which brings us to the next section of our chapter.

To summarize: So far we have described Macquarrie's understanding of revelation by showing how he uses Heidegger's philosophy, the fascinosum, the appetitus, and Being's self-gifting as means to develop his concept of revelation. Macquarrie wants to emphasize the personal in revelation because of his belief that the divine initiative and the human response must be kept in equilibrium whenever one considers revelation. Therefore, Heidegger's philosophy,

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coming (out into the open, arriving and establishing itself in the light) of Being. Versenyi, p. 110. Thinking is the event or occurrence in which Being is disclosed or released.

Macquarrie differs from Heidegger in the sense that he attributes a more significant role to man's response to Being's self-gifting. Macquarrie wants to assert that, unless man of his own free will desires or resolves to respond to Being's self-offering, Being's self-disclosure would lack meaning for man. Therefore, Macquarrie speaks of commitment and acceptance on the part of man. This crucial difference between Heidegger and Macquarrie will emerge as we go along.

the _fascinosum_, the _appetitus_, and Being's self-offering--not forgetting anxiety as a catalytic element in preparing man for revelation--are used to prepare us to see the personal in revelation.

II. _The Content of Revelation_.

Before dealing with the constitutive elements of revelation--the divine initiative and man's response--let us make it crystal clear that this section will use the work and person of Jesus Christ as a means of illuminating the personal in revelation. They are meant to be a paradigmatic illustration of the way Being deals "personally" with mankind, and as such are not meant to be an exhaustive analysis of Christology. We also wish to utilize the phrase "God-as-Being" to indicate the dynamic character of Being in reaching out to man. The purpose is to indicate how Being deals "personally" with man by "going out" to him. Finally, we want to say that our dissertation, as the title indicates, is a study of revelation from an existential-ontological perspective; it indicates the "structure" of revelation existentially-ontologically conceived. As such it is not an elucidation of the content of the Christian revelation, though it operates from Christian premises, so to speak, and utilizes Christology as a paradigmatic illustration of the personal in revelation.

Underlying the treatment of the content of revelation is the explicit understanding that Being's attempt to reveal itself to man is only possible precisely because man has the capacity to "know" Being, a conviction expressed by the formulation of the transition from existence to Being, the passage from inauthenticity to authenticity, or the transition from the ontological to the ontic.

There are two constitutive elements in revelation, viz., Being's self-gifting, self-disclosure, or self-offering, and man's response to and appropriation of it. Macquarrie then sees how in Jesus Christ Christians experience the self-giving of Being to mankind; Macquarrie's description of Being's self-offering in the person and work of Jesus Christ operates from the Christian perspective, implying that there are other perspectives, and that Christology is used as a handle to explain or indicate the personal in revelation.

From the very start it is claimed that revelation is not a collection of revealed statements, dogmatic or confessional formulations. Revelation is the self-giving of Being which grasps the whole being of man, who then consequently responds by exhibiting an attitude of commitment and acceptance.[44] As expected, such an experience cannot be adequately conceptually articulated; any attempt to give verbal formulation to this experience presupposes the content of the revelation that has been experienced. In the case of Macquarrie's explication of revelation, the Christian experience of Being's self-disclosure in Jesus Christ is the presupposition underlying his explication. However, this should not be an excuse for not endeavouring to express the content of revelation. A revelation that defies verbal expression will always remain a private affair, and as such cannot be communicated to others. If so, communities of faith which share the benefits and are the result of a revelation would

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[44] _Supra_, pp. 165-167 on commitment and acceptance.

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never have come into existence. (It is observed that because churches, temples, synagogues, mosques, etc., do exist, it indicates that an experienced revelation can be articulated, no matter how falteringly.)

Macquarrie delineates the content of revelation in terms of an encounter with Being:

> This encounter with Being, the coming alive to the mystery that there is a world and not just nothing, lies very close in its epistemological structure to what the theologians call 'revelation.' This too is a coming alive to the presence of Being, but we call it 'revelation' in the theological sense because Being gets expressed as holy, and calls forth the commitment of faith. It is the content of this encounter with holy Being that theological discourse seeks to represent. But such representing can never be simply a matter of indicating some observable fact, for what is here represented belongs once more in the realm of the comprehensive.[45]

To Christians the encounter with Being, or the coming alive to the mystery of Being or the wonder of wonders, or the experience of Being's self-gifting comes through their experience of the redemptive work of Jesus Christ. That is to say, to Christians revelation is the designation of faith in the person of Jesus Christ as the event in which God gives himself to mankind. In Jesus Christ, Christians see the acme of God's decisive revelatory activity as a means through which he gifts himself to man to enable him to become man in the fullest sense of the word.

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[45] Principles, p. 90. Encounter with Being always belongs to the comprehensive. Jaspers spoke of three areas of being. There is the world of things or objects. Then there is the realm of existence which cannot be objectified, but which is experienced in our decision-making. Finally there is Being itself (or transcendence, God, Omega-point, etc.) which addresses the world and lies beyond it but which can only be understood through the world of beings. To Jaspers, faith is not a subjective intellectual assent to propositions; neither is it objective such as dogmas are often regarded as resting on objective truths. Jaspers spoke of the "comprehensive" [das Umgreifende] to express the fullness of the subjective and objestive aspects of faith. "We call the being that is neither only subject nor only object, that is rather on both sides of the subject-object split, the 'comprehensive'." The Perennial Scope of Philosophy, trans. Ralph Manheim (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1950), p. 14. Quoted by Macquarrie in God-talk, p. 81. Thus we can experience Being, not as an object which we can talk of disinterestedly, but in an existential manner in which we live and move and have our being. Tillich understood this very well when he spoke of God as Being itself and as ultimate concern. Systematic Theology, I, 14.

"Man needs some concrete manifestation of God's activity, some manifestation that can seize him and bring him into an attitude of faith."[46] In Macquarrie's language, man needs the personal "push," as it were, to enable him to appropriate the availability of the ontico-existentiell possibility for authenticity; man requires Being's self-offering to enable him to experience the ontic dimension of the ontological reality. The New Testament claims that in the historical revelation in Jesus Christ, Being does just that. That is to say, for Christianity faith in Being means that in Jesus Christ man sees the specific salvific work of Being in enabling man to effect the passage from inauthenticity to authenticity. In Jesus Christ, Being imparts itself to man so that with the personal self-gifting it could enable man to attain to his ontic possibility for authenticity. To Christians Jesus Christ is the decisive or paradigmatic revelation or self-disclosure of Being. So Macquarrie could say that Jesus Christ is the "symbol" of Being, or, to put the same sentiment quite differently, Being is present and manifested in Jesus Christ. Thus Christians proclaim that God "comes" to mankind in Jesus Christ who is the παρουσία (presence) and ἐπιφάνεια (manifestation) of Being, and these are the very words traditionally used to symbolize or describe Being's self-disclosure in Jesus Christ: advent and epiphany.[47]

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[46] Principles, p. 248.

It is not easy trying to describe Jesus as the presence and manifestation (advent and epiphany) of Being. So Macquarrie turns to the concept of "focusing" for some elucidation. Not all events have equal significance or relevance to a person at a particular given time, though they constitute a continuous series or the becoming of continuity. In theology, some events "stand out" as events of God's acting; they light up God's mighty acts in the midst and for the benefit of mankind. They have special power of appeal to men and can ". . . address men at the deepest level of their existence, to seize them, as it were, and bring them into the attitude of faith."[48] Theologians call them "revelatory events," "miracles," or providential events or acts." Such an event is Jesus Christ, who, for Christians, is the hallmark or high tide of Being's self-revealing activity. For Christians, the Christ-event signifies the "concentrated" effort of Being to disclose its graciousness to man so that it can help him to attain to authenticity. So in Jesus Christ man sees the personal invitation of Being, as it were, to embrace and appropriate the ontic

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[47] *Ibid.*, p. 249. Cf. "And the Word became flesh and dwelt among us, full of grace and truth; we have beheld his glory, glory as of the only Son from the Father." John 1:14.

[48] *Principles*, p. 249. Cf. Whitehead, *Religion in the Making*, p. 38.

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possibility for authenticity. This it does by affording man the chance to be most conscious of its overture, so to speak, made to man in and through the person and work of Jesus Christ. In short, man becomes aware of the approach and presence of Being in the events of Jesus' life and death. Revelation is the moment when man "sees"--at least in the case of the Christian revelation--in Jesus Christ Being's offer, overture, invitation, urge, etc., to him to accept and appropriate Being's offer of the ontic possibility for authenticity. In this sense Being's creativity, letting-be, grace, etc., is personal. The invitation to participate in and appropriate the ontic possibility for authenticity comes not through mere factors or conditions in life but through a person, through Jesus Christ as in the case of the Christian revelation. In this sense Macquarrie's assertion that Being's letting-be is neeced in addition to the factors provided by death, conscience, historical-cultural situations, and anxiety makes sense. This is the qualitative-structural identity of Being's letting-be that Macquarrie wants to emphasize when he stubbornly adheres to the necessity of Being's creativity which is needed in addition to that provided by death, conscience, historical-cultural situations, and anxiety.[49]

As this chapter unfolds it will be apparent that Being's letting-be is most vividly seen as it relates itself to man personally. However, to say this is to jump the gun. Thus, at this stage of the

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[49] Cf. ante, pp. 183-209.

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game it is wise to proceed to the second constitutive element in revelation, viz., man's response to the divine initiative.

The intention of dealing with the response of man to the overture of the divine initiative is to show the meaning of a Being-orientated life.

Man's response in faith to the impression Being makes on man via its self-gifting--a fact known to Macquarrie as the divine initiative which shows that in a God-man encounter the initial move is always made by God, revealing himself to man through revelation--must now be dealt with.[50] In revelation Being discloses itself and its graciousness to mankind; Being's self-disclosure is aimed at the well-being of man, and it achieves its purpose by helping man to appropriate the ontic possibility for authenticity. For man to accept Being's offer he must do so in faith; the divine initiative becomes meaningful in the light of the human response. Following the flow of our dissertation we will consider man's response in faith in terms of commitment and acceptance. Faith is the recognition of God's gracious purpose to which we awaken and believe in. We cannot get faith from someone else; we do not believe unless we ourselves can recognize the "object" of our faith, so to speak. Nonetheless, we have to say that faith is a gift of God; it is a gift of God, not because he implants it in us by force, but because he presents himself through all his dealings with us as one worthy of trust.

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[50] Our treatment of man's response in faith to Being's self-gifting presupposes or bypasses the consideration of Christology and pneumatology because the aim and scope of our dissertation zero in on our attempt to understand revelation in general--the moment man "sees" Being's creativity working in him to effect the passage from inauthenticity to authenticity--not a specifically Christian or Buddhist or Islamic or Hindu understanding of revelation. Brief remarks alluding to the Christian perspective were made to indicate the premises from which Macquarrie operates, and nothing more was intended. To go further would result in overstepping the boundary of our dissertation, causing chaos, the introduction of new materials which would have to be superficially dealt with, and the dissipation of our energy and the thrust of our dissertation.

Macquarrie has already characterized faith in terms of commitment and acceptance; as such there is no need for repetition except to point out one or two salient facts.[51] Macquarrie desires to show how faith can be called an "existential attitude," i.e., what it means to be a man who is oriented to this attitude. There are two fundamental elements in this faith-orientation, viz., the divine initiative which has been alluded to, and the constitution of man which makes the quest for faith a human activity. Man is so constituted that his quest for faith is part and parcel of his existence. This quest for faith can best be understood in terms of commitment and acceptance. Let us then examine this assertion.

In Macquarrie's analysis of existence we have seen the existential imbalance and the numerous efforts of man to overcome it. Macquarrie has also affirmed that man _per se_ does not seem to be able to master the tensions or polarities of existence as evidenced by the perennial presence of the existential imbalance. Macquarrie then tried to show how faith in Being seems to be a reasonable alternative in man's effort to achieve wholeness of life as contrasted to man-made salvation, to

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[51] _Supra_, pp. 164-167.

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use another biblical word. However, this reliance on faith in Being does not produce a spineless type of dependence but a type of dependence that takes into consideration commitment and acceptance,[52] which are the hallmarks of an authentic existence.

Macquarrie has defined an inauthentic or irresolute existence as one with scattered possibilities; a master possibility is lacking to hold in perspective all concerns and possibilities. On the other hand, an authentic or resolute or unified existence has a master possibility which gives meaning and form to all the activities of life, and in authentic existence commitment and acceptance are of paramount importance.[53]

Commitment characterizes the signal existence with its unity and purposefulness; commitment gives meaning to all the possibilities of existence by having a master possibility. In persistently directing itself on this master possibility, the other possibilities of life are subordinated to it, and in this way unity and purposefulness are achieved. For example, a man whose master possibility is to serve mankind will channel all his energy and talents to humanitarian activities, and in this way achieve unity and purposefulness in living. The absence of such a commitment results in the hopping from one immediate concern or possibility to the next, with no master possibility to hold everything in its proper place, leading to an existence that is dictated by chance circumstances or changing desires.

Acceptance is as equally crucial as commitment in a life of faith in Being. Macquarrie has just said that commitment has to do with future possibilities; he now reverses gear and considers acceptance which ". . . is the retrospective view of the self's unity, for it has to do with what has been, with the situation which already obtains and in which we find ourselves."[54] If there is to be a unified self, if there is to be faith in Being, then one has to consider seriously the facticity of the situation. Commitment is only meaningful if there is a frank and total acceptance of the facticity of the situation; commitment without acceptance of the situation can be fantastic as well as disruptive. For example, the Nazi dream of a master race ignored the heritage of the past and the situation that already obtained, resulting in ridiculous schemes and malaction of the most inhumane kind.

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[52] *Supra*, pp. 164-167.

[53] *Supra*, pp. 128-131.

To have faith in Being is to respond to the divine initiative and to have commitment and acceptance. Thus when Macquarrie says that man's response to the divine initiative is of crucial importance in revelation, he means to say that, after seriously considering commitment and acceptance, man finds meaning in life by looking for succour to the wider being within which his existence is found.[55] That is to say, man ceases to regard himself as the measure of all things, relying solely on his own resources and creating his own values and norms. This is not a depreciation of the value and power of man, but is a candid appraisal of his position and existence. It is a frank acknowledgement of his need to look "beyond" himself to find meaning in existence. This he does in his response to the divine initiative.

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[54] *Principles*, p. 68.

[55] *Ibid*., p. 71.

Up to this point we have examined the divine initiative and man's response in faith to Being's impinging, the two constitutive elements in a revelatory experience. We can further describe the content of revelation by indicating Macquarrie's reasons for calling God Being or holy Being. Macquarrie has affirmed that Being's creativity is responsible for effecting the transition from existence to Being. What is this Being? It has been a question lurking behind our mind all along. We now proceed to show the reasonableness of Macquarrie's attempt to address God as holy Being.

Macquarrie is aware of the fact that though Heidegger talked of Being in a quasi-religious, mystical language, yet he always made it clear that Being is not God.[56] Does Macquarrie create a logical hiatus if he turns around and claims that Being is God? Macquarrie does not think so, and tries to demonstrate the reasonableness in associating Being with God.

God is not some being or another being in addition to the world; he is not the particular being, not even the ens realissimum which is the most beingful of all beings. "Even an almighty being of this sort is still toto coelo different from being itself, and is transcended by being."[57] In short, God is not a or some particular being but Being itself. It may be said that Heidegger's claim concerning the forgetting of Being is analogous to the tendency in theology to think of God as an almighty being instead of Being itself. As Heidegger fought against the forgetting of Being so must theologians fight against the tendency to think of God as a being, albeit almighty.

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[56] Principles, p. 105.

[57] Ibid., p. 106.

To think of God as Being is actually nothing new because the doctrine of God as Being is as old as the Christian faith. Macquarrie cites Augustine and Aquinas as examples.[58] The ambiguity of the meaning of Being is the main reason for the failure to spell out the notion of God as Being. Now that theology faces the challenge posed by the idea that God is _a_ being, it has to formulate the meaning of God as Being and not as a being.

To meet this challenge Macquarrie cites Exodus 3:14 as the _locus classicus_ from which the biblical and Christian revelation of God as Being originates. This "I am what I am" is the celebrated Old Testament theophany whose exegetical difficulties and translation pose numerous problems. It could be that Yahweh or Yah is derived from a repetitive, semi-ecstatic shout at festivals, and as such has nothing to do with the idea of Being. However, there are scholars who think that the etymology of Yahweh or Yah can be traced to _hwh_ or _hyh_ which means "He exists" or "He is present."[59]

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[58] E.g., Macquarrie, in treating of the Trinity, says that "if the three persons are of one substance, and this 'substance' is Being, we are again directed to the understanding of God as Being, rather than _a_ being and likewise directed to understanding Father, Son and Holy Spirit in terms of Being rather than as three beings." _Principles_, p. 176. Also see _Principles_, pp. 107, 179.

[59] E.g. Walter Eichrodt, _Theology of the Old Testament_, trans. J.A. Baker (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1961), I, 189, where he says: "As far as the Tetragrammaton is concerned, Ex. 3:14 at least reveals this much, that to the Israelite ears the sound of the name suggested affinity with the verb _hwh_ or _hyh_ . . . . Hence the most natural interpretation remains that which equates the Tetragrammaton with 'He is,' 'He exists,' 'He is present'."

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Macquarrie sides with the interpretation which says that the Hebrew verb hyh has a more dynamic sense than the ecstatic shout at festivals; he even goes further than the interpretation which says that hyh means "to be." Macquarrie wants to believe that hyh has a more dynamic meaning than "to be," meaning something like "to become," so that "I am what I am" means more than just an immutable principle of being. In conformity with his belief that Being includes becoming, Macquarrie interprets "I am what I am" to refer to "the ongoing process of being, or to being in time and history rather than to a static being."[60] This interpretation has a basis in both ontology and Hebrew thought. The former is borne out by the interpretation of Being that includes the notion of becoming and the latter by those Old Testament scholars who interpret hyh in a causal sense to mean "I cause to be . . ." or "I bring to pass . . .,"[61] or in existentialist language we can say: "I let be what I let be." This immediately reminds us of the letting-be of Being, the prior enabling condition of all existents. Let us push this point a bit further.

Let us see what it means to deal with the dynamism of God understood as the letting-be of Being, coupled with the assertion that Being includes becoming. To begin with, we see that God or Being is not immutable, immutable understood as being incapable

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[60] Principles, p. 180.

[61] E.g., William Foxwell Albright, From the Stone Age to Christianity: Monotheism and the Historical Process, (2nd ed. New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1957), pp. 15-16.

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of change. God or Being cannot be regarded as completely monolithic and inert, an uncarved block. After all, becoming is included in Being. This does not mean ignoring stability which has to be considered. Macquarrie points out that immutability arises from the paradox of dynamism and stability, with emphasis laid on stability, i.e., without stability dynamism and change would result in chaos.[62] Therefore, to say that God is "immutable" is to say that he is constant in the midst and in spite of change. He is affected by change, but in spite of that he is still faithful or consistent, providing stability and order. This immediately reminds us of (a) Being, as the Immediate, is the mediation or cause of the beings which are held together by the patterning activity of Being, and (b) the relationship between Being and becoming. Macquarrie explains it thus:

> Insofar as Being includes becoming, it has taken time into itself, and manifests itself in time and history, more and more unfolding its resources. Just as the trinitarian symbols, while indeed reflecting the community's temporal or historical experience of God, nevertheless point to something in God himself, so time and history are not just forms under which we perceive a timeless and nonhistorical Being. They really point to Being, and without them Being could not be dynamic, it could not manifest itself, it could not be God or holy Being; it could be only an inert Being, and about this we would know nothing for we ourselves could not be.[63]

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[62] Principles, p. 190.

[63] Ibid., p. 191. Cf. In process philosophy we say that God's aim at formal intensity orders the eternal objects as relevant lures for concrescence "severally appropriate for all realizable basic conditions." Process and Reality, p. 134. Consequently, by definition God is the ground of "order" in the world, because, "'order' in the actual world is differentiated from mere 'givenness' by introduction of adaptation for attainment of an end." Process and Reality, pp. 373-374, 127. Apparently God's primordial ordering of possibility--apart from which it is in "mere isolation

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There is one more point on _hyh_ we need to note. The Tetragrammaton does not hesitate to say that God "is," but by doing so it does not subsume God under a higher generalization. On the contrary, it asserts God's absolutely _sui generis_ selfhood. God is simply himself, just like Being is itself, mysterious, unique, numinous, and not part of the world but is the prior condition of all existents. God is not to be compared with beings, as if he shares in their being as the supreme being. Rather it gives [_es gibt_] beings their being. So God is Being whose being is his revelation or self-disclosure of himself, comparable to the understanding of Being as unveiling or self-disclosing.[64]

There is one final place where we can address God as holy Being. Being is transcendent, i.e., it is the prior condition of whatsoever may be; yet Being is also immanent, i.e., it is present and manifest in the beings. Therefore, to conceive of God as Being is to think of God as both transcendent and immanent, and thus to

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indistinguishable from nonentity"--cannot be fixed and static. If it were, the principle of creativity (of which God is primordial exemplification) would be internally violated; also, as merely conceptual realization it requires the actual world to which it must ever be adapted as relevant. While forms are generally "ordered" primordially according to the aim at intensity in formed immediacy, God must wait upon the world in its givenness and self-emphasis. Although, then, forms are realized "primordially" it seems necessary to stress the unity of God from which the primordial and consequent natures are abstractions.

[64] Cf. Ott's words: "_The being of God signifies_, in terms of the way we have understood 'being' thus far, _an occurrence of unveiling_; that God unveils himself to thought as he who is! that he strikes upon thought as a fate and gives himself as the subject matter to be thought, that he encounters thought as a claim upon it and requires of the thinking person a correspondence in freedom." _Denken und Sein. Der Weg Martin Heideggers und der Weg der Theologie_, (Zurich: EVZ-Verlag, 1959), p. 148. Quoted in _The Later Heidegger and Theology_, pp. 41-42.

avoid the awful mistake of overstressing one to the detriment of the other.

The same sentiment is expressed in the characterization of Being as the "incomparable" because the usual categories of that fail to articulate the "mystery" of Being. Yet Being discloses itself to man. The similarity is seen in theology where God is represented as the incomparable, [*das ganz Andere*]. "To whom will you liken God, or what likeness compare with him?"[65] So Macquarrie can say that "God or Being is suprarational, and escapes the grasp of our intellect."[66] Yet adjectives like "incomparable," "suprarational," etc., are balanced by terms like "present and manifest" in the beings. This calls for holding together the tension between the transcendent and the immanent, for after all we believe in *Deus revelatus et simul Deus absconditus*:

> The discussion of the attributes in relation to the mystery of God points us to the paradoxical, or dialectical, character that belongs to every adjective applied to the incomparable, which nonetheless draws near in revelation and presence. God is both hidden and manifest, our highest attributes fall short, yet insofar as they make God hidden, they are true.[67]

The above examples seem to indicate the reasonableness of Macquarrie's attempt to address God as Being. Our exposition of Macquarrie's understanding of revelation seems to show how we can understand revelation in terms of Being's self-disclosure, high-

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[65] Isaiah 40:18.

[66] *Principles*, p. 187.

[67] *Ibid*. To lose sight of the tension between the transcendent and the immanent is to court trouble, because one is very likely to overstress one at the expense and to the detriment of the other. Thus we do well to keep the transcendent and the immanent in balance.

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lighting the initiative of Being in gifting itself to man, the preparatory role of moods, anxiety in particular, in preparing man to "see" Being's self-manifestation, and finally the attracting activity of Being as seen in the fascinosum and the appetitus. Macquarrie summarizes his discussion on revelation in terms of Being thus:

> The term "God then is adequately indicated on the frame of reference by the expression "holy Being." It follows that "God" has a twofold meaning: an ontological meaning, in so far as the word denotes being, and an existential meaning, in so far as the word expresses an attitude of commitment to, or faith in, being. These two meanings belong together in the word "God" and are inseparable. This word is the key word of religion because it already expresses the basic religious conviction--that fact and value belong together, that being which gives being is also gracious being. The assertion "God exists" may be expressed in another way as meaning that being "is" not alien or neutral over against us, but that it both demands and sustains, so that through faith in being, we can ourselves advance into fullness of being and fulfill the potentialities of selfhood . . . .[68]
>
> It is no accident that in this book the expressions "God" and "holy Being" have been treated as equivalent.[69]

Two things have to be said here, viz., (i) the necessity to spell out more fully the personal in revelation; and (ii) three observations on revelation. It is our intention to treat the first point at the end of this chapter. Thus we go on to the second point, but before doing that let us recapitulate.

To summarize: We have tried to spell out the content of revelation by describing the way Being's creativity operates through its self-giving to man, who has been prepared by anxiety to "see" and appropriate Being's self-offering. The work and person of Jesus Christ were used as a paradigmatic illustration of Being's self-gifting to mankind, the emphasis being laid on the personal dimension of Being's operation rather than an actual elaboration of Christology and its related subject, pneumatology. We now proceed to mention three observations of revelation.

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[68] Principles, p. 110.

[69] Ibid., p. 192.

III. Three Observations.

(i) There is a universal possibility of revelation, and the structure of a revelatory experience can be delineated. It is true that any particular experience of revelation is concrete, experienced by a particular person, at a particular time, in a particular culture, and expressed in particular symbols. However, Macquarrie does not wish to confine this concreteness and particularity to the biblical revelation. There can be several revelations, but there is no such thing as an exclusively particular revelation, so Macquarrie affirms. Exclusiveness can be said of certain Country Clubs, but it cannot be applied to revelation.

(ii) Revelation makes one see things in depth. In a revelatory experience, one sees things in a different way; features of a situation which usually escape our notice are seen in a deeper dimension. Man is not only conscious of the particular beings that belong to a situation, "but he becomes aware of the _being_ that is _present_ and _manifest_ in, with, and through these particular beings."[70] Hence the relevance of moods in a revelatory situation, moods understood as attunement to the environment.

Moods are evoked by a situation rather than by an object even if they have a particular reference to some object in the situation.

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[70] _Principles_, p. 80.

For example, considered as an object, passing the comprehensive examinations amounts to nothing more than an acquisition of a few vital facts, and nothing can be added to it than what can be perceived by the senses. When we consider the situation in which the passing of the comprehensives takes place, then we go beyond mere sense perception and the object. Similarly, seeing a lion in my garden will make my flesh creep, but seeing him in the circus does nothing of the sort. Related to revelation, moods light up the situation wherein man is prepared to "see" Being's self-gifting. It is not just fear that confronts, bewilders, and frightens us, but it is the whole situation, within which fear occurs, that is important. For example, in confronting the burning bush it was not fear or curiosity that mattered to Moses' understanding. "Do not come near; put off your shoes from your feet, for the place on which you are standing is holy ground."[71]

Macquarrie has just said that revelation makes us see things in depth, i.e., the features of an environment take on a new look, so to speak. He has also said that moods are evoked by a situation; objects in and features of a situation that ordinarily escape our attention are brought into a new perspective and take on a new meaning. This does not mean that he equates revelation with moods, but what he does wish to affirm is the preparatory role moods play in lighting up a revelatory situation. This calls for some elaboration and supportive statements.

Two things call for our attention, viz., a reiteration of limit-situations and a reiteration of how anxiety acts as a catalyst in disclosing a revelatory situation.

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[71] Exodus 3:5.

In the previous chapter, we gave Macquarrie's analysis of a limit-situation.[72] He said that in the life of a man, there comes a time when, after trying his level best to overcome the tensions in his life, he still finds himself experiencing the existential imbalance. This leads him into a cul-de-sac, and it is on such an occasion when he finds himself in this dimension of existence that he is most likely to realize that something else--call it "transcendence" if you will--is needed to help him to overcome the existential imbalance, and we have described the process in which the existential imbalance is overcome.[73] Death, suffering, and anxiety are examples of such limit-situations. At this stage of the game, Macquarrie is only interested in seeing how anxiety catapults man into the dimension of existence which prepares him to "see" revelation.

In anxiety, man understands his existence as possibility bound up with the world. Macquarrie observes that man can either interpret this situation atheistically or theistically, i.e., atheistically man accepts the fact "that he is thrown into the ocean of being, alien and even hostile to himself, in which he must exist," and theistically "he can seek a ground of being, which means simply a Creator who is author both of man's being and of the being of nature."[74] Macquarrie contends that the earlier Heidegger stopped at the first possible interpretation; the earlier Heidegger was satisfied with articulating the facticity of man.[75] Thus anxiety shows the ocean of what it is in which man exists as an isolated possibility. However, this is an inadequate view precisely because pessimism or nihilism inevitably follows; if life is such a useless passion, then there is nothing worth struggling for. Such a view fails to do justice to Heidegger's philosophy, and it was logically appropriate that the later Heidegger spoke of the graciousness of Being; man is not only made aware of what is but he is also made to realize that the self-gifting of Being enables him to live ". . . in that wider Being in which man lives and moves and has his being."[76]

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[72] Supra, pp. 163-167. [73] Supra, pp. 175-179.

[74] An Existentialist Theology, p. 74.

Anxiety not only reveals that man is thrown into the ocean of being, but it also reveals the "ground of being." Anxiety not only reveals the fact that man is not the master of his existence, but it also reveals ". . . a Being who is not thrown into the sea of what is, because he is himself the ground of what is, being itself beyond both the _Vorhandenheit_ of inanimate things and the _Existenz_ of man . . . ."[77] Both _Vorhandenheit_ and _Existenz_ are contingent and conditioned, but Being-itself being "ground" is not. In other words, anxiety reveals the creatureliness of man, making it possible for man to search for God, except in Christian theology one would say that it is God who initiates man's search for him. However, anxiety does not yield an explicit knowledge of God; it is only the _condition_ to know God. In this sense, anxiety prepares man to "see"

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[75] _Ibid._ [76] _Studies_, p. 94.

[77] _An Existentialist Theology_, p. 75.

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Being's self-gifting. We will have more to say on this.

(iii) We now come to the third and final observation of Macquarrie concerning revelation, viz., a directly given revelation is rare. Communities of faith are founded on classic or primordial revelations which are perpetuated by the subsequent experiences of the ongoing communities of faith. The subsequent experiences of primordial revelations can be called "repetitive" revelations.[78] When Macquarrie gives the general description of revelations, he does not mean to imply that everyone experiences a direct revelation of Being. In most cases, it is a re-living of some primordial revelation, though this re-living has "traces" of a first-hand participation in the awareness of the transition from the sense of finitude to the sense of the presence of the holy. For example, the Christian church re-lives the classic revelation experienced by Jesus Christ, and though the church's experience is only a repetitive one, yet it has all the elements of experiencing the seventh heaven, metaphorically speaking.

This section has been subtitled "Three Observations" for a purpose. The emphasis is on the word "observations." It is our intention to stay within the boundary of our dissertation, suggesting that discussions on particularity and exclusiveness of revelation and their refutations are really outside the scope of our dissertation. The three observations--the second observation on anxiety's catalytic role is more germane to our dissertation than the other two--were made to indicate Macquarrie's sympathy and belief when it comes to discussing Christianity's relations to other faiths.

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[78] Cf. post., pp. 179-180.

To summarize: Our desire to view revelation from an existential-ontological perspective has brought us a long way and through quite a maze. We began by expressing our understanding of modernity, followed by a detailed exposition of Heidegger's foundational philosophical notions with the intention of indicating his influence on Macquarrie. We then dealt with Macquarrie's existential-ontological perspective with the belief in and intention of showing how his existential-ontological perspective provides a viable way for us to understand revelation, revelation understood as the conferring of the gift of a sense for existence in answer to man's quest for the sense of existence. To do this we analyzed Macquarrie's understanding of existence and Being and the transition from existence to Being, or from the ontological-existential to the ontico-existentiell. To accomplish our goal, we examined the meaning of Being's creativity, letting-be, grace, favour, etc., and man's response (utilizing Heidegger's understanding of primordial thinking), the two constitutive elements of revelation. Being discloses or gifts itself to man who appropriates Being's self-offering. To show this personal dimension of Being's dealings with man, the work and person of Jesus Christ were pressed into service as a paradigmatic illustration of Being's self-gifting. In this way we have "delineated" the structure (not content in the strictest sense of the word) of revelation as the moment when man "sees" Being's creativity at work which is aimed at his well-being, the conferring of the gift of the sense for existence in answer to man's quest for the sense of existence that we have talked of.

IV. The Personal

Up to this point we have given an examination of Macquarrie's understanding of revelation from his existential-ontological perspective, as far as present talent and scholarship permit. We now would like to see how Macquarrie uses the concept of the "personal" to explicate the necessity and function of Being's self-gifting.

The impact of the personal can be most effectively felt by considering the preservation of man's integrity in the process of becoming authentic and by indicating the reasonableness in the belief that in the Christ-event man sees a "focusing" of Being.

To what extent does Macquarrie's postulation of the necessity of the self-gifting of Being lend itself to a possible accusation that Macquarrie domes near to advocating a *Deus ex machina* type of theology? Has Macquarrie exposed himself to this possible objection by adhering to Being's creativity as the *dynamis* responsible for man's transition from existence to Being? Macquarrie seems to be conversing quite intelligibly with an imaginary existentialist philosopher when he talks of man's condition, his facticity, his existence as exemplified by care, etc., but suddenly Macquarrie breaks off from the philosopher because of his insistence that man needs Being's creativity, self-offering, or revelation to enable him to attain to authenticity. Is not this an underhanded *coup de grace*? Macquarrie does not think so for two reasons.

To begin with, Macquarrie acknowledges that he does differ from the imaginary existentialist philosopher in terms of man's capacity to save himself. That is to say, Macquarrie examines existence as he knows it. He inquires into the structures of existence as popularly understood by mankind; he then pays special attention to the existential imbalance which seems to be perennial. This perennial existential imbalance prompts Macquarrie to question quite seriously man's ability to save himself. On the whole, if man can save himself how does one account for the fact that the existential imbalance seems to exist perennially, tormenting man and making him dissatisfied with the what-is? Is it unreasonable to postulate Being's creativity as a catapulting force in helping man to expedite his process of becoming whole? Macquarrie does not think so, and this is how he goes about explaining his position.

The existential imbalance can be explained by the fact that man as possibility is in the process of becoming. That this is reasonable very few people will disagree. The problem lies in how the end product can be most effectively achieved. Macquarrie understands Being's creativity as *fascinosum* and *appetitus* which help to expedite the process of man's becoming whole, as lures which needle man to embrace authenticity, as the accelerating *dynamis* in leavening up the bread of life, as it were. In this process of becoming whole, man is not a marionette, his personality is not violated; as a matter of fact he is a co-worker towards wholesomeness,

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a fact Macquarrie pointed out when he dealt with man's response in the process of making whole.[79]

In using Being's creativity, in particular Being's self-offering to mankind, as a form or impetus in assisting man to attain to authenticity, Macquarrie is the first to insist that nothing "foreign" that is not already there is introduced into the picture. That is to say, Being can assist man to achieve authenticity precisely because the ontic possibility for authenticity is innate in and germane to the ontological structure of man's being. Therefore, nothing "foreign" has been introduced into the picture. This belief was explained in terms of the reorganization and refocalization of possibilities, or the leavening up or concretion of potentialities, which are already in man.[80] Understood in this sense Being's creativity can never be interpreted as a Deus ex machina prop; there is no place for the God-in-the-gaps in Macquarrie's theology.

This is Macquarrie's solution to the perennial existential imbalance. Something is needed to quicken the process of reorganization and refocalization of possibilities so as to effect authenticity or wholesomeness. It is in this limited sense that man cannot save himself, but this is not the same as saying that man does nothing in the process of achieving his authenticity. If there is no place for the God-in-the-gaps in Macquarrie's theology, neither is there a place for a marionette. Macquarrie is most anxious to preserve man's integrity when it comes to explaining the transition from existence

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[79] Supra, pp. 250-251.

[80] Supra, pp. 225-231.

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to Being. This fact is better appreciated in the light of a few words on Jesus Christ and man's commitment and acceptance.

We have said that the person and work of Jesus Christ were used as a paradigmatic illustration of the personal _modus operandi_ of Being when it gifts itself to assist man to attain to authenticity. This does not mean, however, that man is totally helpless or that he does nothing in this "restoring" process. He has to cooperate, and he "does his thing," to use a slang, through commitment and acceptance.

It is a commitment to an ideal or the ultimate wholesomeness, a resolution to embrace authenticity. To do so means, among other things, a frank acceptance of the past and present, an honest acknowledgement of the influence of the past heritage, and a down-to-earth appraisal of present possibilities. As commitment and acceptance have been previously mentioned we need not repeat ourselves.[81] They are mentioned to make sure that man's integrity is not violated in the process of becoming whole.

We now try to see the reasonableness of Macquarrie's belief in the Christ-event as the "focusing" point of Being, as far as Christians are concerned. Macquarrie begins by remarking on the process of dissolution that takes place whenever the existential imbalance fails to attain to integrative wholesomeness. Whenever the integrative process is not functioning, or whenever the creative process is impeded, possibilities are wasted and potentiality is deprived of concretion. What is the purpose and the benefit of having possibilities if there is lacking the integrative power, the principle of concretion to actualize them? Is it unreasonable to believe that certain people and/or events are "epochal" occasions which help to prevent the dissolution and wastage of possibilities by making them concrete? The answer from most people is "No." Applied to man, Macquarrie inquires into the possibility of the ability of certain people and/or events to heal the disorders of existence, redress the imbalance of existence, and prevent further scatteringness. Macquarrie suggests that the Christ-event might serve as the power which can bring potentiality to its full fruition, indicating that the Christ-event might serve as the power which can bring potentiality to its full fruition, indicating that the Christ-event is a personal manifestation of Being's letting-be, whereby Being ". . . confers, sustains, and perfects the being of the creatures."[82]

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[81] _Supra_, pp. 132-134.

Macquarrie observes that the Christ-event is a manifestation of Being's reconciling activity in making man whole, or, to express the same conviction differently, in assisting man to actualize his potentiality. Naturally, the Christ-event should not be interpreted to mean ". . . that at a given moment God adds the activity of reconciliation to his previous activities, or that we can set a time when his reconciling activity began."[83] Rather, the Christ-event should be understood as a "concentrated" effort of Being to make man whole, an

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[82] Principles, p. 247.

[83] Ibid. The reconciling activity of Being is one form of Being's creativity. It is taken to signify Being's work in making man whole, in bringing man's potentiality to full fruition.

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activity that has been going on since time immemorial, an activity that is equiprimordial with creation itself. So the Christ-event is a manifestation of the fact that at a given time there was a special and decisive revelation of a reconciling, restoring activity that had been in action since the dawn of history or creation. This suggests that Being's reconciling, restoring activity is coextensive in time and extent, i.e., Being's creativity is at work in all places and at all times. To "see" Being's letting-be at work in making man whole, to "see" the transition from existence to Being is to "see" revelation.

Macquarrie then argues that man "needs some concrete manifestation of God's activity, some manifestation that can seize him and bring him into an attitude of faith."[84] For Christians the Christ-event is one such event that arrests a man's attention and opens his eyes to Being's self-gifting:[85]

> This, [Christ-event], for Christianity, is the classic or primordial revelation on which the community of faith is founded and which determines its way of understanding Being (God) and of comporting itself towards Being . . . . The fullness of time is seen as a critical moment of history when God's reconciling work moves out into the open and takes a new and decisive leap forward toward building up that commonwealth of beings which would realize the potentialities of the creation.[86]

It is in this sense that the Christ-event is the symbol or focusing point of Being, as far as the Christians are concerned.

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[84] Principles, p. 248.

[85] "When the time had fully come, God sent forth His Son." Galatians 4:4.

[86] Principles, p. 248.

Thus Christians claim that in Jesus Christ Being is "present and manifest," that Jesus is the "advent and epiphany" of Being. In this sense Jesus Christ is the paradigmatic or decisive illustration or manifestation of Being's self-gifting. We now proceed to see the reasonableness of such a claim.

There seem to be certain persons and/or events that reflect Being-itself more clearly than others. They are known as the "epochal" occasions. We quote Whitehead to illustrate our statement:

> Rational religion appeals to the direct intuition of special occasions, and to the elucidatory power of its concepts for all occasions. It arises from that which is special, but it extends to what is general. The doctrines of rational religion aim at being that metaphysics which can be derived from the supernormal experience of mankind in its moment of finest insight.[87]

For Christians the Christ-event is such an "epochal" occasion, making it possible for them to "see" Being's self-gifting because it is the focusing point of Being. Such a claim is reasonable in the sense that it serves as a focal point where man begins to see and appreciate the bringing to pass of his potentiality, making him aware of the network of interdependence and interrelationships, and the world of people he lives with. It is the event that "lights up" Being's graciousness in enabling man to achieve wholesomeness and makes intelligible other events. It serves to unify the various concerns of man, giving him a perspective from which he can see a balanced view of life.[88] In this sense the Christ-event is the coming together of

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[87] Religion in the Making, p. 31.

[88] We need not deal with this topic in depth, seeing that it is only our desire to indicate the reasonableness in believing that the Christ-event is an epochal occasion and nothing more. To go beyond this is to digress from the main thrust and problem of our dissertation.

Being's creativity, as it were.

We have defined revelation as the moment when man "sees" Being's creativity at work in him to effect the transition from existence to Being, the transition from the ontological to the ontic, the passage from inauthenticity to authenticity. It can now be said that revelation is the designation of faith in a particular person and/or event that enables man to see, accept, and attain to wholesomeness.

Thus from the existential-ontological perspective revelation is that moment when man is assisted by a person and/or event to see and accept and achieve wholesomeness. That he can do this is due to two factors, viz., the divine initiative in inviting, summoning, luring, etc., him to accept authenticity, and his innate capability to cooperate with and accept Being's invitation. Thus it seems reasonable to believe that the Christ-event is one such event or "epochal" occasion which "focuses" Being's letting-be in one highly concentrated, compacted bundle of energy (power), as it were, from which the universal process of man's becoming whole gets an impetus for further growth. Let us view this point from another angle.

Macquarrie utilizes the personal as a bridge in understanding revelation. Usually a bridge connects two points. In Macquarrie's case, the personal is a bridge that connects inauthenticity to authenticity, or to formulate the same point differently, the personal is the bridge that allows man to cross from the ontological to the ontic. This is the qualitative-structural difference that Macquarrie spoke of earlier,[89] the something that is needed to help man to overcome his existential imbalance. This "something extra" operates on a personal basis, viz., through revelatory figures.

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[89] Supra, pp. 194-209.

There are three things Macquarrie wishes to say in support of this claim, viz., (a) revelatory figures make us realize our degree of unfulfillment; (b) they emit a summons to us to become authentic, a summons that is more alluring and compelling than the *impersonal* forms of Being's creativity precisely because it *is* personal; and (c) the call of the revelatory figures gets embodied in a community that continually tries to realize the ontological possibilities. By describing these three points Macquarrie hopes to make clear how the personal acts as a bridge in allowing man to cross from inauthenticity to authenticity.

(a) Ordinarily, man should constantly be in the process of improving himself, developing his skills, and trying to attain to integrity or wholesomeness, though most of the time he deceives himself into thinking that he is achieving his goals by "achieving" them in the they-self. Then a revelatory figure makes him aware of his degree of unfulfillment, his lack of auhtenticity, by making him realize that to be authentic is, among other things, to be creative and productive. That is to say, a revelatory figure sensitizes man to the fact that authenticity comes about through *enriching* and *creative* interchange with other Daseins, the world, and Being-itself, an encounter that enables him to cultivate sensitivities that are open to suggestions and further developments, to overdome his existential imbalance, and to be productive.[90] A revelatory figure inspires man to expand his appreciable world, to be dissatisfied with his present depth and range of positive value, to be restless with his present wholeness unless the expansion of his authenticity can have further occasions to mature. It is in this sense that revelatory figures make man aware of his degree of unfulfillment. Let us push the problem further.

Macquarrie has said that man is possibility or potentiality; man is always caught up in the process of becoming. This suggests that man is committed to the creative process of becoming or creativity; he cannot find satisfaction in the what-is, but must commit himself to the what-can-be. Frequently, he is not aware of or has become numbed to this fact, and therefore he has to be re-awakened and sensitized to it. We can explain this process of awakening to the lack of self-fulfillment in terms of man in "knowing" his true self because of the influence of some revelatory figures. That is to say, under ordinary conditions man uses "security props" to safeguard his self-esteem; he uses them to maintain his image or self-worth without which he cannot hope to survive. Unfortunately, these security props are deceptive, depriving man of an accurate knowledge and appraisal of his true worth, especially when they are based on the judgment of das Man.

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[90] In the case of the Christian faith, through his absolute self-giving and obedience Jesus Christ makes man conscious of the fact that an integrative personality arises from a disowning of self-centeredness. In this sense Jesus Christ is a revelatory figure for the Christian faith, so Macquarrie believes. Principles, pp. 280-293.

The security props are a means man uses to conform himself to das Man, and this is a tragedy because das Man's appraisal of an individual is never a true estimate of him. An individual is never totally known by others, and all too often he is approved or disapproved on the basis of a false or at least a misleading estimate. Das Man's approval or disapproval, then, is based on a misinterpretation and a misunderstanding of an individual. Therefore, when a person uses the security props to conform to das Man's appraisal of him, he fails to actualize his true self. In fact, in most cases he might even have forgotten his true self because of his incessant wallowing in das Man's approval or disapproval of him. This is a tragedy because an individual's personality gets shaped and governed by what others misleadingly think of him instead of being judged by his own knowledge of his true self. Resultingly, the security props determine the way a man feels, thinks, and acts in comformity to the they-self, and in this way he perpetuates a false picture of himself. A revelatory figure shows up man as he really is and makes him see his lack of authenticity.[91]

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[91] How a revelatory figure can help man to see his lack of self-fulfillment was briefly described in our utilization of Jesus Christ as an "epochal" occasion. Supra, pp. 271-274. Since our dissertation does not purport to deal with Christology or Buddhalogy, we need not deal with them in depth, except to indicate how in the case of Christianity the Christ-event is an "epochal" occasion, and briefly describe how an "epochal" occasion can personally appeal to man to embrace authenticity by first showing him his degree of unfulfillment, followed by the luring summons to embrace authenticity.

(b) Intimately related to the ability of revelatory figures to make man realize his lack of authenticity is the way they summon man to self-fulfillment, a summons that is more alluring and compelling than the "impersonal" forms of Being's creativity and that complements or makes more adequate the impersonal forms of Being's letting-be.

The revelatory figures make man aware of his dissatisfaction with the what-is by making him realize that man in his present condition is on the way to becoming something beyond what he is now. Anxiety, death, conscience, and historical-cultural factors play the same role, but because they are "impersonal" in the sense that they are just "there" they need to be complemented by another form of Being's creativity, namely a revelatory figure or event, which utilizes them as forms of its own creativity to summon man to authenticity. This summons is personally seen in the revelatory figures who, by their contacts with men, challenge their listeners to forsake the womb of the they-self and be born anew, in a manner of speaking. For example, a stimulating discussion affords us an opportunity to see nuances of a point which were, prior to the discussion, beyond our ken, but which become clearer in the light of the discussion. Analogously, prior to meeting the revelatory figures, men were contented, if they were not disturbed by anxiety, conscience, death, and historical-cultural factors, with the everyday living, but after having met them they began to yearn for the what-can-be.[92]

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[92] Two points need to be observed, viz., (i) at present we "repeat" the revelatory experiences of those people who encountered the revelatory figures at first-hand, (ii), a repetition that has traces of that first-hand encounter as it is relived and/or re-experienced in the

The revelatory figures enable man to enjoy satisfaction in the present, the concrete situation in which man finds himself. The what-can-be becomes an actualized present, i.e., the what-can-be cannot be enjoyed by man apart from an existing, concrete situation which permits man to enjoy the maximal range of his being. Therefore, it is within the present that man enjoys his future, or, to formulate the same point in another way, the revelatory figures help man to enjoy his potentiality by making it possible for him to live authentically, here and now. In this way, the revelatory figures assist man to "idealize" the present by informing him more reliably concerning those aspects of the present which will become more beingful when they are realized, making it possible for man to make coherent, evaluative judgements. This was what Macquarrie meant when he regarded revelation as the designation of faith in a particular person as the key to a better understanding of reality, as the event that makes it possible for man to existentiellize his ontological possibility for authenticity.

In the case of our treatment of Macquarrie's understanding of revelation as viewed from the existential-ontological perspective, the thrust of our problem is to lay bare the presuppositions, reasons, and other related factors that underlie his philosophical-theological stance and not so much to examine his Christology. Consequently, we need not delve into the question as to how an "epochal" occasion like

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communities of faith. Thus we will have to say a few words on the community of faith and revelation at the end of the section.

Also see supra, pp. 271-274, on how revelatory figures as "epochal" occasions can lure man to look "beyond" himself to get caught up in the creative process of becoming.

the Christ-event functions to make possible the onticization of the ontological possibility for authenticity, except simply to indicate the way it works. To deal with the modus operandi of epochal occasions in depth in our dissertation is to digress from the explication of our problem and the main thrust of our dissertation. Therefore, we only wish to indicate the way revelatory figures personally act as a summons to man to achieve authenticity.

Anxiety, death, conscience, historical-cultural factors, as forms of Being's creativity, appeal to man to attain to the what-can-be, but because they are impersonal in the sense that they are the factors or conditions in life and are just "there," their ability to lure man to accept wholesomeness is less concentrated or less enticing than the personal summons and challenge arising from the revelatory figures. For example, a man wishes to be a scholar, and to this end he devotes all his energy to realize his ambition. He can fulfill his dream by exercising all the discipline that is required of him, and to a certain extent he does achieve his goal through sustained efforts. However, experience informs us that he tends to achieve more and climb to greater heights if and when he has an understanding friend who, through personal contact, assistance, and encouragement, prods him on to wider vistas. It is in some such way that Macquarrie understands anxiety, death, conscience, and historical-cultural factors as forms of Being's creativity and the personal summons emitting from the revelatory figures to assist man to appropriate authenticity. The history of the world-religions indicates that revelatory figures are few and far between, which brings us to our next point, viz., the role of the community of faith in perpetuating the personal call to authenticity.

(c) Man as we know him lives in a community and therefore we need briefly to touch on the community of faith which embodies and is the result of the personal summons of the revelatory figures to man to forsake the they-self and be an authentic self.[93]

As we know it today, any giving and receiving of revelation as we have understood it usually results in a community of believers, who try to perpetuate the call to authenticity of the revelatory figure by living up to their faith and obligations. Therefore, members of the community of faith sustain one another by mutual encouragement, and try to "convert"--to use an old fashioned word--the world by sharing their faith with others. In this way, the personal call to wholesomeness arising from the revelatory figures is being perpetuated. Let us develop this point of view.

Macquarrie has gone to great length to show the communal dimension of human existence. Being-in-the-world means living with and getting caught up in a nexus of inter-relationships and interdependence. Revelation, if it is to be meaningful, must surely be a communal affair. Every community needs structures of sorts to hold itself together and to impart a sense of cohesion and belongingness to the members. The same principle applies to revelation; as a societal affair revelation must have its institutional structures to make its community of members feel that they belong to it. The communal aspect of revelation is most clearly discerned in the idea of kinship, especially in the early stages of the development of the giving and receiving of revelation.

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[93] Previously, we criticized Heidegger for failing to do justice to the community of authentic beings because his emphasis tends to gravitate to the individual authentic selves. To be authentic is to be separated from das Man, a fact that has to be complemented by an emphasis of the community of authentic selves, so we argued. Supra, pp. 190-192. We now try to make up for that deficiency with a few words on the community of faith.

Revelation is a communal thing seeing that it has its institutions and even theories to explain the meaning and implications of the giving and receiving of revelation. Thus we hear of the need to be with other fellow believers whose presence is a source of joy and strength, and which accounts for the existence and perpetuation of the places of worship.[94]

It is easy to see why revelation cannot be merely a private affair with no social dimensions. The collective faith of the religious community gives stability and assurance to the individual member's faith, and man succumbs to his doubts when he can find no support and encouragement for his own beliefs in the beliefs of his fellow-believers.[95] The religious community thus supports and uplifts the faith of the individual, and through persecution and changing fortunes maintains the continuity of religious traditions and experience, as verified by the history of the world-religions, which are a result of the giving and receiving of a revelatory occasion. The religious community nurtures the faith of the believers from infancy to old age, influences the mind and will of the believers, and prepares its adherents to face the problems of the present.[96] In this

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[94] Cf. Dietrich Bonhoeffer's arguments for the social aspect of Christianity as when he extolled the benefits of the Christian community in providing fellowship, encouragement, and strength to the believers. He pointed out the fact that Jesus never lived a cloistered life but in the midst of friends and foes; the fact that, in and through Jesus, Christians are held together in fellowship though they live in different countries; that the Christian fellowship is a gift of God. Life Together, trans. John W. Doberstein (New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1954), et passim.

[95] E.g. "Alone, drones cannot make honey, but they can with the help of the bees; in the same way with the help of those who are devout we can easily practise devotion." St. Francis de Sales, Introduction

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to the Devout Life, trans. Michael Day (London: Burns & Oates, 1956), p. 155. Cf. Speaking of the influence of accepted religious customs and practices, W. McDougall said that "it is fortunately only a rare individual here and there among us who in considerable degree emancipates himself from the influence of such representations and becomes capable of confronting all objects about him in a perfectly cool, critical, logical attitude--who can 'peep and botanize upon his mother's grave.'" The Group Mind, (England: Cambridge University Press, 1927), p. 75.

[96] In emphasizing the communal aspect of revelation we must not overlook the importance and place of the individual. Revelation cannot exist *ad infinitum* if it ceases to be vital to individuals. We need not go in great length to spell out this important fact, but we mention it to show that revelation has been carefully examined, and to indicate our awareness of the important role played by the individual members. A cursory examination of religious reforms in any religious community will speedily show that they were first initiated by a few persecuted individuals, who endured contempt and even ill-treatment before their reforms were accepted by the community. For example, William Robertson Smith went to Aberdeen University at the tender age of fourteen and carried all honours before him; he then went to New College, Edinburgh, and studied in Germany, too. When he was only twenty-four years old, the Assembly of the Free Church appointed him to the chair of Hebrew and Old Testament Criticism in its College at Aberdeen, where he was an able and devout teacher and scholar. In 1875 a new edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* began to be published with W. R. Smith as a co-editor and contributor. His article on the "Bible" advanced theories of the origin of the Pentateuch, the authorship of the Psalms, the non-predictive character of Old Testament prophecy, and the composition of the Gospels that were "heretical" to his church, but which were accepted as axiomatic shortly after his dismissal from Aberdeen. It was only appropriate that Cambridge University called W. R. Smith to be its Professor of Arabic, a tribute to Smith's scholarship and justice to truth. It was also ironical that W. R. Smith delivered three courses of lectures (1888-1892) which became his famous *Lectures on the Religion of the Semites*--in Aberdeen!

way we have the community of faith that tries to aim at some manifestations of authentic beings, whose measure of success seems to correspond to its ability to attract others to participate in the quest for wholesomeness and integration. Seekers of faith can find salvation because there are members of this authentic or redeemed community to give a helping hand by personally sharing their faith with the adherents. There might be a few attempts on the part of some authentic selves to dominate others, but all of them are supposedly caught up in the creative process of becoming. So there are concerted efforts made to manifest the fruit of the giving and receiving of revelation, viz., the outward, visible manifestation of authentic selves.

By considering the way revelatory figures make man conscious of his degree of unfulfillment, the personal summons emitting from revelatory figures to man to attain to authenticity, and the role of the community of faith in perpetuating the personal call to wholesomeness, it is hoped that we have outlined Macquarrie's claim that the personal acts as a bridge in allowing man to cross from inauthenticity to authenticity. We now proceed to see some flaws in Macquarrie's attempt to correlate Being's creativity to that of death, anxiety, conscience, and historical-cultural factors, but before doing that let us end this chapter with a summary.

To summarize: This chapter was devoted to explicating Macquarrie's understanding of revelation from his existential-ontological perspective. We began by describing how anxiety serves as a catalyst in preparing man to see revelation, and how revelation--

the moment one "sees" the transition from existence to Being, the transition from the ontological to the ontic, the passage from inauthenticity to authenticity--is brought about through Being's creativity, which operates through its self-gifting to man as discerned in the fascinosum and the appetitus, which serve to attract man to Being, and in particular, from the Christian premises, as discerned through the Christ-event, which is an "epochal" occasion through which Being's self-giving is focusedly and concentratedly made present and manifested to man. We then observed that the structure of a revelatory experience can be delineated, that revelation makes one see things in depth, and that a directly given revelation is rare. We concluded with a discussion on the personal, maintaining that the personal summons of revelatory figures enables man to realize and fulfill his unfulfillment, an activity perpetuated in the community of authentic beings.

CHAPTER V

FINAL CONCLUSIONS

It is the intention of this chapter to raise a few questions concerning the *relation* between Being's creativity and that of death, conscience, anxiety, and historical-cultural factors; to dwell on the central theses or hypotheses of our dissertation; and to mention very briefly three final remarks. Thus we wish to raise some criticisms, suggestions, and recommendations to round off our dissertation on Macquarrie's understanding of revelation as viewed from a Heideggerian context.[1]

I. *A Further Consideration of Being's Creativity*

This section purposes to re-examine the relationship of Being's creativity and that supplied by anxiety, death, conscience, and historical-cultural factors. Macquarrie utilizes Heidegger's philosophy to expound his understanding of revelation--and other tenents of the Christian faith, we may add--but in the process of doing so he seems to have pushed it to the darkest part of the background, where

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[1] Let us acknowledge the fact that Macquarrie's present understanding of revelation is provisional in the sense that he has not fully developed a definitive statement of his teaching on revelation. As a matter of fact, he has not dealt with in depth the concept of revelation, though he leaves numerous hints in his writings for the readers to expand and amplify. This assertion will become more obvious as this chapter unfolds. However, we can say that Macquarrie's concept of revelation serves as a foundation for further analyses of and attempts to elucidate the meaning of revelation.

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it can hardly be seen. Consequently, Being's letting-be and that of death, anxiety, conscience, and historical-cultural factors do not seem to have been held in equilibrium. This imbalance seems to have been caused by Macquarrie's desire to stress the divine initiative, so much so that his assertion of Being's presence and manifestation in the beings, and in particular his understanding of the role of death, conscience, anxiety, and historical-cultural factors seems to have been misplaced.[2] Naturally, Macquarrie would like to hold in balance Being's letting-be and the contribution of death, anxiety, conscience, and historical-cultural factors, but his exposition of Being's creativity and that of death, conscience, anxiety, and historical-cultural factors has not been too well guarded. One possible reason for this defect is the fact that Macquarrie's own teaching on Being's creativity and that of death, anxiety, conscience, and historical-cultural factors has not been dealt with in depth. Therefore, though it is clear that

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[2] If Being's letting-be and the creativity of death, conscience, anxiety, and historical-cultural factors are not held in balance, then Macquarrie is guilty of bifurcation, i.e., if the divine initiative has nothing to do with death, anxiety, conscience, and historical-cultural factors then one has to postulate a supernatural "thing" to summon man to authenticity. Yet this is the last thing that Macquarrie wishes to be accused of as evidenced by his affirmation that man's ". . . quest for the sense of existence is met by the gift of a sense for existence." Principles, p. 75. That is to say, the divine initiative can only start to operate precisely because man has the capacity to yearn for and appropriate it as evidenced by his attempt to look "beyond" himself for succour. Therefore, Macquarrie can say "in so far as it [divine initiative] brings him [man] a new understanding both of himself and of the wider being within which he has his being (for the understanding of these is correlative); then it may be called 'revelation.'" Ibid. We agree with Macquarrie that the understanding of man and of Being is correlative, but we believe that he has not made that correlation explicitly clear.

Macquarrie will never wish to neglect the importance of the creativity provided by death, anxiety, conscience, and historical-cultural factors, yet his present formulation of the divine initiative does not seem to consider adequately the role and contribution of death, anxiety, conscience, and historical-cultural factors, or at least the correlation is a bit vague and not sufficiently explicit. We hope to make explicit the correlation--which is a key word--of Being's creativity and that of death, anxiety, conscience, and historical-cultural factors.[3]

We begin by asking what is distinctive in Being's creativity and how that is different from the creativity of death, anxiety, conscience, and historical-cultural factors. Is there a definitive answer to this question? If there is, has Macquarrie taken care of the discontinuity caused by two types of creativity, viz., Being's letting-be and that of anxiety, death, conscience, and historical-cultural factors? Naturally, Macquarrie would insist that there is no discontinuity in his understanding of Being's creativity and that of death, anxiety, conscience, and historical-cultural factors, but in his desire to stress the divine initiative, a desire caused by his belief that man on the whole seems to need some "outside" Power to jettison him into the orbit of authenticity, he seems to have overlooked the importance and place of death, anxiety, conscience, and historical-cultural factors as forms of creativity. Thus it is our task to indicate a way in which Being's creativity and that of death, anxiety, conscience, and historical-cultural factors can be more fully and more explicitly made clear.

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[3] "Conscience . . . can at best awaken in fallen man the awareness of a lost possibility of being. It can disclose to him his ontological or existential possibility of authenticity. But it cannot by any means empower him to choose that possibility. It cannot bring before him the existentiell or ontical possibility of authenticity for which he can decide. And it now appears that only some Power, grace, or graciousness of Being outside man, some Power not fallen as man is fallen, can bring to man this concrete possibility of regaining his authentic being. And yet even such a Power could only hold that existentiell possibility because it falls within the horizon of man's existential possibility of authenticity, and can therefore be appropriated by man and made his own." An Existentialist Theology, pp. 148-149.

Here the correlation between Being's creativity (some Power outside man) and that of conscience is explicit, i.e., Being's creativity complements or makes more adequate the creativity of conscience, but when Macquarrie stresses the primordiality of Being's letting-be he seems to have overlooked the contribution of conscience, death, anxiety, and historical-cultural factors as forms of creativity, a course of action that goes hand in glove with Macquarrie's understanding of Being's letting-be and that of conscience, death, anxiety, and historical-cultural factors, though it has not been made explicitly clear by Macquarrie.

We will try to show how the divine initiative, which makes possible Being's self-offering, must be related to death, anxiety, conscience, and historical-cultural factors. That is to say, if the divine initiative is not related to death, anxiety, conscience, and historical-cultural factors then it is self-subsistent and has nothing to do with men.[4] If so then it becomes a "supernatural thing," having nothing in common with man or the world that we live in, resulting in a bifurcation of reality, the very thing that Macquarrie would disown. Let us then try to construct or suggest a way which will do justice to Being's creativity and that of death, anxiety, conscience, and historical-cultural factors, and their correlation.[1]

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[4] For example, anxiety constantly reminds man of a certain unmanageability and uncontrollability in life as evidenced by the fact that the interdependence and inter-relationships of any man living anywhere are there no matter how or where he lives. Even the most ascetic mystic is related to his fellowmen, environment, and everything one can think of. The very air he breathes--and he has to breathe!--relates him directly or indirectly to his environment and fellowmen. There is no other choice; man cannot escape relation. In this intridate network of interrelationships and interdependence anxiety is an inescapable factor; it is an ontological sine qua non. No man can tear it away from his breast, so to speak. Therefore, to

Let us assert the conviction that revelation needs death, anxiety, conscience, and historical-cultural factors before it can be meaningful to man, and that in turn death, anxiety, conscience, and historical-cultural factors need revelation to complement them and make them more adequate. The understanding of revelation and death, anxiety, conscience, and historical-cultural factors must be correlated, else one ends up with bifurcation. Macquarrie might wish to affirm the

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accept this inevitable fact is already to move toward authenticity, and in this sense anxiety, incessantly reminding man that he is not the end of living and is not an inevitable and irremovable reality, when accepted acts as a form of creativity, because it makes him see life as it should be seen. Thus anxiety's creativity must be related to that of Being's letting-be.

Jesus once said: "Therefore do not be anxious about tomorrow, for tomorrow will be anxious for itself. Let the day's own trouble be sufficient for the day." Matthew 6:34. Jesus called man to accept anxiety as an inevitable conditio sine qua non from which man cannot escape. Thus why be anxious about your life, food, drink, etc. Life is like that! Accept anxiety! So when man truly confronts anxiety he begins to realize that he is not the end of himself, that there is a certain uncontrollability and unmanageability in life, that he is inevitably and continuously related to God, other Daseins, and the environment, even though he might not be conscious of it, and that he cannot tear anxiety from his being. To realize this is to embrace authenticity, and in this sense anxiety, as a form of creativity, must be correlated to that of Being's letting-be, else the latter becomes a "supernatural thing" with no relation to man and reality. To fail to do this is to bifurcate reality.

fact that, Being's letting-be being more adequate, is needed to help man to attain to authenticity, but if he fails to correlate Being's creativity to that of death, anxiety, conscience, and historical-cultural factors then he opens himself to possible criticism of having bifurcated reality, an accusation he might never wish to be guilty of. He might argue that death, anxiety, conscience, and historical-cultural factors are forms of Being's creativity though inadequate as far as most men are concerned, but he must also see to it that they are correlated to Being's letting-be. That he does so is evident from the numerous hints one comes across in his writings,[5] but our criticism of Macquarrie centres on the adequacy or depth of his attempt to correlate them. Therefore, we wish to bring the correlation between Being's creativity and that of death, anxiety, conscience, and historical-cultural factors into focus, hoping to remedy Macquarrie's unintentional defect in not fully making that correlation explicit. Let us begin with the primordiality of Being's creativity and then try to correlate that to death, anxiety, conscience, and historical-cultural factors as forms of Being's creativity.

The primordiality of Being's creativity is taken to mean the prior enabling condition of anything that may be.[6] Among other things, it is responsible for human existence with its existentialia, e.g., anxiety, moods, conscience, understanding, death, etc., which are in their own right forms of Being's creativity. When Macquarrie speaks of the divine initiative which is responsible for Being's self-gifting, he really wants to say that, in conjunction with death, anxiety, conscience, and historical-cultural factors as forms of Being's creativity, the divine initiative is the "concentrated effort or impetus" in helping man to achieve authenticity. This it does personally, i.e., through revelatory figures. So two things need to be discussed, viz., the relation of Being's creativity and that of death, anxiety, conscience, and historical-cultural factors and the personal in the divine initiative. We need only deal with the former as the latter had already been dealt with.[7]

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[5] Supra, pp. 189-200 where Macquarrie explains the transition from existence to Being in terms of the transition from the ontological to the ontic which is possible precisely (a) the ontic springs from the ontological, and (b) man is able to respond to Being's invitational pull.

[6] Supra, pp. 253-256.

The divine initiative, which makes possible Being's self-disclosure, is the added impetus to death, anxiety, conscience, and historical-cultural factors and utilizes these as forms of Being's creativity in assisting man to attain to authenticity. Death, conscience, anxiety, and historical-cultural factors are the continuous operational forms of Being's creativity, and together they and the revelational forms of Being's creativity make possible the existentiellization of the ontological possibilities. That is to say, in a revelatory experience man is not given a new and different set of possibilities nor is man's former constitution abrogated,[8] but he is assisted to appropriate the existentiell possibility for authenticity.

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[7] Supra, pp. 266-282.

[8] Supra, pp. 224-241, where we saw how Being's creativity is responsible for the organization and refocalization of possibilities so as to yield an integrative or master possibility. Also see supra, pp. 189-190 where we discussed Macquarrie's idea of the existentiellization of the ontological possibilities.

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This means that in a revelatory experience man is helped to "control" anxiety, death, conscience, and historical-cultural factors to the point where he will not run to the they-self for security. In this way we see how Being's revelational creativity is correlated to that of death, anxiety, conscience, and historical-cultural factors.

Let us continue our attempt to construct or suggest a way to correlate Being's creativity and that of death, anxiety, conscience, and historical-cultural factors by using the way Heidegger understood authentic possibility and *das Man*. Man is inevitably found in a community which usually comprises inauthentic men, who have not realized their authentic being. To realize his authentic self man must start from where he is, viz., among the inauthentic selves. Analogously, if the divine initiative is to operate and is to have meaning for man, it must begin with existence, with its *existentialia*, e.g., anxiety, conscience, moods, etc. It cannot be of a different order. At best it can act as an augmenting catalyst to speed up the process of becoming whole. It is "primordial" in the sense that it is more "concentrated," more "accelerating"; it cannot differ in kind, only in degree and intensity, else it results in a bifurcation of reality. That Macquarrie agrees with this is rather obvious;[9] our complaint is that he has not *fully* clarified this point. By not adequately

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[9] We cite one of the numerous hints Macquarrie leaves in his writings concerning the correlation of Being's creativity and that of death, conscience, anxiety, and historical-cultural factors: ". . . a continuity between the quest for sense and grace that arises out of man's existence, and the directionally opposite quest man to which experiences of grace and revelation bear witness . . . ." *Principles*, p. 78.

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correlating Being's creativity and that of death, anxiety, conscience, and historical-cultural factors Macquarrie's exposition of his understanding of existence is not fully utilized in his effort to explicate revelation in the sense that his redders fail *immediately* to see how his understanding of Being's letting-be is intimately related to the *existentialia* of existence.

However, we can see that it is Macquarrie's desire to assert the point that whatever possibilities may arise, they arise precisely because they are *native to man*; the quest for authenticity is an ontological possibility, i.e., ontologically there is nothing to hinder man from achieving wholesomeness.[10] Therefore, Being's creativity and that of death, anxiety, conscience, and historical-cultural factors are *correlative powers to help man to realize his ontological possibilities*. Let us get at this point from another angle.

Macquarrie acknowledges that death poses the ontic possibility for authenticity. Death summons us to wholesomeness, and in this sense it becomes creative of selfhood. The same principle applies to conscience, which makes man dissatisfied with the contentment of a life dominated by the they-self, and thus turns man to search for his authentic being.[11] In this way death, conscience, and anxiety are not only forms of creativity but also forms of Being's creativity, *continuously operating in man*. They are Being's ways of helping man to realize or existentiellize his ontological possibilities. Macquarrie wishes to say that since they are impersonal in the sense that they are

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[10] *Supra*, p. 188.

[11] *Supra*, pp. 183-209.

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just "there," something more personal like revelation (Being's self-disclosure as manifested in a revelatory figure) is needed to help man to actualize his ontological possibility. This brings us to the two central theses of our dissertation which will in their own way help us to see the thrust of the above paragraphs.

II. Two Central Theses

Underlying our dissertation are two fundamental theses, which form the foundation of our writing. They are so central to our dissertation that without them our dissertation can be compared to a building built on sand. Thus it is most appropriate that we mention them briefly at this juncture.

(a) This-worldly attitude. It is now generally acknowledged that few educated people would think of the world in terms of the natural and supernatural as if they were two distinct realms.[12] In other words, there is a strong tendency to shy away from bifurcating reality. Naturally, such a change of attitude in conceptualizing reality has bearing on the doing of theology. Thus our dissertation started with a brief description of the world we know, with a view to seeing how the doing of theology is affected by the world we know. The brief description of the world we know can be termed this-worldly.

A this-worldly earth affirms, among other things, that if religion were to be relevant it must express itself in terms and ways that are "earth-bound." For example, in days gone by the thought of a just reward in heaven was sufficient to encourage a man in trouble to plough on, fully believing that God will compensate him for undergoing sore afflictions. Nowadays, a man undergoing similar afflictions will ask for his compensation now, and thoughts of a just reward in heaven do not seem to possess the same compensatory allurement as they did previously.[13]

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[12] A similar emphasis of this thought is seen in the way the human body is thought of by physicians. It is now commonly acknowledged that the human body should be regarded psychosomatically and not just bodily *per se* and mentally *per se*, as if the body and mind were two different entities.

A "this-worldly" outlook looks for spiritual value insofar as they can be discerned in and through this world, i.e., if the "supernatural" were to have any meaning it must be able to impinge man where he is in his world. To express the sentiment differently: the divine must be able to communicate with the human if the former were to impress itself on the latter.

A "this-worldly" attitude is actually nothing new, because the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation is a good paradigmatic illustration of the divine communicating with the human in human terms. The Incarnation shows the supernatural realm tabernacling with the natural in such wise that the former is discerned in and through the latter. It also shows that the supernatural and the natural are not two separate entities, but rather the former is the latter's understanding in depth of what is commonly known as the sacred.[14]

Furthermore, a "this-worldly" attitude wishes to affirm the

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[13] A good example is seen in the way the American Blacks act today. In former days they used to think of their rewards in heaven as seen in the Negro spirituals, but right now they ask for their compensation here and now.

[14] See Otto's concept of the "holy," pp. 257ff.

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fact that if salvation were to be intelligently and intelligibly understood it must be understood within the framework of the human. In other words, if salvation were to have meaning it must be grounded in human life. Nothing alien to existence must be introduced, else salvation can become an "un-human" experience in the sense that the salvific experience has been anchored in something other than human. If the words like "God," "grace," "salvation," "sanctification," etc., were to mean anything to man they must have been born from human experience, so to speak. Of course this does not mean humanizing God in the sense of making God in man's image. We are not interested in playing God, but we are very keen to see that any attempt to explain theological concepts is and must be grounded in a human context, though the process must necessarily have been initiated by God.

The benefits of such an approach are numerous. Let us just cite one. From experience we know the intricate problems involved in explaining theological concepts and religious experiences. How does one explain revelation, assuming that revelation can be explained? Faced with the depressing immensity of our problem we are tempted to draw on "supernatural" knowledge to "explain" revelation, as if "supernatural" knowledge is totally alien to and different from "natural" knowledge.[15] However, if this unjustifiable resort to "supernatural" knowledge is denied, i.e., if we refuse to dichotomize knowledge into two separate and distinct realms then we are faced with the Herculean task of attempting to explain this highly complex thing called "revelation," by using the available conceptual tools found in our common knowledge.

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[15] *Supra*, pp. 211-216.

Such an approach then involves us in endeavouring to explicate a revelatory experience in terms of ordinary human knowledge. No attempt is made to fall back on "revealed" knowledge as a safety valve to explain away areas of knowledge that are still unknown, or at least unfamiliar to us. It is from this context that careful attempts were made to distinguish the ontological from the ontical, with a view to seeing how the ontic can be the "realm" where revelation can be discerned. Thus we spoke of the ontologico-existential and the ontico-existentiell possibilities,[16] being very eager to state that both sets of possibilities are grounded in existence and that the latter are available precisely because they are germane to existence. To "see" revelation, then, is to have our possibilities so re-organized and re-focalized that we can "see" God's self-disclosure with the help of revelatory figures. The mention of revelatory figures brings us to our second thesis.

(b) It was seen that existentialia like anxiety, death, conscience, and historical-cultural factors are forms of creativity which can influence and assist man to drag himself from the they-self and to embrace authenticity. At least they can make man aware of what he ought and wishes to do. For example, conscience calls man to his authenticity; man hears the call and wishes to answer the call of conscience. Yet, somehow, man feels impotent to rise to the occasion, viz., that of leaving the womb of the they-self and of embracing authenticity. In this sense anxiety, death, conscience, and historical-cultural factors are existentialia that are just "there." They are forms of creativity, but they are inadequate to assist man to embark on the course to authenticity.

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[16] Supra, pp. 185-194.

We have argued that most men need revelatory figures to jettison them into the orbit of authenticity, and through their personal contacts and influence revelatory figures succeed where anxiety, conscience, death, and historical-cultural factors fail to push man away from the womb of das Man, as it were. For example, a revelatory figure like Jesus Christ so influenced his disciples that they became convinced of his divinity, a conviction that led them to leave the influence of their fellowmen and become Christians. They, then, in turn shared their personal experience with others and "won them for Jesus Christ." That this "sharing" activity can go on must be due to the primordial (most original) influence of Jesus Christ, a revelatory figure who inspires man to forsake das Man.

In this sense revelatory figures become the personal way through which man's possibilities are so reorganized and re-focalized that they form a meaningful pattern, resulting in man being made authentic. In other words, man's existential possibilities have been existentiellized to the extent that he regards the revelatory figures as his way or bridge to authenticity, because they were the means through which he achieves his wholesomeness.

With these two central theses in mind we have tried to explicate Macquarrie's understanding of revelation as viewed from his existential-ontological perspective and, in the process of doing so, we called on the help of Heidegger's philosophy as a way to enlighten further Macquarrie's basic philosophical-theological premises, with a view to spelling out Macquarrie's understanding of man and the way man can be led to "see" revelation.

III. Final Remarks

We would like to conclude our dissertation with three brief remarks. To begin with, Macquarrie's understanding of revelation from his existential-ontological perspective is adequate, though certainly not perfect, because it considers all the ingredients in the recipe, as it were. We are treated to an examination of God-as-Being, the various structures of existence, the network of interdependence and interrelationships involving man's relationship to himself, God, other Daseins, and the world, and an "epochal" occasion which seems to be able to summon man from the unforgetfulness of Being, or, to express the same conviction quite differently, to lure man to attain to authenticity.

(1) God-as-Being was taken to mean the primordial creativity that is the ἀρχή of all forms of creativity, i.e., the prior enabling condition or dynamis of anything that may be. As such it is the ultimate principle of concretion, providing means to the multitudinous entities to become, supplying the integrative order to insure continuity and cohesion in the universal process of becoming. Being, while "primordial," is not removed from the beings, is not the uncarved block. On the contrary, it is discerned in the beings which

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participate in Being. Applied to man and his becoming whole, this means that the divine initiative supplements and makes more complete man's quest for the meaning of the sense of existence. To explain this assertion Macquarrie delineated his understanding of existence.

Man is possibility, not a fixed entity. He is in the process of becoming whole; his existence is a bid for self-delineation and self-definition. Therefore it is only natural that he should utilize all sorts of assistance to enable him to become authentic. In this quest for wholesomeness, and because his existence is possibility, man faces various ways of being. This leads us to the four sets of tension experienced by man. Undergoing these tensions makes him realize that he needs some added impetus in Being's self-gifting as discerned in the _fascinosum_ and the _appetitus_, and, in particular, in certain "epochal" occasions which exude Being's creativity most focusedly and concentratedly, thereby supplying the added impetus needed by man to orbit him into the realm of authenticity. Operating from Christian premises, Macquarrie finds in the Christ-event the paradigmatic and decisive illustration of Being's self-offering in order to assist man to achieve wholesomeness. This does not imply a passive and spineless contribution on the part of man. On the contrary, man has to cooperate with the divine initiative to bring about his authenticity. To see his coming into integration or wholesomeness is to "see" revelation, which then grows in a society, involving a man's relationship to the world and his fellowmen. We believe that such a treatment of revelation is adequate, though certainly not perfect. It also gives us a chance to remain what we are by race and culture and be a Christian at the same time. This leads us to our second brief remark.

(2) To the embarrassment of the church Christianity has been popularly, though mistakenly, regarded as a western religion by many people. To not a few Orientals becoming a Christian means, among other things, forsaking their Oriental heritage and embracing the Occidental way of living. To what extent missionaries have been responsible for this mistaken notion is a debatable subject and it is beyond the pale of our dissertation, but what is germane to it is the fact that our analysis of Macquarrie's understanding of revelation from his existential-ontological perspective certainly permits an Oriental Christian to hang onto his heritage and remain a Christian at the same time. That is to say, the process of becoming whole or authentic as indicated by the giving and receiving of revelation and as described above applies to the experience of anyone who has had the revelatory experience, whether he happens to be an African, European, or Asian. Of course the formulation of the experience will vary from people to people, but the fundamental experience of becoming whole still holds true for everyone. This might be a minor point to some people, but not to those who have to explicate the meaning and implications of revelation in non-Christian countries.

It is a fact that the Younger Churches face the awesome task of having to develop some indigenous theology to meet the crying needs of the country they come from, assuming that their country is in need of

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some spiritual guidance. What are the factors that must be considered before the native spiritual leaders or theologians can embark on working out an indigenous theology? Certainly one factor that must be taken into account is the foundation of any theological enterprise, i.e., one must have a clear understanding of revelation before he proceeds to construct his theology, because revelation is a basic category of theology. Religion, theology, etc., spring from the giving and receiving of revelation, and as such one must pay special attention to revelation before he can hope to construct his understanding (western or otherwise) of God, church, sacraments, etc. Our analysis of Macquarrie's understanding of revelation viewed from an existential-ontological perspective provides one such avenue from which one can construct an indigenous theology. Of special importance is Macquarrie's emphasis on existence and Being which are two universal concepts widely acknowledged, directly or indirectly but rather inevitably, by all men.

Man cannot escape from existence and ontology. They form the "substance" of his life, as it were. Interestedly or disinterestedly, man has to accept his existence--his very life is a reminder of the fact of existence and its challenges, possibilities, frustrations, joy, etc. Therefore, in some way he must ask the purpose, if any, of living. Why work or why not loaf around? Either way man has already or is in the process of giving his answer, which might change as time goes by. Therefore the stark, stubborn fact of existence stares at every man.

If man fails to escape from existence as long as he is alive, neither can he escape ontology. Everything _is_. Man can evade or try to avoid ontology, but he cannot escape it as long as he lives.

Given these two a prioris, it looks reasonable to work out an understanding of revelation which tries to describe revelation as the moment when man "sees" the transition from existence to Being, the moment when Being's creativity enables man to effect the passage from inauthenticity to authenticity, a course of action that needs man's cooperation. In this sense Macquarrie's understanding of revelation viewed from his existential-ontological perspective holds promise for us who have to do theology in a predominantly non-Christian culture, and at the same time allows us to hold on to our Oriental heritage without having to dehumanize ourselves by denying our cultural facticity. Let us say a bit more on this point.

In Macquarrie's analysis of existence he calls for an unequivocal acceptance of man's facticity. This means a full acceptance of the situation in which man finds himself, the thrownness of man's existence. Among other things, the call to man to accept his facticity involves a complete acceptance of his race, intelligence, sex, cultural-historical heritage, etc. Applied to man becoming whole, this means a serious consideration for and total acceptance of his ontological constitution which includes everything he is and has. To deny him this fact is to dehumanize him. In this sense Macquarrie's understanding of revelation considered from an existential-ontological perspective can be regarded as a "humanizing" enterprise, and as such merits some consideration. We now proceed to see how Macquarrie's understanding of revelation as it is considered within the context of Heidegger's philosophy can further serve us.

(3) In a way we can say that our dissertation can be regarded as a foundation for further probing into the relationships of Christianity to the non-Christian faiths. For example, in what ways can Macquarrie's understanding of revelation help to bridge the gap between Christianity and the non-Christian religions? What are some of the ingredients, if any, that are shared by the non-Christian faiths when it comes to discussing revelation? Is a person ever justified in advocating particularity and exclusivity in his teaching on revelation? These are some important questions that have to be answered, and we believe that our dissertation can be regarded to have provided a foundation, for reasons mentioned above, for further analysis of the Christian faith and its relationships to other faiths. To say anything beyond this is premature and preposterous, if not totally beyond the range of our dissertation. All that we can justifiably claim is the suggestion that our dissertation serves as a foundation for further analyses of the Christian faith and its relationships to the non-Christian religions. In this sense we can say that our dissertation is a modest contribution to the wider concerns of the church as it tries to share its faith with the world and as it tries to humanize mankind, a contribution that is only the beginning of further thinking and exploring.

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